Two false sciences of right
Can reason tell us what is right by nature? Two schools claimed it could, one by imagining people before society, the other by the bare form of a law, and Hegel argues that both come away empty-handed.
The empiricists strip human beings of custom, history and state, picture the remainder as a state of nature, then add back what they need for a government; nothing says where to stop. Kant and Fichte start at the other end, with the pure form of a law any rational will could give itself. Hegel's test cases turn that form against itself: a world without deposits contradicts nothing, and a duty to help the poor, obeyed by everyone, abolishes poverty and with it the duty. The bare form decides nothing; content is smuggled in.
- empiricism
- formalism
- moral formalism
- practical reason
- morality
- natural law
- philosophy of science
- abstraction
- law
- coercion
- necessity
- philosophy of law
- nature
- negation
- infinity
Enter a dialogue
- If everyone helped the poor, there would soon be no poor left, and the duty would cancel itself. What does that show about Kant's test of universal law?
- Theories of punishment each seize one aim: reforming the criminal, deterring others, repairing the damage. Why do you distrust a theory built on a single aim?
- The empiricists picture humans in a state of nature, stripped of custom, history and state. Why does nothing in that method say what to strip away?
- You grant that experience rightly resists philosophies that force their formulas on it. Why isn't starting from how people actually are the better method?