Education for equal virtue
Can an education that trains girls to please ever make them virtuous? For Wollstonecraft, the answer decides whether women can act as responsible human beings—or whether marriage will keep them dependent ornaments.
Wollstonecraft attacks Rousseau, Fordyce, and Gregory for treating girls as ornaments rather than agents of virtue. She insists that reason and character require the same moral standard for women and men, so education must cultivate judgment, reflection, and independence instead of vanity, concealment, and dependence on a husband. Her target is socialization, not female nature: an agreeable companion cannot become an autonomous person through training designed to please. Published in January 1792, the 87,000-word book turned domesticity into a political question and made equality answerable to education.
- virtue
- education
- reason
- gender
- morality
- rationality
- authority
- duty
- autonomy
- marriage
- power
- character
- sensibility
- independence
- intellect
- equality
- affection
- socialization
- dignity
- nature
- judgment
- domesticity
- gender roles
- vanity
- reflection
- intellectual development
- human nature
- justice
- prejudice
- dependency
Enter a dialogue
- When a girl is trained to please rather than judge, how would you recover her capacity for virtue?
- If virtue has one standard for everyone, why should education ignore differences between the sexes?
- To make women capable of virtue, which comforts of dependence must a household stop calling natural?
- Where does cultivated sensibility end and the training of female submission begin?
- Rousseau makes domestic training sound natural; what in that argument should a just education refuse?