PhilosopherFrance

Henri Bergson

Defender of lived time against clock and equation

4 works · 869 passages grounded

The mind

Herbert Spencer, the English philosopher of universal evolution, had a young French admirer who meant to finish his system for him. The admirer was in his mid-twenties, teaching philosophy at a secondary school in Clermont-Ferrand, the lycée Blaise-Pascal, and his plan was modest and technical: to give Spencer's mechanism the precision it lacked. He got as far as time, and the plan collapsed.

What mechanics measures, Bergson concluded, is not time. To calculate with time you must first lay it out as a medium whose parts sit side by side and can be counted — which is to say, as space. A clock does not show you an hour; it shows you a hand that has travelled through so much space. Lived time has no parts of that kind: a melody is not a row of notes but each note carrying all the notes before it. Bergson named this real time durée: duration, time as it is undergone rather than counted.

The stake was freedom. The standard case for determinism treats a person as a sequence of separate inner states, each produced by the one before; if the inner life has no separate states, the case has nothing to grip. He submitted that argument as his doctoral thesis in 1888, and it appeared the next year as Time and Free Will: An Essay on the Immediate Data of Consciousness.

Everything afterwards carried the same suspicion into new country. Laughter: An Essay on the Meaning of the Comic, in 1900, asked what makes a thing funny and answered that we laugh at rigidity — at the living body caught behaving like a mechanism. Creative Evolution put the objection to biology in 1907. Mechanistic explanation, Bergson argued, accounts for how variations are sifted and not for how anything genuinely new arrives; evolution is one impulse, an élan vital or vital surge, dividing as it advances.

Creative Evolution made him famous outside philosophy. His lectures at the Collège de France, the Paris institution whose courses anyone may walk into, filled past capacity after he took a chair there in 1900; T. S. Eliot, then a young American in Paris, was among those who came. The Catholic Church put three of his books on its Index of Forbidden Books in 1914, the year the Académie française, the national academy of letters, elected him. The Nobel Prize in Literature followed in 1927; arthritis kept him from Stockholm.

Then, on 6 April 1922, Albert Einstein came to a meeting of the Société française de philosophie, the French philosophical society, in Paris, and Bergson argued that relativity had produced a construction, not a replacement for the time we live in. Einstein replied in a few sentences: there was no philosophers' time, only physical time and a psychological time distinct from it. Physicists read the exchange as a rout. That December the physics prize held over from 1921 went to Einstein, at sea on his way to Japan and not there to take it. Presenting it, Svante Arrhenius, chairman of the Nobel committee for physics, noted that Bergson in Paris had challenged the theory; the prize went to the photoelectric effect, not to relativity. Bergson's own book on the dispute, Duration and Simultaneity, came out that year and ran to six editions, the last in 1931. Whether he then suppressed it is disputed: Édouard Le Roy, who succeeded him at the Collège de France, reported that he had refused any further reprinting, but his will names no such wish, and editors reprinted the book in 1968.

In his last years arthritis had taken most of his public life. In 1940 the Vichy government, which had just barred Jews from teaching and public office, offered him an exemption on account of his eminence. He declined it and registered as a Jew. His will instructed that his unpublished papers be destroyed, and his wife and daughter destroyed them.

The eclipse was near-total. Jean-Paul Sartre and Maurice Merleau-Ponty, the two philosophers who set the terms of French thought after the war, took their bearings from German phenomenology, and by the 1960s Bergson was a period name. Gilles Deleuze, a philosopher of the generation after theirs, published Bergsonism in 1966 and put the argument back in circulation. The philosopher Frédéric Worms founded the Société des amis de Bergson in 2006 and directed the first critical edition of the works, published between 2007 and 2012.

Key concepts

What does Bergson mean by duration, or durée?

Duration is time as it is undergone rather than counted. A clock, Time and Free Will (1889) argues, shows a hand that has travelled through so much space, and the hour is really that distance. Lived time has no separable parts: a melody is not a row of notes but each note carrying all the notes before it.

Why does Bergson say the intellect turns everything into space?

Because intelligence evolved to act on matter, and it works by cutting the continuous into solid, repeatable units. That habit is why language, geometry and the sciences succeed, and he takes nothing back from them. Turned on the inner life instead, it yields snapshots strung together, importing from outside the juxtaposition that makes inner states look countable.

