Who Knows That Things Exist
Can anything be called real, or even unreal, without someone to whom it appears? The answer decides whether a conscious self is one thing among others or the ground every other thing stands on.
Utpaladeva answers an opponent for whom there is no lasting self, only a stream of passing cognitions, and for whom being real means being able to produce an effect. He turns that test against its owner: an effect counts only for someone who registers it, so existence and non-existence are ways a thing appears to a knower. Inert things are established only by resting in a knower who is not inert, the one who says 'I', and the closing verses make that knower single.
- consciousness
- self-awareness
- nondualism
- selfhood
- epistemology
- agency
- causation
- embodiment
- subjectivity
- perception
- idealism
- existence
- world-order
- bondage and liberation
- ignorance
- freedom
- objectivity
- knowledge
- māyā
- appearance and reality
- experience
- momentariness
- intrinsic nature
- manifestation
- reality and unreality
Enter a dialogue
- Your opponent opens the book: in themselves, a conscious being and a stone differ no more than what exists and what does not. Where does he go wrong?
- Existence, you argue, is no feature of a thing but a way it appears to a knower. What is a thing that nobody registers?
- For your opponent, whatever can produce an effect is real. Why does an effect, on your view, count only for someone who notices it?
- Each of us lives as a small self, tied to one body and held in place by breath. How can that knower also be the unlimited one?
- Many people, many minds, countless points of view: why do you conclude that only one knower finally stands behind them all?