EssayistFrance

Michel de Montaigne

A doubting judge who took himself as his subject

1 work · 2,286 passages grounded

Lifespan
1533–1592
School
Skepticism
Wikipedia

The mind

Around 1576 a retired magistrate from near Bordeaux had a medal engraved with his age and two mottoes in the spirit of the ancient Sceptics, the school that answered every argument with an equal and opposite one. The first was a Greek word for holding back one's judgement. The second, in French, asked what he knew. France had been at war with itself over religion since 1562, Catholics against Protestants, and each side was sure enough of God's will to kill for it. Michel de Montaigne spent the rest of his life asking how much any human being is entitled to be sure of.

He came to the question as a lawyer. By 1557 he sat as a judge, first in a tax court at Périgueux and then in the Parlement of Bordeaux, the region's high court of appeal. There he formed an intimate friendship with Étienne de La Boétie, a humanist poet two years older, which lasted until La Boétie's death in August 1563. Montaigne later wrote the essay "Of Friendship" about him. In 1570 he sold his seat. On his thirty-eighth birthday, 28 February 1571, he withdrew to a library in a tower on his estate, and within a year he had begun to write.

The book he wrote there, the Essays (Essais), takes one ordinary man — himself — as its subject. Its title comes from the French verb essayer, to try or to test, and each chapter tests his judgement on something: custom, death, friendship, cruelty, God. He said he studied himself more than any other subject, and what he found was a judgement pushed about by habit, health and mood. The conclusion he drew was practical: he offered his opinions as what he believed, not as what others should believe, and he ranked cruelty as the worst of the vices. He argued that burning an accused witch alive set too high a price on a guess. In "Of Cannibals" he described three Tupinambá men from Brazil who were at Rouen in 1562, where the twelve-year-old king, Charles IX, talked with them. They were puzzled that armed, bearded men obeyed a boy, and that some Frenchmen begged at the doors of others who were gorged.

His scepticism is argued most fully in the longest chapter, "Apology for Raymond Sebond". At his father's request he had translated the Natural Theology of Sebond, a Catalan theologian who set out to prove the Christian faith by reason, and published it in 1569. The "Apology" defends Sebond by taking apart the confidence of reason itself. Scholars disagree about where that leaves his religion. Richard Popkin, the historian of scepticism, read it as fideism: reason cannot prove the faith, so faith must stand on its own. Others point to the places where Montaigne holds firm convictions and doubt that "sceptic" fits him at all.

He did not stay in the tower. Elected mayor of Bordeaux in 1581 while he was travelling in Italy, he was re-elected in 1583 and served until 1585. As mayor he stayed loyal to the Catholic king, Henri III, while keeping on good terms with the Protestant leader, Henri of Navarre. In 1588 the Catholic League, the militant Catholic party, drove Henri III out of Paris, and a duke loyal to the League had Montaigne put in the Bastille. He was released the same day. He spent his last years writing additions in the margins of his copy of the 1588 edition, lengthening the book by about a third, and died at his château in September 1592.

Descartes answered Montaigne's doubts in his Discourse on Method (1637), borrowing from the Essays without naming their author. Antoine Arnauld and Pierre Nicole, the logicians of Port-Royal Abbey, condemned him as scandalous. In 1676 the Catholic Church put the Essays on the Index of Prohibited Books, and his influence in France faded for fifty years. In the late twentieth century the political theorist Judith Shklar called him the first modern liberal, because he put cruelty first among the vices.

Key concepts

What does suspending judgement mean for Montaigne?

Suspending judgement means withholding assent where the reasons on each side balance, instead of forcing a verdict the evidence has not earned. Montaigne took the practice from the ancient sceptics, who met every argument with an equal and opposite one. It is not a refusal to act: he still chose, served and lived by his conclusions, but he held them as provisional and open to the next trial.

Why ask 'What do I know?' instead of saying 'I know nothing'?

