GrammarianIndia

Bhartṛhari

The grammarian for whom every thought is woven of words

2 works · 307 passages grounded

Lifespan
~450–~510
Also known as
Bhartrihari
Wikipedia

The mind

Words, said the logicians of the Nyāya school, have meaning because they point to things that exist outside the mind. The Buddhists answered that meaning rests on nothing firmer than the conventions of a community of speakers. Bhartṛhari, a Sanskrit grammarian of the fifth century, rejected both answers. Language, for him, is not a set of labels laid over a world that is already there. No cognition comes without words, he held, and all knowledge appears as if shot through with them. In its strongest form the claim says that the word makes the thing: the world shows up only for a mind already shaped by speech, and the reality behind the world, Brahman, is itself of the nature of the word.

He came out of the oldest science in Sanskrit learning. Pāṇini's rules had fixed the language centuries before, and Patañjali, around 150 BCE, had explained and defended them in the Mahābhāṣya, the "great commentary". Grammar counted as one of the auxiliary sciences of the Veda, a tool for reciting and understanding scripture correctly. Bhartṛhari wrote a commentary on the Mahābhāṣya himself, which survives only in fragments, and in his main work he credits some of his ideas to his teacher, Vasurāta. With this inheritance he turned the grammarian's questions about words and endings into questions about how anything is known at all.

That work is the Vākyapadīya, some two thousand verses in three books, whose name means roughly "on sentences and words". Its best-known argument concerns how a listener understands. Sounds reach the ear one after another, yet the meaning arrives whole, in a single flash he called pratibhā, intuition. What carries that meaning is the sphoṭa, from a root meaning "to burst forth": the sentence taken as one indivisible unit. Grammarians cut sentences into words and words into stems and endings, and he granted that the cutting is useful. Yet the pieces, he argued, are abstractions that analysis makes afterwards; only the whole sentence means anything. Speech itself he described on three levels, from an undivided inner "seeing", through the ordering of thought, to the sounds the voice produces. Correct speech clears the mind, and so the study of grammar becomes, in the first book of the Vākyapadīya, a path to liberation in its own right.

The book found readers well outside the grammarians, many of them hostile. Dignāga, the Buddhist logician and a near contemporary, built a short treatise on time out of its verses. Kumārila, the great exegete of Mīmāṃsā, the school that interprets the Vedas as commands, attacked the sphoṭa in a chapter of his Ślokavārttika: the sounds of a word, he argued, are enough to carry its meaning, and nothing beyond them is needed. Maṇḍana Miśra, an Advaita Vedānta author of the eighth century, gave the sphoṭa a central place in his version of that school. The Śaiva philosophers of Kashmir, Abhinavagupta among them, took over the three levels of speech and added a fourth above them. Modern scholars compare his view that meaning lives in the whole sentence with the philosophy of language of Wittgenstein and Austin.

About the man himself almost nothing is on record. Yijing, a Chinese Buddhist pilgrim in India in the late seventh century, described a famous grammarian named Bhartṛhari as a Buddhist who wavered seven times between the monastery and the life of a layman; researchers have found the account mistaken about both his religion and his time. Indian tradition makes him a king of Ujjain, elder brother of King Vikramāditya, who left a life of pleasure for renunciation and wrote the Śatakatraya, three hundred verses on conduct, love and detachment. Modern scholars, K. A. Subramania Iyer and Bimal Krishna Matilal among them, generally treat the grammarian and the poet as two different people, though some leave the question open. Two of the three centuries, the Nītiśataka on worldly conduct and the Vairāgyaśataka on renunciation, are held here under his name because the tradition ascribes them to him; the century on love is not among them. Historians who build the chronology from his teacher before him and from Dignāga after him place Bhartṛhari at about 450 to 510. Reference works that follow Yijing's account, and with it the identification with the poet, still put his death in the middle of the seventh century.

Key concepts

What does āgama, the teaching handed down, mean for Bhartṛhari?

Āgama is the unbroken body of teaching passed from teacher to pupil: the Vedas, the remembered texts and the grammarians' own tradition. Bhartṛhari treats it as a source of knowledge in its own right. Right conduct, he argues, cannot be settled by reasoning without it. He likens it to consciousness itself, running on without a break, so that whoever relies on it is not shaken by those who argue from reasons alone.

What is an apabhraṃśa, a corrupt word?

An apabhraṃśa is a deformed version of a correct Sanskrit word, used where the correct one is meant. A speaker who means gauḥ, 'cow', and produces an unpolished variant of it has used one. Such a form, Bhartṛhari holds, does not mean anything directly: the hearer understands it by recalling the correct form behind it, as if the two were the same word. Grammar matters to him because it keeps the forms that carry meaning by themselves.

How can one word have a primary and a secondary meaning?

The primary meaning is the one a word's form calls up at once, by sheer familiarity: 'cow' for the animal with the dewlap. A secondary meaning is reached through a further cue, as when the same word 'cow' is applied to a man for some quality he is taken to share with the animal. For Bhartṛhari the word holds all its powers together, and which meaning counts as primary depends on how familiar each use is.

What is 'figurative existence' in Bhartṛhari's account of language?

