The soul that has no parts
Why should the soul outlast the body it animates? Mendelssohn's case turns on a single claim: what has no parts cannot fall apart, and the soul is simple.
Mendelssohn rebuilds the case for immortality in the language of eighteenth-century rational psychology. Bodies perish by decomposing, their parts coming apart; but the soul, he argues, is simple and without parts, and what has no parts cannot dissolve, so it cannot die as a body does. The whole demonstration rests on this indivisibility. It is a metaphysical argument, not an appeal to scripture — which is its strength and, as Kant would show, its exposed flank: everything hangs on whether simplicity really rules out ceasing to be. Take away that single premise and the proof has nothing left to stand on.
- soul
- immortality
- metaphysics
- substance
- philosophy of mind
- continuity
- change
- divine providence
- immortality of the soul
- religion
Enter a dialogue
- Two colours mixed too finely for the eye to separate remain two, yet we see a third. Why must that third exist only in the one who sees?
- You argue the soul has no parts and so cannot fall apart. Couldn't a partless thing simply vanish without ever coming apart?
- Socrates' friend Cebes suggests God might wipe out the soul by a miracle, then admits this is nearly blasphemy. Why?
- No single syllable has meaning, yet a sentence does. Why can't thinking arise from unthinking parts the way meaning arises from syllables?