Because 'I know nothing' is itself a claim to know something, and so defeats itself, while a question asserts nothing. By making his motto a question, Montaigne kept doubt from hardening into one more dogma, the fault he found in every school that claimed certainty. A question also stays open as a thesis cannot: it has to be put again to each new opinion, his own included.

What does Montaigne mean by presumption?

Presumption is the human habit of overrating ourselves, and Montaigne calls it our natural and original disease. It shows whenever people set themselves above the animals, above other peoples and above the evidence of their own weakness. He treats it as the root of dogmatism, because it lets a mind take its guesses for knowledge, and of cruelty, because it lets one people treat another's ways as barbarous.

What does it mean to put cruelty first among the vices?

It means treating the deliberate infliction of suffering as the worst thing a person can do, the vice to be feared before all others. For Montaigne the ordering has consequences: punishment must stay within what is truly known, and any conviction that licenses torment is the first to be doubted. Judith Shklar later called him the first modern liberal for exactly this ordering.

What does 'the whole form of the human condition' mean?

It means that every person, however ordinary, carries the entire human condition within them. Montaigne used the claim to license a book about one unremarkable man, and it also works as a check on presumption: no one who studies a single human being honestly can go on believing themselves a different kind of creature from the rest, or another people less human than their own.

What is the back-shop of the mind?

The back-shop is a private room kept behind the public one, where a person's freedom and judgement remain their own. Montaigne's word is arrière-boutique, the room behind a shop that no customer enters. It lets someone serve family, office and friends fully without handing any of them the whole self, and it is what a retreat from the world was meant to protect, not a refuge from duty.

Themes of the Mind

Concepts that recur together across the corpus held here, gathered into themes and ordered by how much of this philosopher's writing each one occupies.

What do I know? Doubt as a way of living

Can a person act, believe and judge others while holding back from certainty? The answer decides whether doubt is a paralysis, or the discipline that keeps a mind honest about what it has actually earned.

The mottoes on Montaigne's medal name a practice rather than a doctrine: hold back judgement, and keep asking what you know. He does not claim that nothing can be known, which would be one more certainty; he asks the question and lets it stand. What follows is a way of holding opinions: as his own, offered rather than imposed, and open to the next day's experience. Whether the doubt finally rests in faith is disputed, since some readers find fideism in it and others find convictions he never gave up. The habit is the point: a judgement kept in use because it is never trusted outright.

  • skepticism
  • judgment
  • knowledge
  • reason
  • religion

Certainty, cruelty and the price of a guess

How sure must a person be before they may kill or torment someone for what they believe? For a country at war over God's will, the answer measured every conviction by what it was prepared to do.

Montaigne wrote through a civil war in which each side's certainty licensed killing, and he drew the line where the harm is greatest: cruelty is the worst of the vices. His case against burning an accused witch alive is an argument about knowledge. No human conclusion about hidden things is sure enough to destroy a person on its strength. Doubt here is not indifference; it is a limit on what a belief may do to a body. The later reading of him as the first modern liberal starts from exactly this ordering of the vices.

  • justice
  • war
  • suffering

Who is the barbarian? Custom seen from outside

What would a society look like to people who owe none of its habits any loyalty? The question turns the word barbarian back on those who use it, and asks how much of their own customs anyone can see at all.

Custom works best where it goes unnoticed, and Montaigne's device for noticing it is the stranger's eye. The three Tupinambá men at Rouen were not puzzled by anything exotic; they were puzzled that armed men obeyed a boy, and that the gorged lived beside the begging. Seen from outside, the ordinary looks arbitrary and the charge of barbarism can be turned around. Montaigne does not conclude that every custom is as good as another. He concludes that a people's own practices are the ones it has examined least, and that each calls barbarous whatever is not its own usage.

  • custom
  • nature
  • honor

A self that will not hold still

If a person's judgement shifts with habit, health and mood, what in them can be relied on, promised or repented? At stake is whether an honest self-portrait finds a character, or only a sequence of passing states.

