Knowing Through Causes
When does an argument give us knowledge rather than a well-founded opinion? Averroes makes the answer the top of a ladder that every other kind of reasoning stands below.
The commentaries on On Interpretation and the Prior Analytics lay out how statements combine into valid arguments; those on the Posterior Analytics, middle and long, say which arguments yield knowledge. Averroes's answer is demonstration: reasoning from premises that are true, certain and prior to the conclusion, through a middle term that is also the cause of the fact. Such premises cannot all be proved in turn, so knowledge rests on first principles grasped without proof. Everything else, however convincing, falls short of knowing.
- demonstration
- syllogistic logic
- causation
- logic
- definition
- necessity
- middle term
- predication
- syllogism
- modal logic
- knowledge
- universals
- premises
- infinite regress
- conversion
- essential predication
- epistemology
- first principles
- contradiction
- negation
Enter a dialogue
- To know something, your commentary on the Posterior Analytics says, is to know its cause. Why is knowing only that a thing is so not yet knowledge?
- Every proof rests on premises, and those premises seem to need proofs of their own. How, in your long commentary on the Posterior Analytics, does the chain stop?
- A proof, you explain, turns on a middle term that links the two ends of its conclusion. Why should that link also be the cause of the fact?
- Someone is sure of a belief but cannot say why it has to be true. Would your account of proof call that knowledge?