Descartes proved, and quietly exceeded
Can another man's philosophy be set out in strict geometrical order without being endorsed — and what shows through when Spinoza does the setting out? The exposition is faithful; the appendix is not innocent.
Written to teach a pupil Descartes without handing over his own opinions, Spinoza recast the first two parts of the Principles — physics, motion, and mechanics included — into definitions, axioms, and proofs, with Meyer's preface warning that the author expounds Descartes and dissents from much he here demonstrates. The appended Cogitata Metaphysica, dressed as a scholastic handbook, threads in positions that are Spinoza's own. The only book he published under his own name, it became the one dated, authorised text against which to read the rest.
- metaphysics
- epistemology
- motion
- mechanics
- physics
- ontology
- logic
- matter
- substance
- extension
- force
- geometry
- existence
- essence
- perfection
- eternity
- creation
- divine attributes
- god
- certainty
- necessity
- truth
- error
- time
- infinity
- will
- causation
- free will
Enter a dialogue
- For a student learning a thinker they may come to reject, what is gained by first proving that thinker's system faithfully, as you did with Descartes?
- If you dissent from much you prove here, isn't setting it out in strict order a kind of dishonesty toward the reader?
- How should a careful reader tell where you expound Descartes from where the Cogitata Metaphysica is quietly your own?
- To present a philosophy geometrically without endorsing it, what must the expositor keep silent about — and what does that silence cost?
- You let Meyer's preface do the disowning for you — why not simply state in your own voice where Descartes goes wrong?