What is the élan vital in Creative Evolution?

The élan vital is the single impulse Bergson takes evolution to be, a vital surge dividing as it advances into the lines that end in plant, insect and human intelligence. Creative Evolution (1907) sets it against mechanistic explanation, which accounts for how variations are sifted but not for how anything genuinely new arrives. It names a movement, not a substance.

Is Bergson's intuition just a hunch, or something more disciplined?

It is instinct become disinterested and self-conscious, able to reflect on its object, which is how Creative Evolution (1907) defines it. Instinct already knows life from inside, but blindly; intellect sees clearly, but only from outside. Intuition is the effort to enter the movement of life itself, and a hunch is exactly what it is not, because a hunch costs nothing. It claims back nothing that the sciences have earned.

Why does Bergson say we laugh at rigidity?

Because the comic appears wherever something mechanical is encrusted upon the living, which is his formula for it: a living thing caught behaving like a mechanism. Laughter (1900) finds it in a man who stumbles over a stone he should have stepped around, a gesture repeated until it runs by itself, a character reduced to one spring. The laugh is a social corrective.

Themes of the Mind

Concepts that recur together across the corpus held here, gathered into themes and ordered by how much of this philosopher's writing each one occupies.

Duration: Time as It Is Lived

What is time before a clock turns it into a line of countable instants? The answer decides whether the inner life can be measured at all, or whether measuring it has already replaced it with something else.

Mechanics measures space, not time: a clock shows a hand that has travelled, and the hour is the distance. Against Spencer and the psychophysicists who graded sensations in degrees, Time and Free Will (1889) argues that lived duration has no separable parts, since a melody is not a row of notes but each note carrying the ones before it. Quantity applied to the inner life imports juxtaposition from outside, and states become countable only once they have been laid out as space.

  • duration
  • time
  • space
  • measurement
  • becoming
  • metaphysics

The Case Against Determinism

If a self were a chain of distinct inner states, each produced by the one before, where could a free act come from? Bergson attacks that premise rather than the inference, leaving the argument for necessity nothing to grip.

Determinism's standard case needs an inner life built of separate items in causal succession, which is exactly what duration denies. Submitted as a doctoral thesis in 1888, the argument makes a free act one that issues from the whole self as it has become, not one inserted into a gap in the causal order. That rules out the libertarian picture of indifferent choice as firmly as the necessitarian one, since both borrow their diagrams from space. Acting freely is rare, and never a matter of prediction.

  • free will
  • freedom
  • determinism
  • causality
  • action
  • consciousness

Life as a Creative Surge

Can sifting and selection explain how anything genuinely new arrives? Everything turns on whether evolution rearranges given parts or is an impulse that invents as it advances.

Mechanism and finalism commit the same error twice, Creative Evolution (1907) holds: one reads the future off the past, the other off a plan already drawn, and neither leaves room for novelty. Life is one impulse, an élan vital, dividing as it goes into the lines that end in the torpor of the plant, the instinct of the insect and the intelligence of man. Adaptation explains the turns a route takes; it never explains why there was movement to be turned.

  • evolution
  • vitalism
  • life
  • philosophy of biology
  • biology
  • teleology
  • organism
  • adaptation
  • instinct
  • mechanism

What the Intellect Cannot Reach

Why should a faculty shaped for handling solids be trusted to describe what flows? Setting a limit to the intellect's competence is not the same as handing the remainder to mysticism.

Intelligence evolved to act on matter: it cuts the continuous into solid, repeatable units, and is superb at it, which is why language, geometry and the sciences work. Turned on duration or on life, the same habit yields snapshots strung together, and the nothingness and negation it generates are artefacts of thwarted expectation rather than features of things. Intuition is offered as the alternative, an effortful sympathy that enters its object instead of circling it, and takes back from science nothing science has earned.

  • intellect
  • intelligence
  • intuition
  • language
  • negation
  • epistemology
  • philosophy of science
  • matter

Laughter and the Mechanical

A room laughs at the same thing for a reason, and the reason is neither cruelty nor taste. Making rigidity the trigger decides whether comedy belongs to aesthetics at all.

