Known in Advance, Yet Free
If God already knows and has decided what we will do, is anything left for human choice? The treatise takes the worry seriously and denies that there is any contradiction.
Anselm’s answer is that what God foreknows includes the manner of each event, so a free act is foreknown as free; his knowledge cannot be wrong about it, and that is all its necessity amounts to. Predestination is treated the same way, since God predestines as he foreknows. Behind both stands an account of eternity begun decades earlier in the Monologion. God’s present is not a moment in our time but an eternal present in which all times are held at once, much as the present moment contains every place.
- divine foreknowledge
- predestination
- necessity
- modality
- time
- eternity
- free will
- divine causality
- moral responsibility
- justice
Enter a dialogue
- God foreknows that someone will sin, and his knowledge cannot be wrong. Why, on your account, does that not make the sin necessary?
- Just as the present moment contains every place, you write, the eternal present holds every time at once. What becomes of knowing in advance?
- Suppose God has predestined some to be saved: their choices seem settled before they are made. Why does predestination, on your account, force nothing?
- A person worries that if God already knows how their life turns out, their efforts change nothing. What do you answer them?