WorkPublius

The Federalist

Eighty-five essays, most first printed in newspapers, written at speed under one Roman pen name to win New York for the new Constitution.

by Publius712 passages held

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Overview

In the autumn of 1787 New York's newspapers filled with attacks on the Constitution just signed in Philadelphia, and the reply came in eighty-five essays arguing that the union needed a strong national government, and that such a government could be kept from tyranny by the way it was built. The attackers, writing as Cato and Brutus, warned that a republic as large as the United States could not last, a view taken from Montesquieu, the French political theorist, who held that republics must be small. Alexander Hamilton decided to answer them at length. He brought in James Madison and John Jay, and all three signed as Publius, after Publius Valerius Poplicola, one of the founders of the Roman republic. From 27 October 1787 the essays ran in New York newspapers, sometimes three or four a week, and a two-volume book edition completed the series in May 1788. The union under the Articles of Confederation, Publius argues, is too weak to survive. In the tenth essay Madison turns the small-republic argument around: a large republic holds so many parties and interests that no single majority can easily combine to oppress the rest. Later essays set the branches of government against one another and give the courts the duty to declare void any law that contradicts the Constitution. The eighty-fourth calls a bill of rights unnecessary, and even dangerous. By the reckoning of the historian John Kaminski, the essays did little to move New York's voters, who sent 46 opponents of the Constitution to the state's ratifying convention against 19 supporters; the convention ratified on 26 July 1788 all the same. In 1789 Madison introduced in Congress the amendments that became the Bill of Rights. For a century the tenth essay was not counted among the most important of the series, until the historian Charles Beard made it central to his 1913 account of the Constitution. Who wrote which essay is still argued. Hamilton left a list of his own essays shortly before his fatal duel with Aaron Burr in 1804, Madison later drew up another, and the lists disagree over twelve essays; a statistical study of their wording in 1964 pointed to Madison. Courts still read the book for what the men who drafted the Constitution meant.

Key concepts

What does Publius mean by a faction?

A faction is a number of citizens, a majority or a minority, united by a common passion or interest adverse to the rights of other citizens or to the permanent and aggregate interests of the community. Its causes lie in human nature: fallible reason, self-love, attachment to leaders, and above all the unequal distribution of property. Because those causes cannot be removed without destroying liberty, the task is to control faction's effects.

What does it mean to 'extend the sphere' of a republic?

It means enlarging the territory and population a republic governs, so that it takes in a greater variety of parties and interests. In a small society a majority easily forms around one interest and executes its plans of oppression; across a large one, a common motive to invade the rights of others is less likely, and those who share it find it harder to discover their own strength and act in unison.

What is the difference between a league and a government?

A league binds states, which may obey or refuse; a government makes laws for individuals and enforces them through courts. The Confederation, Publius argues, was a league claiming to govern: its requisitions carried no penalty, so they amounted to advice, and the only way to compel a delinquent state was war. The Constitution extends the Union's authority to the persons of the citizens, the only proper objects of government.

What does 'ambition must be made to counteract ambition' mean?

It means the Constitution relies on the self-interest of officeholders, not on their virtue, to keep each branch inside its bounds. Each department receives the constitutional means and personal motives to resist encroachment by the others, so that the interest of the man is connected with the constitutional rights of the place. Publius calls such devices a reflection on human nature and defends them plainly: if men were angels, no government would be necessary.

What are the ingredients of energy in the executive?

Publius names four: unity, duration, an adequate provision for its support, and competent powers. Unity, one person rather than a council, brings decision, activity, secrecy and despatch, and leaves no doubt about who is to blame. Duration gives the president time to act firmly and to resist a sudden breeze of popular passion. Safety comes from two further ingredients: a due dependence on the people and a due responsibility.

What is judicial review as Federalist 78 describes it?

It is the courts' duty to treat any legislative act contrary to the Constitution as void. The reasoning is that of a commission: a delegated authority cannot validly do what its principal forbids, and the Constitution is the people's own will. Interpreting the laws is the proper and peculiar province of the courts, so where a statute and the Constitution conflict they must prefer the Constitution. The people, not the judges, stand above the legislature.

Themes of the book

What this book returns to, gathered into themes and ordered by how much of the text each one occupies.

