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Publius

Three pens arguing as one voice for the Constitution

1 work · 712 passages grounded

Lifespan
~1787–~1788
Wikipedia

The mind

American newspapers of the 1780s argued politics under Roman names, and in the autumn of 1787 the New York papers were full of them. Writers signing as Cato and Brutus attacked the Constitution drafted that summer in Philadelphia. The reply that began on 27 October signed itself Publius, after Publius Valerius Poplicola, who by Roman tradition helped drive out the last king in 509 BCE and served as one of the republic's first consuls. Tradition remembered him as a founder who refused to become a king: when rumour read the house he was building on the Velian hill in Rome as proof that he meant to rule alone, he had it pulled down in a single night, and he gave citizens the right to appeal against a magistrate's sentence. The literary historian Albert Furtwangler ranks the name above those of the Caesars, Catos and Brutuses who signed the other newspaper essays.

Alexander Hamilton, a New York lawyer who had sat in the Philadelphia convention, ran the series. He had signed as Publius once before, in three letters of 1778 exposing Samuel Chase, a Maryland delegate to Congress, for trying to corner the flour market with what he learned there. Hamilton brought in John Jay, the Confederation's secretary for foreign affairs, and James Madison, a Virginian then in New York as a delegate to Congress; Gouverneur Morris, a fellow delegate at Philadelphia, was asked too, and declined. Jay fell ill after the fifth paper and wrote only one more, leaving two men to write as one at a pace set by the printer. Madison later recalled that the first part of a paper was often being set in type while the rest was still being written. At first he and Hamilton showed each other their drafts, then stopped, partly for lack of time and partly, Madison explained, because neither wanted to approve every doctrine of the other when their political theories were known to differ.

What held them together was the question Publius put in his first paper: whether a people can set up good government by reflection and choice, or must always take its constitutions from accident and force. His answer ran against the opposition's central fear. A national government strong enough to hold thirteen states in one union, he argued, was not the enemy of liberty but its protection, provided it was built so that each branch had both the means and the motive to resist the others. That is the claim Publius is remembered for, and American courts still cite him when they ask what the drafters of the Constitution meant.

The secret was kept loosely. In private letters a New Hampshire doctor reported that readers there took Publius to be Hamilton, while a New York merchant gave Madison the principal hand. Opponents attacked the persona instead of the men: the Northern Centinel, a paper in Lansingburgh, New York, pictured Publius as a man who cared only for present gain. Madison's last paper appeared on 1 March 1788 and he left New York days later, so Hamilton finished alone. In the last paper, printed on 28 May in the second volume of the collected edition, The Federalist, Publius admitted that he had often felt a struggle between strong feeling and restraint.

The single voice did not outlast the occasion. In 1793 Hamilton, writing as Pacificus, defended President Washington's proclamation of neutrality and a broad presidential power over foreign affairs, and Madison, pressed by Thomas Jefferson, answered him as Helvidius, arguing that Congress must share that power. The quarrel later reached the book itself. Shortly before his death in 1804 Hamilton left a list claiming sixty-three of the eighty-five papers, three of them shared with Madison, and Madison's list of 1818 claimed twenty-nine. The historian Douglass Adair assigned the twelve disputed papers to Madison in 1944, and a statistical study in 1964 agreed, though some scholars still hold that a few of them were written jointly.

Key concepts

What does 'reflection and choice' mean in the first Federalist?

It names government founded on a people's deliberate decision rather than inherited from conquest or chance. Publius opens the series by asking whether societies of men can establish good government that way, or must always take their constitutions from accident and force. He treats the ratification contest as the test case, so that a wrong choice would be a misfortune for mankind, not only for America.

What does Publius mean by jealousy of power?

Jealousy is watchful suspicion of those who hold power, and Publius treats it as a virtue with a failure mode. It is, he says, the usual companion of the love of liberty, and an over-scrupulous jealousy is more often a fault of the head than of the heart. Pushed into unbounded distrust, though, it injures liberty's own cause, because it implies that men lack the virtue self-government needs.

What is the 'cool and deliberate sense' of the community?

It is the people's settled judgment, as opposed to what it demands in a moment of passion. Publius holds that this deliberate sense ought to prevail in every free government, yet there are moments when the people, stirred by some irregular passion or misled by interested men, call for measures they will later lament. Institutions such as the Senate exist to hold the line until reflection returns.

Why does Publius argue from experience rather than first principles?

Because he calls experience the least fallible guide of human opinions and the best oracle of wisdom. His proofs run through the leagues of ancient Greece, the Germanic body, the United Netherlands and above all America's own trial of the Articles. Theories that promise lasting peace between neighbours, or a golden age of perfect virtue, he treats as reveries that experience has already refuted.

What does candor mean in The Federalist?

Candor is fairness in weighing an opponent's case: granting what is true in it, and not reading bad motives into disagreement. Publius admits that wise and good men stand on both sides of great questions, and that ambition moves supporters as well as opponents. He therefore offers arguments open to all and keeps his motives in his own breast, where they are not in question.

Themes of the Mind

Concepts that recur together across the corpus held here, gathered into themes and ordered by how much of this philosopher's writing each one occupies.

