PhilosopherEngland

Henry Sidgwick

The utilitarian who let reason end in a deadlock

8 works · 3,188 passages grounded

Lifespan
1838–1900
Wikipedia

The mind

The first edition of The Methods of Ethics, published in 1874, ended by admitting that its argument had failed at the last step. Its author, a lecturer at Trinity College, Cambridge, had set out in 1862 to reconcile the two camps of English moral philosophy, and twelve years later he had found that reason gave two answers to the question of what to do. One said: act for the greatest happiness of everyone, because from the point of view of the universe no one's good counts for more than anyone else's. The other said that it is reasonable for each person to put their own happiness first. Both seemed to him self-evident. When they collided, reason could not settle the case. Unless some moral order in the world made the two coincide, he concluded, duty fell apart into chaos. Later editions softened the tone and kept the conclusion, which philosophers now call the dualism of practical reason.

Henry Sidgwick came to ethics by way of a problem of honesty. He had been elected a fellow of Trinity in 1859, the year he graduated at the head of the classical list. In the 1860s he lost his hold on Anglican doctrine. He tried to settle the matter as a historian would: in 1862 he spent some weeks in Dresden beginning Arabic, and he worked at Arabic and Hebrew for a comparative study of the Semitic religions. Then he gave the research up, convinced it would not answer the fundamental questions. His fellowship required assent to the Thirty-Nine Articles, the doctrinal statement of the Church of England. In October 1869 he resigned it. His colleagues let him keep his lectureship, and his example strengthened the campaign that ended such tests in the Universities Tests Act of 1871. By his own account, the struggle over assenting to the Articles led him back to philosophy, and much of the thinking later set out in the Methods was done while he wrestled with it.

The book's method came from the same scruple. Sidgwick took the rules ordinary decent people live by — tell the truth, keep promises, be just — and examined them one at a time. Wherever they turned vague or contradicted each other, he found, people settled the case by asking what would do the most good. Two schools had been treated as enemies: the intuitionists, who held that conscience simply sees what is right, and the utilitarians who followed Jeremy Bentham and John Stuart Mill. On his showing, careful intuition leads to utilitarianism. Only the case for self-interest refused to be absorbed. In a late chapter he went further: a utilitarian might rightly do in private what it would be wrong to advocate in public, and even this permission might best be kept from the many. Plain moral sense, he conceded, rejects the very idea of such a private morality.

He looked outside the study for what would make duty and self-interest coincide. Eleanor Balfour, whom he married in 1876, did scientific work with her brother-in-law, the physicist Lord Rayleigh; with her he helped found the Society for Psychical Research in 1882, and he was twice its president. The Sidgwicks hoped to find evidence that a person survives death, which they took to be an essential support of morality. The evidence never came, and near the end of his life he judged the work largely a waste of time, though he allowed that it had yielded some positive results. His other public cause was the education of women. In 1871 he rented a house, at his own risk, for women attending lectures in Cambridge, and that house was the beginning of Newnham College.

F. H. Bradley, the Oxford idealist, attacked the book's main argument in a pamphlet in 1877. Sidgwick became Knightbridge Professor of Moral Philosophy at Cambridge in 1883 and was re-elected to his Trinity fellowship in 1885. He died of cancer on 28 August 1900. In 1930 the Cambridge philosopher C. D. Broad judged the Methods the best treatise on moral theory ever written. John Rawls, the Harvard political philosopher, introduced its 1981 reprint as the clearest statement of classical utilitarianism, and in 2014 the utilitarian philosophers Katarzyna de Lazari-Radek and Peter Singer took one of its phrases as the title of The Point of View of the Universe, a book arguing that the deadlock between the two answers can be broken in utilitarianism's favour. Whether it can is still disputed.

Key concepts

What does Sidgwick mean by 'the point of view of the universe'?

It is the standpoint from which no one's good counts for more simply because it is theirs. Sidgwick held it self-evident that, judged from there, the good of any one individual matters no more than the good of any other, unless more good is likely to be realised in one case. As a rational being, he concluded, a person is bound to aim at good generally, not only at their own share of it.

What are perceptional, dogmatic and philosophical intuitionism?

They are Sidgwick's three stages of the view that people can simply see what is right. The perceptional intuitionist judges each particular act on sight; the dogmatic one takes general rules, such as 'keep your promises', as self-evident; the philosophical one looks behind those rules for a few deeper axioms. He tested the first two against common sense, found them too vague, and kept only the third.

Why does Sidgwick say that 'ought' cannot be defined?

Because the notion shared by 'ought', 'right' and 'reasonable' is, he argued, too elementary to be broken into simpler parts. Explaining it as what others will punish, or as what will make the agent happy, changes the subject: it says why people might act, not what it means that an act should be done. He granted that the notion has developed over time; that does not reduce it to anything else.

