WorkThomas Reid

An Essay on Quantity

A country minister tells the Royal Society that pain, beauty and virtue cannot be measured, and that equations about them measure nothing.

by Thomas Reid14 passages held

  • English, the original language, and your language
First published
(aged 38)
Original language
English

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Overview

In 1725 Francis Hutcheson, later professor of moral philosophy at Glasgow, printed formulas for calculating the moral worth of an action from the good it produced and the ability of the person who did it; he dropped them from the fourth edition in 1738 and died in 1746. Two years later Reid argued in the Royal Society's Philosophical Transactions that virtue cannot be calculated at all. He was then minister of New Machar, a country parish near Aberdeen, and the paper was sent in by a Fellow of the society, Henry Miles. It never names Hutcheson; its title says only that it was occasioned by a treatise applying ratios to virtue and merit. Mathematics applies, Reid argues, only where a thing can be measured by a unit of its own kind — doubled, halved or added to, as a length can. Pain, pleasure, beauty and virtue come in degrees, but nobody has a unit for them, so equations about them add no knowledge and only dress up what is already known. He then turns the same test on a quarrel that had occupied mathematicians for decades: whether the force of a moving body varies with its velocity, as Newton's followers held, or with the square of its velocity, as Leibniz's did. Each side, he argues, had simply defined force differently, and no experiment could decide between two definitions.

Key concepts

What does Reid mean by quantity?

Whatever can be measured, and not, as some had said, whatever admits of more and less. A true quantity is made of parts that bear proportion to one another, so it can be added to, subtracted from, doubled or halved. The narrower definition matters because the wider one invited people to apply mathematical reasoning to things that have degrees but cannot be measured.

What is the difference between proper and improper quantity?

Proper quantity is measured by its own kind: a line by known lines, a stretch of time by known times. Reid finds four kinds, extension, duration, number and proportion. Improper quantity, such as velocity, density or force, cannot be measured by itself, so a measure is assigned to it through some related proper quantity, as velocity is measured by the space passed over in a given time.

Why does Reid call mathematical evidence an evidence of its own kind?

Because it belongs only to propositions about things measurable by lines or numbers. Quantity admits a greater variety of exactly definable relations than any other subject, which is why mathematics can follow long trains of reasoning without danger of mistake. Where that condition is missing, as with tastes, pleasures, beauty or most probabilities, the same certainty cannot be had, however mathematical the notation looks.

What quarrel about force does the Essay try to settle?

The long dispute over how to measure the force of a moving body: Newton's followers measured it by velocity, Leibniz's by the square of velocity. Reid argues that force becomes a mathematical quantity only once a definition assigns it a measure. Each side had laid down a different definition and then tried to prove it by experiment, a task that could never succeed, since no definition can be false.

Themes of the book

What this book returns to, gathered into themes and ordered by how much of the text each one occupies.

What Can Be Measured

Which things can mathematics truly reach, and which only look reached by it? The essay answers with one test, a unit of the thing's own kind, and applies it both to virtue and to the force of moving bodies.

Quantity, Reid argues, is what can be measured, not whatever admits of more and less. Extension, duration, number and proportion are measured by their own kind; velocity and force become mathematical only once a definition ties them to one of these. Pain, pleasure, beauty and virtue have degrees but no unit, so equations of merit only ring changes on words. The same test settles a scandal of mechanics: Newton's followers measured force by velocity, Leibniz's by its square, and each side had simply laid down a different definition, which no experiment can overturn, since no definition can be false.

  • measurement
  • quantity
  • force
  • velocity
  • definition
  • philosophy of physics
  • philosophy of mathematics
  • mechanics
  • scientific method
  • pain
  • ethics
  • virtue
  • proportion
  • extension
  • probability
  • mathematical definitions
  • scientific disagreement

Within this work

passages held
14
distinct concepts
29
by passages held, corpus-wide
#802

What this book thinks together

The wheel takes this book’s leading concepts and shows how often they come up together. The wider the band between two, the more of its passages speak of both. Among them, most often together: “force” and “philosophy of physics”.
Concept co-occurrence, strongest first 4 concepts, joined by 5 pairings. 14 pairings reach beyond these concepts and are not drawn.
ConceptPaired conceptShared passages
forcephilosophy of physics5
measurementphilosophy of mathematics5
forcemeasurement4
measurementphilosophy of physics3
forcephilosophy of mathematics1

Works held

The author's work in order, this book marked in place. Your-language title first, the original beneath it where the two differ; side chips show which full texts are held.

  1. 1748 An Essay on Quantity you are here EN
  2. 1764 An Inquiry into the Human Mind on the Principles of Common Sense

    Reid's first book briefly states the case against the theory of ideas that his two later volumes of Essays argue at length.

    EN
  3. 1774 A Brief Account of Aristotle's Logic, with Remarks

    A chapter in another man's book rather than a book of its own, and the fullest account of formal logic that Reid published.

    EN
  4. 1785 Essays on the Intellectual Powers of Man

    The book many scholars now rank as Reid's greatest, and the one that sets out his theory of knowledge in full.

    EN
  5. 1788 Essays on the Active Powers of Man

    Companion to the Intellectual Powers, turning from how we know to how we act; the last of Reid's books.

    EN
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