The soul that has no parts
Why should the soul outlast the body it animates? Mendelssohn's case turns on a single claim: what has no parts cannot fall apart, and the soul is simple.
Mendelssohn rebuilds the case for immortality in the language of eighteenth-century rational psychology. Bodies perish by decomposing, their parts coming apart; but the soul, he argues, is simple and without parts, and what has no parts cannot dissolve, so it cannot die as a body does. The whole demonstration rests on this indivisibility. It is a metaphysical argument, not an appeal to scripture — which is its strength and, as Kant would show, its exposed flank: everything hangs on whether simplicity really rules out ceasing to be. Take away that single premise and the proof has nothing left to stand on.
- soul
- immortality
- metaphysics
- substance
- philosophy of mind
- continuity
- change
- divine providence
- immortality of the soul
- religion
Enter a dialogue
- The soul is simple, so it cannot fall apart — but couldn't a simple thing simply blink out of existence rather than decompose?
- What does it mean for how a person faces their own death to be told the soul is the one thing that cannot come apart?
- How is your proof that the soul is indivisible different from merely wanting it to survive?
- To rest immortality on the soul having no parts, what must a reader admit about how much the whole case leans on that one premise?
- For someone who fears death as an ending, what consolation does the soul's simplicity actually offer, and how far does it reach?