Studying himself more than any other subject, Montaigne found no fixed centre to report: a judgement pushed about by habit, by the body's condition, by the humour of the hour. He paints, in his own phrase, not being but passing. The discovery ends neither in despair nor in a demand for iron consistency. It makes him a careful witness who records the change instead of hiding it, and a sceptic of anyone claiming a constancy no human being has. Each person, he held, bears the whole form of the human condition, so the shifting self he recorded is everyone's.

  • self-knowledge
  • human nature
  • emotion
  • imagination

Learning to live in a mortal body

Is the art of living something philosophy can teach, or do the body, pleasure and ageing teach it better? The answer decides whether wisdom means rising above nature or learning to follow it well.

Montaigne took up the ancient view that to philosophize is to learn to die, then tested it on himself, ill, ageing, pleased and afraid, and trusted less and less the doctrines that asked him to steel himself against nature. Ordinary people, he noticed, die with a simplicity the philosophers might envy. Pleasure is not the enemy of virtue but part of its material, taken with measure; the body is not the mind's prison but its ground; and experience, not the library, is the final teacher. Wisdom becomes the skill of living one's own life well.

  • nature
  • pleasure
  • moderation
  • embodiment
  • aging
  • desire
  • death

Given wholly, lent carefully: friend and office

How much of oneself does a person owe to others: to a friend, to a city, to a party at war? The answer separates the one bond that takes a person entire from the duties that may borrow them but never own them.

Two relations mark out what Montaigne owed to others. The friendship with La Boétie was one self given wholly to another, a bond he could explain by nothing beyond the two people it joined. Public office was the opposite case: he served as a judge and as mayor of Bordeaux, loyal to the Catholic king and on good terms with the Protestant leader, while keeping a back room of the mind where his freedom and judgement stayed his own. Between the two lies his account of loyalty in a divided country, where the hard thing was to take a side without losing one's judgement.

  • friendship
  • prudence
  • virtue

By the numbers

works held
1
passages traced
2,286
concepts traced
1,592
thematic clusters
5

Concepts that travel together

The wheel takes the leading concepts of these writings and shows how often they come up together. The wider the band between two, the more passages speak of both. Among them, most often together: “courage” and “death”.
Concept co-occurrence, strongest first 8 concepts, joined by 27 pairings. 87 pairings reach beyond these concepts and are not drawn.
ConceptPaired conceptShared passages
couragedeath24
educationvirtue23
couragevirtue22
human naturevirtue17
judgmentself-knowledge17
human natureself-knowledge15
educationjudgment14
judgmentskepticism14
deathvirtue13
human natureskepticism13
self-knowledgeskepticism12
educationself-knowledge9
judgmentvirtue9
deathhuman nature7
educationskepticism6
self-knowledgevirtue6
deathjudgment4
human naturejudgment4
courageeducation3
couragehuman nature3
deatheducation3
deathself-knowledge3
educationhuman nature3
courageself-knowledge2
deathskepticism2
couragejudgment1
skepticismvirtue1

The arc of a career

A cell's weight is that concept's share of the work's passages, so a column can be read downwards as well as a row across. Densest: virtue in The Complete Essays, 9.5%.

Density 0% 9.5%

Concept density per work, chronological A single work. 8 concept columns, ranked by total weight. 86 further concepts fall outside the columns shown.
WorkYearvirtueskepticismdeathself-knowledgeeducationcouragehuman naturejudgment
The Complete Essays9.5%7.4%7%6.5%5.9%5.8%5.7%5.4%

Works held

Titles in your language, the original beneath in brackets; “lit.” marks our own translation where no English edition exists. Side chips show which full texts are held.

THE TOWER — THE FIRST TWO BOOKS

  1. 1580 The Complete Essays (Essais)

    The book Montaigne kept open for the last twenty years of his life, adding to it rather than correcting it, so that later thoughts sit beside earlier ones instead of replacing them.

    FR
Begin a dialogue with Michel de Montaigne

— or wander to another mind

Set two minds against each other

Each of these is a question the two of them answer differently. Choose one and they argue it out, both drawing on the texts held here.