What is the 'empirical-reflective method' of weighing pleasures?

It is the plain way of acting for one's own happiness: picture in advance the series of feelings each open course of action is likely to bring, judge which series looks better on the whole, and take that course. Sidgwick treated it as the natural method of egoism, then showed its defects — expected, remembered and present pleasures are hard to compare, and different people rank the same pleasures differently.

What is 'positive morality', and why keep it apart from ethics?

Positive morality is the code a community actually holds: its accepted moral rules and prevailing moral sentiments. Sidgwick kept it apart from the question of what is really right, because after learning what one's society expects, a person still has to ask how far it is their duty to conform. On his utilitarian view, that is settled by weighing the good the code does against the good of departing from it.

Themes of the Mind

Concepts that recur together across the corpus held here, gathered into themes and ordered by how much of this philosopher's writing each one occupies.

The Point of View of the Universe

If no one's good counts for more than anyone else's, what does a person owe to strangers, and to creatures who can suffer but cannot speak? The answer decides how far a single life is answerable to all the others.

Sidgwick held that the only thing good in itself is desirable consciousness — in the end, the happiness of whoever has it — and that reason sees one principle plainly: the good of any one individual is of no more importance than the good of any other. From there he restated the utilitarianism of Bentham and Mill with more care than its founders, keeping Bentham's single scale of pleasure against Mill's higher and lower kinds, and judging Mill's proof of the principle incomplete. The result was the classical doctrine in its most exact form, the one later utilitarians still argue from.

  • utilitarianism
  • happiness
  • pleasure
  • hedonism
  • consequentialism
  • impartiality
  • benevolence
  • utility
  • the good
  • beneficence
  • altruism

When Reason Gives Two Answers

Reason tells each person to seek the general happiness, and it also tells them that their own happiness is a reasonable aim. What is left of ethics when the two collide and nothing settles which one wins?

His main treatise ends here. Both principles survived every test Sidgwick could devise, and neither would absorb the other: sympathy narrows the gap without closing it, and experience, he judged, does not prove that virtue always pays the virtuous. Only a moral order in the world, a God who made duty and interest coincide, would make practical reason consistent with itself; without one, he wrote, the hope of rationalising morality completely would have to be given up. Morality itself he did not give up. He refused to call the gap closed, and philosophers now name the deadlock the dualism of practical reason.

  • egoism
  • self-interest
  • practical reason
  • prudence
  • egoistic hedonism
  • self-sacrifice
  • moral motivation
  • sympathy
  • theology
  • immortality
  • reason
  • moral obligation

Common Sense Under Cross-Examination

Ordinary decent people already know they should tell the truth, keep promises and be just. Do those rules hold once someone asks exactly what they require, and what decides the hard cases?

Sidgwick took the morality of common sense more seriously than the intuitionists who praised it, and that is how he undid their claim. Rule by rule — good faith, justice, the duties of family and gratitude — he looked for a principle precise and self-evident enough to be an axiom, and found each one blurring at the edges, colliding with its neighbours, and settled in the hard cases by asking what would do most good. What survived as self-evident was a handful of abstract principles: treat like cases alike, give a later good the same weight as a present one, count everyone's good impartially.

  • intuitionism
  • common sense morality
  • moral rules
  • promises
  • justice
  • moral intuition
  • moral principles
  • duty
  • conscience
  • moral epistemology
  • desert

Candour, and the Morality Kept Private

When is it right to say less than one believes, or to act on a rule one would never defend in public? Sidgwick pressed the question on churches and statesmen, and then on his own utilitarianism.

He resigned his Trinity fellowship rather than go on assenting to articles he no longer believed, and veracity stayed near the centre of his ethics. A church that required its clergy to recite what they doubted was, on his account, teaching untruth, and a minister's duty of plain speech was stricter than a layman's. The same standard then turned on his own theory. A utilitarian, he admitted, might rightly do in private what it would be wrong to teach in public, and might even wish the doctrine kept from most people — a conclusion he called paradoxical, conceding that the plain man's conscience repudiates it.

  • truthfulness
  • religious conformity
  • christian ethics
  • political ethics
  • belief
  • agnosticism
  • social norms
  • public opinion

What Government Is For

If the test of every law is the happiness it produces, how far should the state reach into private life, property and trade? Sidgwick answered case by case rather than by slogan.

His politics start from the individualist doctrine of his day — government protects people from harm and enforces their contracts, and otherwise leaves them alone — and then test it, one exception at a time, against the general happiness. Paternal interference, public provision, the inheritance of property and the regulation of trade each get the same patient weighing, so that the minimum becomes a presumption rather than a dogma. The method is the one his ethics used on common sense: begin from what is generally believed, then ask exactly where utility requires it to give way.