The comic appears wherever something mechanical is encrusted upon the living: a man who stumbles over a stone he should have stepped around, a gesture repeated until it runs by itself, a character reduced to one spring. Laughter (1900) reads this as a social corrective aimed at absent-mindedness and inelasticity, and it requires a momentary anaesthesia of the heart, since sympathy dissolves the joke. Comedy therefore sits closer to the pressure a group puts on its members than to art.

  • comic theory
  • comedy
  • laughter
  • aesthetics
  • emotion
  • automatism

Perception, Memory, and Dreaming

Sleep is the cleanest test of what perception and memory ordinarily do, because nothing practical is demanding attention. Either dreams are manufactured from nothing, or the sleeping mind is doing what the waking mind always does.

Dreaming invents no material, Dreams (1901) argues. The sleeper works on sensations still arriving, a noise, a pressure, the coloured dust behind closed lids, and memories crowd in to fit them, no longer held back by the effort of attending to a task. Waking perception does the same under discipline: selective, cut to the needs of action, saturated with recollection. The difference is one of tension rather than of kind, which is why memory can seem fuller in sleep and not poorer.

  • memory
  • perception
  • consciousness
  • sensation
  • psychology

By the numbers

works held
4
passages traced
869
concepts traced
867
thematic clusters
6

Concepts that travel together

The wheel takes the leading concepts of these writings and shows how often they come up together. The wider the band between two, the more passages speak of both. Among them, most often together: “consciousness” and “duration”.
Concept co-occurrence, strongest first 8 concepts, joined by 21 pairings. 88 pairings reach beyond these concepts and are not drawn.
ConceptPaired conceptShared passages
consciousnessduration60
durationfree will39
consciousnessfree will36
consciousnessmemory18
consciousnessperception17
memoryperception13
durationmemory12
durationmechanism11
free willmechanism9
durationperception8
dreamingperception7
dreamsperception7
dreamingmemory6
consciousnessdreaming5
consciousnessdreams5
consciousnessmechanism4
dreamsmemory3
mechanismperception3
free willmemory2
dreamingduration1
mechanismmemory1

The arc of a career

A cell's weight is that concept's share of the work's passages, so a column can be read downwards as well as a row across. Densest: perception in Dreams, 56.3%.

Density 0% 56.3%

Concept density per work, chronological 4 works, in the order they were written. 8 concept columns, ranked by total weight. 93 further concepts fall outside the columns shown.
WorkYearconsciousnessperceptiondurationmemorydreamsdreamingfree willmechanism
Time and Free Will: An Essay on the Immediate Data of Consciousness44.4%12.1%39.7%4.2%0%0%32.7%3.7%
Laughter: An Essay on the Meaning of the Comic0.7%6.7%0%0.7%4.7%0%0%14.7%
Dreams40.6%56.3%3.1%43.8%40.6%37.5%0%0%
Creative Evolution12.3%6.8%14.4%2.1%0%0%2.5%14.4%

Works held

Titles in your language, the original beneath in brackets; “lit.” marks our own translation where no English edition exists. Side chips show which full texts are held.

EARLY — DURATION & FREEDOM

  1. 1889 Time and Free Will: An Essay on the Immediate Data of Consciousness (Essai sur les données immédiates de la conscience)

    Duration makes its first appearance here, in a doctoral thesis. Memory, comedy, dreaming and evolution are all later applications of what this book works out.

    EN

MIDDLE — THE COMIC & THE DREAM

  1. 1900 Laughter: An Essay on the Meaning of the Comic (Le Rire: Essai sur la signification du comique)

    The outlier on Bergson's shelf: the only one of these books that turns to the stage and the street. What it carries across is the test — the living against the mechanical, now applied to what makes an audience laugh.

    EN
  2. 1901 Dreams (Le Rêve)

    In French it survives as a chapter of L'Énergie spirituelle, the 1919 collection of his occasional pieces; in English it has gone on being sold as a book of its own, which is why a single lecture stands here beside three much larger works.

    EN

MATURE — LIFE & CREATIVE EVOLUTION

  1. 1907 Creative Evolution (L'Évolution créatrice)

    Fame arrived with this one: audiences at the Collège de France who had not come to study, reissue after reissue, a readership well outside philosophy.

    EN
Begin a dialogue with Henri Bergson

— or wander to another mind

Set two minds against each other

Each of these is a question the two of them answer differently. Choose one and they argue it out, both drawing on the texts held here.