Memory and the Knower Who Lasts
If experience were only a stream of moments vanishing as they arise, nothing could look back. What do memory, concepts and the sense of time demand of the one who has them?
Utpaladeva's opponents, the Buddhist logicians who followed Dharmakīrti, grant only momentary cognitions and treat the 'I' as a label for the body. He concedes them their moments and asks how a memory can reach an experience that no longer exists. Remembering shines as 'I saw this before', so the knower who saw and the knower who remembers must be one. Conceptual thought and time, which also join separate moments, are read the same way: as the work of a single subject who does not pass away with each moment.
- memory
- perception
- cognition
- conceptual thought
- personal identity
- epistemology
- time
- knowledge
- self
Enter a dialogue
- Yesterday's seeing is gone, yet someone remembers what was seen. If every experience perishes in its own moment, what joins a memory to it?
- A memory does not show the old experience as an object, you argue, but shines as "I saw this before". What does that small "I" prove?
- Your opponent objects that no permanent self ever shows up in experience, and that "I" always turns out to mean the body. How do you answer him?
- A past joy, merely recalled, no longer delights, yet pictured vividly enough it can delight again. What does that show about where pleasure lives?
- The sun's course, flowers opening, cold giving way to heat only mark time, and time itself is succession. What must stay the same for succession to appear?