PhilosopherFrance

Émilie du Châtelet

Newton's translator, who sided with Leibniz on force

3 works · 208 passages grounded

Lifespan
1706–1749
Also known as
Madame du Châtelet
Wikipedia

The mind

The only complete French translation of Isaac Newton's Principia, his book on motion and gravity, is the one Émilie du Châtelet finished in 1749, the year she died. Almost two-thirds of its second volume is her own commentary. Yet in her book of philosophy she argued that Newton was right about how bodies move but had left physics without foundations, and she took the foundations from Leibniz, Newton's rival over the invention of the calculus.

She came to science through private teachers, because the Paris Académie des sciences, the body that judged and published French science, admitted no women. From 1733 she studied mathematics with Pierre Louis Moreau de Maupertuis, a member of the Académie, and later with Alexis Clairaut, who would work through the Principia with her and see her translation into print. In 1734 Voltaire, the writer who had become her lover, settled at Cirey, her husband's estate, and the two fitted the house with a laboratory. When the Académie set fire as the subject of a prize, she wrote an entry without telling Voltaire. Leonhard Euler won, but in 1739 the Académie printed her essay, the first work by a woman it had published.

Institutions de physique (1740) is where she broke with the Newtonians around her. Physics, she argued, cannot rest on experiment alone. It needs first principles, among them Leibniz's principle of sufficient reason: nothing is so rather than otherwise without a reason why. She also defended hypotheses. Newton had declared that he framed none, and his followers used the line to ban them; she answered that the greatest scientists, Newton included, had advanced by framing them. Samuel Koenig, who tutored her from 1739, later claimed the book's Leibnizian ideas as his; her draft, written before he arrived, already contained them.

The sharpest dispute was over force. Followers of Descartes measured a moving body's force by its mass times its speed; Leibniz by the mass times the square of the speed, a quantity he called vis viva, living force. She sided with Leibniz and publicised the experiments of Willem 's Gravesande, a Dutch physicist, who dropped balls into soft clay and found the dents grew with the square of the speed. In 1741 Jean-Jacques Dortous de Mairan, the Académie's perpetual secretary, answered her book with a printed letter accusing her of misreading him. Her printed reply took his charges one at a time, and Mairan withdrew. The quantity she defended survives in physics as kinetic energy.

Her exclusion was a subject she wrote about. In the preface to her translation of Bernard Mandeville's Fable of the Bees, a satire on vice and prosperity, she asked why in so many centuries no good tragedy, poem or book of physics had come from a woman, and argued for educating women. Her private essay on happiness ranks the love of study above every other passion, and says it matters more to women, who are shut out of every other road to glory.

In his first published work, printed in 1749, Kant took up the debate over living forces and her reply to Mairan; years later he wrote that a woman who disputes about mechanics might as well wear a beard. After her death, six days after the birth of her fourth child, she was remembered chiefly as Voltaire's companion. Two scholarly studies split over whether her thought was her own: Ira Wade's, in 1947, argued that it was, while William Barber's, in 1967, judged it derived from the men around her, Voltaire above all. Recent scholarship has largely taken Wade's side, and reads the Institutions as a work of philosophy in its own right.

Key concepts

What is living force, and how is it different from dead force?

Living force is the force of a body actually moving, and she measures it, with Leibniz, by its mass multiplied by the square of its speed, so a body moving twice as fast has four times the force. Dead force is force held in check: stopped, as far as the senses can tell, without being destroyed. Her essay on fire borrows the pair, comparing fire hidden in a cold body to dead force.

What separates a presumption from a demonstration in her quarrel with Mairan?

A presumption only makes a view likely, and there the standing of the people who hold it can tip the balance. A demonstration shows that the opposite view implies a contradiction, and then nothing else counts. She tells Mairan that if their quarrel rested on presumptions she would gladly concede the advantage, but authority, however it is weighed, does nothing in a question that has become wholly mathematical.

Why does she call the properties of matter mere phenomena?

Because what we perceive in matter, such as weight, or the way a body keeps others out of its place, is how simpler beings appear to us once combined, not something fixed in them. Those simple beings, she argues, could be combined so that a body shows none of the usual properties. So nothing in reason forbids a fire without weight, and only experience can say whether fire weighs.

What is the 'adunation' of bodies that fire works against?

Adunation is the drawing together of a body's parts into one compact mass, which is where cohesion and weight tend. Fire opposes it without pause: acting on bodies and acted on by them, it keeps matter fluid, soft and springy. Take fire away for a moment, she writes, and everything in the universe would be packed solid and soon destroyed. That opposition is why she calls fire one of the Creator's springs.

What does she mean by 'whoever says wise says happy'?

That wisdom is not resignation but skill at being happy. In her dictionary, she writes, the wise and the happy are the same, and wisdom must always keep its counters in hand, like a player at cards, reckoning each pleasure against the pain it brings. The passions are needed for happiness, but they must be made to serve it, and some must be refused entry to the soul altogether.

Themes of the Mind

Concepts that recur together across the corpus held here, gathered into themes and ordered by how much of this philosopher's writing each one occupies.

Reasons, not famous names

When the Académie's perpetual secretary says she has misread him, does his office count for anything? Her answer was that in a question settled by proof, a name, even Newton's, decides nothing.

Authority, she told Mairan, does nothing in a question that has become wholly mathematical, and he, who rebelled so against it, was leaning on Newton's. She cited Bernoulli and Hermann not to impress with famous names but so readers could check their proofs, and she suspected Newton was great enough to adopt Leibniz's view had he examined it. The rule bound her too: she had changed her own mind on reading Bernoulli, and printed an erratum to say so. In the fire essay Descartes appears only as an authority one might lean on, who gave no reason.

