Happiness, and why some pleasures count for more
If pleasure is the only good, is a contented pig better off than a troubled Socrates? Mill keeps the creed he inherited and changes what counts as pleasure.
Actions are right, Mill says, in proportion as they tend to promote happiness, and happiness means pleasure and the absence of pain. To the old sneer that this is a doctrine worthy of swine he replies that pleasures differ in kind as well as in amount. The judges are those competently acquainted with both kinds, who will not give up the higher for any quantity of the lower. It is better to be Socrates dissatisfied than a fool satisfied. He explains the preference by a sense of dignity, and admits that the capacity for the nobler feelings is a tender plant, easily killed.
- utilitarianism
- happiness
- pleasure
- utility
- virtue
- desire
Enter a dialogue
- It is better, you write, to be Socrates dissatisfied than a fool satisfied. If happiness is the goal, why prefer the unhappier life?
- Your test of a higher pleasure is the preference of those who know both kinds. What if such judges merely prefer what they were raised to admire?
- No one can calculate the general happiness before each decision. Why do you answer with the sailor who puts to sea with his almanac already computed?
- A hero or martyr gives up his own happiness, and utilitarians can still honour him. What must his sacrifice achieve, on your account, to deserve that honour?
- Many who loved everything noble when young sink into indolence and easy pleasures later. Why is that, for you, no proof that they chose the lower life freely?