WorkAkṣapāda Gautama

Nyāya Sūtras

The founding rulebook of Indian logic — how we know, how to argue, when a debate is lost — read with its oldest commentary.

by Akṣapāda Gautama436 passages held

  • Sanskrit, the original language
Original title
Nyāyasūtra
Original language
Sanskrit

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Overview

Two authors share this text. Its root is the Nyāyasūtra, more than five hundred sūtras, terse aphorisms meant to be memorised and explained by a teacher, ascribed to Akṣapāda Gautama, the founder of Nyāya, the Indian school of logic and argument. Around and between them runs the Nyāya-bhāṣya, the oldest surviving commentary on them, written by Vātsyāyana in about the fifth century, and the commentary makes up most of the text. Nobody knows when Gautama lived: estimates for the sūtras run from several centuries before the common era to about 200 CE, and many scholars think the five books grew in layers. The first sūtra names sixteen topics whose correct knowledge leads to the highest good. The list starts with the means of knowledge and the things there are to know, and goes on through doubt and the example to the honest debate, the debate fought only to win, the quibble, and the point at which a debater can be declared beaten. The means of knowledge are four — perception, inference, comparison and reliable testimony — and a full proof has five steps, from the claim through the reason and an example to the conclusion. A skeptic argues that no means of knowledge can be established, since it can come neither before its object, nor after it, nor at the same time. The sūtras reply that his denial falls to the same argument, and that someone who rejects every means of knowledge has nothing left to deny with. Nāgārjuna, the second-century Buddhist philosopher, turns the same three-way argument against the logicians, and scholars still debate which of the two texts answers the other. Vātsyāyana claims that the whole inquiry is ānvīkṣikī, "investigation", which the Arthaśāstra, the old Indian manual of statecraft, had listed as the fourth of the four sciences, beside the Vedas, trade and government. Later Dignāga, a Buddhist logician, attacked Vātsyāyana's reasoning, and Uddyotakara wrote a further commentary, the Nyāyavārttika, to defend it. The text closes on a verse in which Vātsyāyana says that the Nyāya had revealed itself to the sage Akṣapāda, best of speakers, and that he has set out this commentary on it.

Key concepts

What is a means of knowledge in Nyāya?

A means of knowledge, pramāṇa, is a reliable road to a true cognition. The sūtras name four: perception, when a sense meets its object; inference, from a sign to what it signals; comparison, learning a thing through its likeness to something known; and testimony, the word of a reliable person. Every other topic in the book is tested by these four.

What are the five steps of a proof?

A full proof has five members: the claim, the reason, an example, the application of the example to the case, and the conclusion. Vātsyāyana's commentary illustrates them with the claim that sound is not eternal, because it is produced, like a pot. Stating all five lets an opponent see exactly where an argument stands or fails.

What is the difference between vāda, jalpa and vitaṇḍā?

They are three kinds of debate. Vāda is the honest one, where both sides use means of knowledge to find the truth. Jalpa is fought to win and allows quibbles and tricks. Vitaṇḍā is jalpa without a thesis of one's own: the debater only attacks. The sūtras define all three and say what each may and may not use.

What is a fallacious reason, a hetvābhāsa?

It is a reason that looks like a reason but proves nothing, a 'semblance of a reason'. The sūtras sort them into kinds, among them the reason that wanders, fitting the conclusion and its opposite alike, and the reason that contradicts the very claim it is meant to support. Spotting one ends an argument as surely as a counterproof.

What is a quibble, chala, in a debate?

A quibble blocks what someone said by pretending they meant something else. The sūtras name three kinds: twisting an ambiguous word, stretching a general statement to cases it never covered, and taking a figure of speech literally. Vātsyāyana's example is the boy with a 'nava' blanket, meant as new, answered as if it meant nine. A quibble refutes nothing, because it never meets the claim.

Themes of the book

What this book returns to, gathered into themes and ordered by how much of the text each one occupies.

How Anything Is Known

Before any argument can be settled, someone has to say what counts as knowing. The sūtras ask which roads lead to knowledge and whether the doubter who denies them all can even speak.

Four roads are named: perception, inference, comparison and the word of a reliable person. Perception is defined strictly, as what arises when a sense meets its object, does not go astray and is not yet put into words. Against the skeptic who says no means of knowledge can be established in time, Gautama replies that the denial needs the very means it denies, and that a means of knowing, like a lamp's light, shows itself while showing other things.

  • perception
  • inference
  • epistemology
  • testimony
  • knowledge
  • cognition
  • doubt
  • evidence
  • sense perception
  • time

Arguing for Truth, or for Victory

People argue to find out what is so, and they argue to win. The sūtras ask what separates the two, and whether the second may ever serve the first.

The honest debate, vāda, works with means of knowledge and reasoning and sets out its case in five steps. Beside it stand the debate fought to win, which may use quibbles and tricks, and the pure attack, which defends no thesis at all. Gautama catalogues the tricks and the fallacious reasons, and the points at which a debater is beaten, and still allows the contest for victory one use: guarding a hard-won truth, as thorns guard a seedling.

  • argumentation
  • debate
  • fallacies
  • logic
  • language
  • figurative language
  • interpretation
  • classification

A Self to Be Freed

If pain is what we want to be rid of, something must be there to be rid of it. The sūtras ask what that something is and how knowledge, of all things, could set it free.

The self is not the body, the senses or the mind. It is known by its marks, desire, aversion, effort, pleasure, pain and knowing, and by recognition across the senses, as when what one eye saw the other knows again. Its trouble runs in a chain from false knowledge through faults, action and birth to pain, and release, apavarga, is pain's final end, reached when true knowledge cuts the chain at its root.

  • self
  • liberation
  • karma
  • rebirth
  • memory
  • personal identity
  • desire
  • suffering
  • body
  • embodiment
  • mind
  • materialism
  • consciousness

Within this work

passages held
436
distinct concepts
268
by passages held, corpus-wide
#169

What this book thinks together

The wheel takes this book’s leading concepts and shows how often they come up together. The wider the band between two, the more of its passages speak of both. Among them, most often together: “epistemology” and “perception”.
Concept co-occurrence, strongest first 8 concepts, joined by 25 pairings. 80 pairings reach beyond these concepts and are not drawn.
ConceptPaired conceptShared passages
epistemologyperception35
inferenceperception35
causationperception33
causationinference31
epistemologyinference31
perceptionself17
argumentationinference16
causationepistemology14
causationself11
inferenceself10
causationliberation8
epistemologylanguage7
liberationself7
argumentationepistemology6
inferencelanguage6
languageperception6
argumentationlanguage5
argumentationperception5
causationlanguage5
epistemologyliberation5
epistemologyself5
inferenceliberation4
argumentationself2
liberationperception2
argumentationcausation1

Works held

The author's work in order, this book marked in place. Your-language title first, the original beneath it where the two differ; side chips show which full texts are held.

  1. Nyāya Sūtras (Nyāyasūtra) you are here SA
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