Government by reflection and choice

Can a people found its government by deliberate argument, or must constitutions always come from accident and force? Publius stakes the whole contest on the answer, and calls a wrong choice a misfortune for mankind.

The ancient republics, Publius observes, handed the framing of their governments to a single sage, a Solon or a Lycurgus; America tried an assembly, and the plan came out a compromise of many interests rather than a theorist's symmetry. He does not pretend otherwise. He never expects a perfect work from imperfect man, and he borrows a warning that no genius can balance a large state by reason alone: experience must guide the labour and time perfect it. So he urges adoption first and amendment after, and reads the Convention's overstepping of its commission as forms giving way to substance.

  • constitutional reform
  • constitutional amendment
  • political experience
  • popular sovereignty
  • political legitimacy
  • constitutional design

Neither angels nor devils

If the passions of men will not obey reason and justice without constraint, how much trust can any government safely place in them? Publius refuses both flattery of the people and the despair that would leave only chains.

Government exists, the fifteenth paper says, because the passions of men will not conform to reason and justice without constraint, and bodies of men act with less rectitude than individuals, since shame divided among many weighs little. Men are ambitious, vindictive and rapacious, and republics have made war as eagerly as kings. Yet Publius turns just as hard on unbounded jealousy. There is a degree of depravity that calls for distrust, and other qualities that justify esteem, which republican government presupposes more than any other form. The best security for fidelity is to make interest coincide with duty.

  • human nature
  • political ambition
  • political incentives
  • political corruption
  • public trust
  • faction
  • interstate conflict

Liberty that needs a vigorous government

Is strong government the enemy of freedom, or its condition? Publius argues that liberty is lost as often through weakness, insecurity and flattery of the people as through the abuse of power.

The first paper sets the terms: the vigor of government is essential to the security of liberty, and a dangerous ambition hides more often behind zeal for the rights of the people than behind zeal for firm government, so that most men who overturned republics began as demagogues and ended as tyrants. The eighth adds the argument from fear. Neighbours without a common government would arm against each other, and a people in continual danger trades its rights for repose, accepting standing armies to be more safe at the risk of being less free. Liberty, the sixty-third concludes, can be endangered by its own abuses.

  • political liberty
  • liberty
  • tyranny
  • standing armies
  • war
  • national security
  • civil liberties
  • government power

Candor in a public quarrel

How should someone argue for a cause they are sure of, when wise and good men stand on the other side? Publius promises reasons laid open to all, and admits he did not always keep to moderation.

The opening paper grants that ambition, avarice and personal animosity move a cause's supporters as readily as its opponents, and that persecution cures heresy no better in politics than in religion. Publius declares his side at once, refuses to feign deliberation over a question he has decided, and puts his reasons before the reader's judgment. His candor has limits. He suspects some opponents of hoping to profit from disunion and charges zealous adversaries with insincerity, and in the last number he confesses a frequent struggle between sensibility and moderation, in which the former sometimes prevailed, though neither often nor much.

  • political rhetoric
  • public opinion
  • deliberation
  • political judgment
  • public good

By the numbers

works held
1
passages traced
712
concepts traced
668
thematic clusters
5

Concepts that travel together

The wheel takes the leading concepts of these writings and shows how often they come up together. The wider the band between two, the more passages speak of both. Among them, most often together: “constitutional design” and “federalism”.
Concept co-occurrence, strongest first 8 concepts, joined by 22 pairings. 84 pairings reach beyond these concepts and are not drawn.
ConceptPaired conceptShared passages
constitutional designfederalism36
federalismtaxation36
checks and balancesseparation of powers22
constitutional interpretationfederalism19
federalismrepresentation18
checks and balancesexecutive power11
constitutional designseparation of powers11
checks and balancesconstitutional design8
constitutional designrepresentation8
executive powerseparation of powers8
checks and balancesfederalism6
constitutional interpretationseparation of powers6
constitutional designexecutive power5
constitutional interpretationexecutive power5
executive powerfederalism5
representationtaxation5
constitutional designtaxation4
constitutional interpretationtaxation4
checks and balancesconstitutional interpretation3
checks and balancesrepresentation3
federalismseparation of powers3
representationseparation of powers1

The arc of a career

A cell's weight is that concept's share of the work's passages, so a column can be read downwards as well as a row across. Densest: federalism in The Federalist, 36.8%.

Density 0% 36.8%

Concept density per work, chronological A single work. 8 concept columns, ranked by total weight. 77 further concepts fall outside the columns shown.
WorkYearfederalismconstitutional designseparation of powerstaxationchecks and balancesexecutive powerrepresentationconstitutional interpretation
The Federalist36.8%12.6%8.6%8.3%7.9%7.6%6.9%6.5%

Works held

Titles in your language, the original beneath in brackets; “lit.” marks our own translation where no English edition exists. Side chips show which full texts are held.

  1. 1787 The Federalist

    The only book of Publius, the name under which Hamilton, Madison and Jay wrote it. Hamilton and Madison, who wrote most of it, had both sat in the Philadelphia convention whose Constitution it defends.

    EN
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