  • political philosophy
  • government intervention
  • paternalism
  • individual liberty
  • distributive justice
  • property
  • inheritance
  • law and morality
  • government
  • legislation
  • individualism
  • social welfare

By the numbers

works held
8
passages traced
3,188
concepts traced
2,658
thematic clusters
5

Concepts that travel together

The wheel takes the leading concepts of these writings and shows how often they come up together. The wider the band between two, the more passages speak of both. Among them, most often together: “happiness” and “utilitarianism”.
Concept co-occurrence, strongest first 8 concepts, joined by 17 pairings. 92 pairings reach beyond these concepts and are not drawn.
ConceptPaired conceptShared passages
happinessutilitarianism51
epistemologymetaphysics25
happinessvirtue25
moral psychologyutilitarianism16
moral psychologyvirtue16
utilitarianismvirtue15
justiceutilitarianism12
justicemoral psychology10
truthfulnessutilitarianism7
happinessmoral psychology6
justicevirtue4
epistemologymoral psychology2
happinessjustice2
justicetruthfulness2
epistemologyhappiness1
metaphysicsmoral psychology1
metaphysicsvirtue1

The arc of a career

A cell's weight is that concept's share of the work's passages, so a column can be read downwards as well as a row across. Densest: utilitarianism in The Methods of Ethics, 23.9%.

Density 0% 23.9%

Concept density per work, chronological 8 works, in the order they were written. 8 concept columns, ranked by total weight. 62 further concepts fall outside the columns shown.
WorkYearutilitarianismmoral psychologyepistemologymetaphysicsjusticehappinessvirtuetruthfulness
The Ethics of Conformity and Subscription0%0%0%0%0%0%0%13.5%
The Methods of Ethics23.9%7.5%1%0.1%5.7%12.8%9.1%2.1%
Outlines of the History of Ethics for English Readers9.9%9.9%0%2.1%7.2%11.1%18.1%0.9%
The Elements of Politics5.3%0.1%0%0%0.8%0.6%0%0%
Practical Ethics: A Collection of Addresses and Essays2%11.9%0.5%0%5%2%1%8.9%
Lectures on the Ethics of T. H. Green, Mr. Herbert Spencer, and J. Martineau15.2%15.2%0.8%2.8%13.9%6.3%3.8%0.8%
Philosophy, Its Scope and Relations0.4%0.4%22.7%21%0.4%0.4%0%0%
Lectures on the Philosophy of Kant and Other Philosophical Lectures and Essays0%0.2%19.5%15.5%0.8%0%0.6%0%

Works held

Titles in your language, the original beneath in brackets; “lit.” marks our own translation where no English edition exists. Side chips show which full texts are held.

EARLY — HONESTY AGAINST SUBSCRIPTION

  1. 1870 The Ethics of Conformity and Subscription

    His answer in print to the question his own resignation from Trinity had raised the year before, published four years before The Methods of Ethics.

    EN

MIDDLE — THE METHODS & THE DUALISM OF REASON

  1. 1874 The Methods of Ethics

    Revised through five editions in Sidgwick's lifetime, this is the book he is read for; his editor called his later Cambridge lectures on Green, Spencer and Martineau supplementary to it.

    EN

MATURE — HISTORY, POLITICS & PRACTICAL ETHICS

  1. 1886 Outlines of the History of Ethics for English Readers

    The historical companion to The Methods of Ethics: Sidgwick telling the story of the moral debates that book had tried to settle by argument.

    EN
  2. 1891 The Elements of Politics

    A two-part treatise — the principles of legislation first, then the structure of government — that carries the utilitarian reasoning of The Methods of Ethics from private conduct into politics.

    EN
  3. 1898 Practical Ethics: A Collection of Addresses and Essays

    Written mostly for the ethical societies of London and Cambridge between 1888 and 1897, these are Sidgwick's applications of his ethics to questions of everyday conduct, for listeners outside the university.

    EN

POSTHUMOUS — THE CAMBRIDGE LECTURES

  1. 1902 Lectures on the Ethics of T. H. Green, Mr. Herbert Spencer, and J. Martineau

    Course lectures never meant for print, in which Sidgwick defended the position of The Methods of Ethics against the schools that had risen since it first appeared.

    EN
  2. 1902 Philosophy, Its Scope and Relations

    Where The Methods of Ethics works inside ethics, these lectures map how ethics, metaphysics, psychology and history fit together — the frame around the rest of Sidgwick's philosophy.

    EN
  3. 1905 Lectures on the Philosophy of Kant and Other Philosophical Lectures and Essays

    The fullest record of Sidgwick's work outside ethics — on Kant, on the theory of knowledge and on the Scottish philosophy of common sense.

    EN
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