Kinds of Being and Inference
Can an argument keep its force when its subject changes, and can anything be said without first sorting what kind of thing it is? Across six treatises and ten kinds, Aristotle makes those questions bear on both valid inference and the structure of what can be said.
Aristotle separates the pattern of an argument from the things its terms happen to discuss: if all A are B and all B are C, the conclusion holds whatever A, B, and C name. The Categories gives that formal work an ontological starting point, sorting what can be said of a subject into ten kinds, including substance, quantity, quality, and relation. The collection thereby supports a view opposed to the Stoics: logic is an instrument taken up before philosophy, not one of its parts.
- logic
- substance
- ontology
- predication
- contrariety
- quantity
- relationality
- habit
- classification
- change
- species
- genus
- quality
- privation
- relatives
- contraries
- definition
- truth
- opposition
- degree
- language
- categories
- time
- space
- motion
- priority
- relation
- possession
- affirmation and negation
- correlatives
Enter a dialogue
- When a person keeps changing roles, what in that life remains the subject rather than another attribute?
- Your ten categories sort what can be said; why should speech's order govern what exists?
- By separating an argument's form from its subject, what kind of knowledge does a thinker postpone until later?
- How can a relation differ from a quality when neither seems to exist independently of its subject?
- Can a valid form rescue an argument whose premises describe nothing real, or does logic need more than validity?