A union that can govern

Can thirteen states stay free and at peace if their union can only ask them for money and men, and never compel? On the answer hangs whether America becomes one nation or a set of rival neighbours.

Publius starts from the failure in hand. Under the Articles, Congress could make requisitions that the states were free to ignore, and a law without a penalty, he argues, amounts to nothing more than advice. The cure is to extend the Union's authority to the persons of the citizens, with its own power to tax and to raise armies, because the means must be proportioned to dangers no one can foresee. Without it he predicts rival confederacies, standing armies on every border, and wars among the states themselves.

  • federalism
  • political union
  • confederation
  • state sovereignty
  • taxation
  • public finance
  • commerce
  • national defense
  • military power

Faction and the large republic

If the causes of faction are sown in human nature, how can a government of the people keep a majority from oppressing everyone else? Publius answers that the remedy is size, not virtue.

The tenth essay defines a faction as citizens united by a passion or interest adverse to the rights of others or to the good of the whole, and finds its most durable source in the unequal distribution of property. Removing the cause would destroy liberty, a remedy worse than the disease, so only the effects can be controlled. A pure democracy cannot do it. A republic can, by passing public views through a chosen body of citizens, and by extending the sphere until no majority easily shares one motive or acts on it together.

  • republicanism
  • representation
  • political representation
  • popular sovereignty
  • elections
  • political liberty
  • liberty

Ambition made to counteract ambition

Written limits give way before the encroaching spirit of power, so what keeps each branch of government inside its bounds? Publius gives the people who hold power personal motives to resist one another.

The accumulation of all powers in the same hands is, Publius agrees, the very definition of tyranny; what he denies is that the branches must be wholly separate to prevent it. Parchment barriers have not stopped legislatures drawing all power into their impetuous vortex, and frequent appeals to the people would cost the government the veneration it needs. What remains is structure: each department armed with the means and motives to resist the others, the legislature split in two, and power divided again between the Union and the states. If men were angels, no government would be necessary.

  • separation of powers
  • checks and balances
  • constitutional design
  • institutional design
  • legislative power
  • political accountability
  • political stability

An energetic executive, a judging court

Can a republic hand one man real power, and appointed judges the last word on its laws, and stay a republic? Publius says it must, if the deliberate sense of the people is to outweigh its passing passions.

Energy in the executive, the seventieth essay holds, is a leading character of good government, and it comes from unity, duration, adequate support and competent powers; a council of several only hides who is to blame. The courts are the other side of the design. With neither force nor will but merely judgment, the judiciary is the least dangerous branch, so its judges hold office during good behaviour and may declare void any act contrary to the Constitution. That makes no judge superior to the legislature, Publius argues, only the people's will in the Constitution superior to both.

  • executive power
  • judicial independence
  • constitutional interpretation
  • constitutional limits
  • constitutionalism
  • political legitimacy
  • political judgment

Within this work

passages held
712
distinct concepts
668
by passages held, corpus-wide
#95

What this book thinks together

The wheel takes this book’s leading concepts and shows how often they come up together. The wider the band between two, the more of its passages speak of both. Among them, most often together: “constitutional design” and “federalism”.
Concept co-occurrence, strongest first 8 concepts, joined by 22 pairings. 84 pairings reach beyond these concepts and are not drawn.
ConceptPaired conceptShared passages
constitutional designfederalism36
federalismtaxation36
checks and balancesseparation of powers22
constitutional interpretationfederalism19
federalismrepresentation18
checks and balancesexecutive power11
constitutional designseparation of powers11
checks and balancesconstitutional design8
constitutional designrepresentation8
executive powerseparation of powers8
checks and balancesfederalism6
constitutional interpretationseparation of powers6
constitutional designexecutive power5
constitutional interpretationexecutive power5
executive powerfederalism5
representationtaxation5
constitutional designtaxation4
constitutional interpretationtaxation4
checks and balancesconstitutional interpretation3
checks and balancesrepresentation3
federalismseparation of powers3
representationseparation of powers1

Works held

The author's work in order, this book marked in place. Your-language title first, the original beneath it where the two differ; side chips show which full texts are held.

  1. 1787 The Federalist you are here EN
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