  • authority
  • argumentation
  • refutation
  • rhetoric
  • scientific disagreement
  • philosophical debate
  • intellectual honesty
  • correction
  • quotation
  • textual accuracy

What experiment can settle, and what it cannot

Some questions are decided on the scales, some by a contradiction no experiment can rescue, and some, about first principles, hardly at all. Knowing which is which is half of her method.

Whether fire weighs is for experience to teach, she argues, because every property we see in matter is only an appearance arising from simpler beings, and nothing forbids a body that lacks weight. So she weighs iron hot and cold. Where reports conflict, the variation is itself evidence: if fire added weight once, it would add it always. Mechanics is different. Mairan's measure of force supposes springs closed and not closed at once, and what implies a contradiction can never become true, whatever experiments seem to show. On first principles, she concedes, only conjectures and likelihoods are allowed us.

  • experiment
  • experimental philosophy
  • scientific evidence
  • measurement
  • contradiction
  • mathematical physics
  • scientific method
  • limits of knowledge
  • uncertainty
  • empiricism
  • matter theory
  • philosophy of science

Correct the senses, keep the illusions

In the laboratory she trusts an instrument over the hand, and in living she refuses to look behind the scenery. When is an appearance an error to correct, and when is it the varnish on a pleasure?

Our senses say marble is colder than wool, and to learn otherwise people had, as she puts it, to create a being that judges for them: the thermometer. Light and heat, too, are only the ways fire acts on us, not what fire is. Yet the essay on happiness defends the illusions of optics, which do not deceive us but show things as we need to see them for our use, and it owes most pleasures to illusion. The line falls between error, which she calls always harmful where conduct is at stake, and illusion, which fits things to our nature without deceiving us about them.

  • perception
  • illusion
  • sensory knowledge
  • thermometry
  • light and heat
  • optics
  • modes and substance
  • theatrical representation
  • imagination
  • prejudice

A world kept from setting solid

What keeps the universe from settling into one dead, solid mass? Her answer sets weightless fire against weight, and reads the balance between them as a sign of design.

Without fire, she writes, all fluidity and perhaps all elasticity would be banished, everything would be packed solid, and the universe would soon be destroyed. Fire is the perpetual opponent of the cohesion of bodies, the breath of life the Creator spread over his work, almost the soul of the world. Hidden in a body, it is like dead force beside living force: held back, not destroyed. Its power has limits, and she reads them as one of the great proofs of design. Her mechanics keeps the same eye on what acts: force is known by the obstacles it overcomes.

  • fire
  • matter
  • force
  • motion
  • causation
  • gravity
  • weight
  • living force
  • cohesion
  • elasticity
  • natural theology
  • providence
  • natural philosophy

Happiness held in one's own hands

Is happiness a matter of mastering desire, or of choosing which desires to feed? Her test for every passion is how far it leaves a person's happiness in someone else's keeping.

Against the moralists, she holds that we are happy only through satisfied passions and tastes, so passions are what one should ask of God, if one dared ask for anything. Reason does not suppress them; it keeps the accounts. A reasonable person, she writes, should blush not to hold her happiness in her own hand. Love puts it wholly in another's, ambition in other people's, and study in no one's but one's own. That is why she ranks study first, and why it matters most to women, shut out by their condition from every other glory. Regret she calls painful and almost always useless.

  • happiness
  • passion
  • pleasure
  • desire
  • reason
  • love
  • study
  • glory
  • ambition
  • gender and education
  • autonomy
  • regret
  • virtue
  • hope and fear

By the numbers

works held
3
passages traced
208
concepts traced
271
thematic clusters
5

Concepts that travel together

The wheel takes the leading concepts of these writings and shows how often they come up together. The wider the band between two, the more passages speak of both. Among them, most often together: “fire” and “heat”.
Concept co-occurrence, strongest first 8 concepts, joined by 8 pairings. 94 pairings reach beyond these concepts and are not drawn.
ConceptPaired conceptShared passages
fireheat24
firematter18
heatmatter15
living forcemechanics10
happinesspleasure6
happinesslove5
heatmechanics1
lovepleasure1

The arc of a career

A cell's weight is that concept's share of the work's passages, so a column can be read downwards as well as a row across. Densest: happiness in Discourse on Happiness, 68.6%.

Density 0% 68.6%

Concept density per work, chronological 3 works, in the order they were written. 8 concept columns, ranked by total weight. 39 further concepts fall outside the columns shown.
WorkYearhappinessliving forcefireheatmechanicsmatterlovepleasure
Dissertation on the Nature and Propagation of Fire0%0%51.5%47.7%0.8%25.8%0%0%
Réponse à la lettre de M. de Mairan sur la question des forces vives0%63.4%0%0%26.8%0%0%0%
Discourse on Happiness68.6%0%0%0%0%0%25.7%25.7%

Works held

Titles in your language, the original beneath in brackets; “lit.” marks our own translation where no English edition exists. Side chips show which full texts are held.

EARLY — THE ACADÉMIE ESSAY ON FIRE

  1. 1738 Dissertation on the Nature and Propagation of Fire (Dissertation sur la nature et la propagation du feu)

    Written for the Académie des sciences' prize of 1738 and printed by the Académie in 1739, then revised for a separate Paris edition in 1744.

    FR

THE QUARREL OVER LIVING FORCES

  1. 1741 lit. Reply to the Letter of M. de Mairan on the Question of Living Forces Réponse à la lettre de M. de Mairan sur la question des forces vives

    A sequel to her Institutions de physique (1740): Mairan's attack was on that book, and this public letter defends its case for living forces.

    FR

LATE — HAPPINESS & THE LOVE OF STUDY

  1. 1746 Discourse on Happiness (Discours sur le bonheur)

    Unlike her physics, a private essay on how to live, written in the mid-1740s and put into print thirty years after her death.

    FR
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