Figurative existence is the existence a word lends to whatever it names, simply by naming it. When people say a thing 'is born', it was not there before its birth, so it cannot be said to exist in the full sense. The sentence still presents it as something that is. No word's meaning, Bhartṛhari holds, ever reaches beyond this kind of existence, which is why language can speak of what has not yet come to be.

Themes of the Mind

Concepts that recur together across the corpus held here, gathered into themes and ordered by how much of this philosopher's writing each one occupies.

Where Reasoning Runs Out

Can a clever enough argument settle what is right to do? Bhartṛhari answers no, and asks what a person can lean on when every proof meets a cleverer counter-proof.

Whatever a skilled reasoner infers with effort, he observes, an abler one explains another way, and things act differently by state, place and time, so inference about them rarely holds. Right conduct is not fixed by argument without āgama, the unbroken teaching handed down, and even the seers' knowledge rests on it. Yet he asks for more than trust. An expert knows a true gem by long practice, not inference, and cannot put that knowing into words; and insight gains discernment from many traditions set side by side, not from chasing one's own reasoning.

  • reasoning
  • scriptural authority
  • hermeneutics
  • knowledge
  • epistemology
  • ritual

Correct Words and Corrupt Ones

Does it matter whether a word is said correctly, if the listener understands anyway? For Bhartṛhari the difference reaches past style to merit and to truth.

The line between a word's correct form and its corruptions is set, for him, by the usage of the learned and by tradition, never by whether a hearer gets the point. A corrupt form conveys a meaning only by calling the correct one to mind, and correct speech brings merit. He faces the hard case: corruptions passed down among careless speakers can grow so familiar that the correct word stops being understood. Even so, the bond between words and meanings is eternal, as the old grammarians taught, and no agreement made it.

  • linguistic correctness
  • grammatical rules
  • speech
  • signification
  • naming
  • linguistic theory

What Decides What Someone Meant

One word can carry several meanings, and its sound alone never picks among them. What does a listener actually use to land on the right one?

Meanings, Bhartṛhari says, are told apart by the sentence, the context, the purpose, what is fitting, the place and the time, never by the word's form alone. Further cues join the list: things mentioned together or apart, an opposite, a telltale mark, a neighbouring word, even the tone of voice. A word may hold several powers at once, as fire both lights and heats, and what the speaker intends selects among them. Understanding is therefore always a judgement made in a situation, and the grammarian who studies forms has to study the occasions of their use as well.

  • context
  • speaker intention
  • pragmatics
  • figurative language
  • linguistic interpretation
  • similarity
  • analogy
  • comparison
  • speech acts
  • ellipsis

One Reality in Many Guises

If there is finally only one reality, why does the world come as countless separate things? Bhartṛhari's answer runs through the powers of the one, and through the words that name them.

Handed down as one, the ultimate reality behaves as if it were many because it rests on distinct powers, though it is never apart from them. It is the seed of everything, present as the one who experiences, the things experienced and the experiencing itself. Unity and plurality, he argues, are each thought only against the other, and in the highest truth the difference between them does not exist. Ordinary dealings with things run on convention, and every word presents its object as existing, even a thing said to be born, which before its birth was not there.

  • nondualism
  • unity and plurality
  • identity and difference
  • manifestation
  • powers
  • causal powers
  • appearance
  • being
  • ontology
  • reality
  • metaphysics
  • cosmology

By the numbers

works held
2
passages traced
307
concepts traced
369
thematic clusters
6

Concepts that travel together

The wheel takes the leading concepts of these writings and shows how often they come up together. The wider the band between two, the more passages speak of both. Among them, most often together: “grammar” and “language”.
Concept co-occurrence, strongest first 7 concepts, joined by 9 pairings. 97 pairings reach beyond these concepts and are not drawn.
ConceptPaired conceptShared passages
grammarlanguage7
grammarsemantics7
impermanencerenunciation6
desirerenunciation3
agingimpermanence2
agingrenunciation2
desireimpermanence2
agingdesire1
languagesemantics1

The arc of a career

A cell's weight is that concept's share of the work's passages, so a column can be read downwards as well as a row across. Densest: grammar in Vākyapadīya, 30.4%.

Density 0% 30.4%

Concept density per work, chronological 2 works, in the order they were written. 8 concept columns, ranked by total weight. 63 further concepts fall outside the columns shown.
WorkYeargrammarrenunciationimpermanencelanguagevirtueagingdesiresemantics
Śatakatraya0%26.3%19.3%0%15.8%12.3%12.3%0%
Vākyapadīya30.4%0%0.4%17.2%0%0.4%0%12%

Works held

Titles in your language, the original beneath in brackets; “lit.” marks our own translation where no English edition exists. Side chips show which full texts are held.

  1. Śatakatraya

    Set beside the Vākyapadīya, his treatise on language, by a tradition that counts both as his; most modern scholars give these poems to a different author.

    SA
  2. Vākyapadīya

    Some two thousand verses in three books, the work by which later grammarians, logicians and Vedānta writers knew Bhartṛhari; beside it he wrote a commentary on Patañjali's Mahābhāṣya, the text whose near loss the Vākyapadīya recounts.

    SA
Begin a dialogue with Bhartṛhari

— or wander to another mind

Set two minds against each other

Each of these is a question the two of them answer differently. Choose one and they argue it out, both drawing on the texts held here.