PhilosopherSpain

Averroes

The judge who ruled philosophy a duty of faith

5 works · 3,482 passages grounded

Lifespan
1126–1198
School
Falsafa
Also known as
Ibn Rushd
Wikipedia

The mind

Many of the commentaries on Aristotle that a judge of Córdoba wrote in the twelfth century survive today only in Hebrew or Latin translation. By the 1230s Latin scholars called their author simply the Commentator. By 1340 nearly all his commentaries existed in Hebrew, though very little of Aristotle's own text did. Dante placed him in Limbo, among the virtuous who lived outside the Christian faith, as the man who wrote the great commentary. The author was Averroes, as Europe named him; in Arabic he was Ibn Rushd.

He came from a family of judges — his grandfather had been chief judge of Córdoba and imam of its Great Mosque — and he defended philosophy as a judge would. Around 1095 al-Ghazālī, the most celebrated theologian of his age, had declared the philosophers unbelievers on three points: that the world has no beginning, that God knows particular things only in a universal way, and that the resurrection of the body is a figure of speech. Averroes answered around 1179 in the Decisive Treatise, written in the form of a legal opinion. The religious Law, he argued, commands those able to follow a demonstration — a proof from certain premises — to study philosophy. One truth cannot contradict another, so where a proof clashes with the plain sense of a verse, the verse must be interpreted.

His work on Aristotle began with a commission from the court. In 1169 Ibn Ṭufayl, a philosopher and the caliph's physician, presented him to Abū Yaʿqūb Yūsuf, the Almohad caliph who ruled Morocco and al-Andalus, Muslim Spain. According to al-Marrakushī, a historian who finished his chronicle in 1224, the caliph asked whether the heavens had existed from eternity or had a beginning. Averroes, aware that a wrong answer could be dangerous, said nothing until the caliph had shown his own learning on the question. When the caliph later complained that Aristotle was hard to follow, Ibn Ṭufayl proposed Averroes as the one to explain him. Over the next quarter-century he wrote three kinds of commentary: short digests, close paraphrases, and long commentaries that quote Aristotle section by section. All the while he served as judge in Seville and Córdoba and, from 1182, as the caliph's physician.

The commentaries had a purpose beyond teaching. Averroes believed that Avicenna, the Persian philosopher of the early eleventh century, had departed from Aristotle on central points, and that al-Ghazālī's attack had landed on Avicenna's weak arguments rather than Aristotle's. In Tahafut al-Tahafut (The Incoherence of the Incoherence), written around 1180, he answered al-Ghazālī passage by passage. Its best-known pages defend cause and effect: to deny that fire burns cotton, he argued, is to deny that things have natures, and with them the possibility of knowing anything through its causes.

Late in life he reached the conclusion that made his name in Europe. In his long commentary on Aristotle's On the Soul he argued that the intellect which receives knowledge is one and the same for all human beings. In his earlier paraphrase of the same book he had called such a view repulsive. Read in Latin, this became the mark of Averroism. In 1270 the bishop of Paris condemned it among other teachings of the arts faculty's teachers there, and Thomas Aquinas wrote a treatise against those who held it. Critics also charged his Latin followers with a "double truth", one for philosophy and another for faith, which his own Decisive Treatise rules out.

In 1195 a tribunal in Córdoba condemned his teachings, ordered his books burned, and banished him to the nearby town of Lucena. Historians disagree about why: some point to the caliph al-Manṣūr's need for the religious scholars' support in his war against the Christian kingdoms, others to a personal offence or to the criticism of tyranny in his commentary on Plato's Republic. The caliph recalled him to Marrakesh, where he died in December 1198. His body was later carried back to Córdoba. Ibn ʿArabī, then a young man and later one of the most influential Sufi thinkers, attended the funeral there. He tells that the body was loaded on one side of a pack animal and, as a counterweight, the books Averroes had written on the other.

A long-repeated account holds that he had no successors in the Islamic world. Scholars now dispute it: one has identified thirty-nine of his direct disciples, and his work was still studied in North Africa and reached scholars in Iran by the sixteenth century. In the nineteenth century his name returned to Arabic debate in the nahḍa, the Arab cultural revival, where writers argued over what his defence of reason allowed.

Key concepts

What separates a proof from a debating argument or a persuasive speech?

The starting points. A demonstration reasons from premises that are certain, so its conclusion cannot be otherwise. A dialectical argument, the kind used in debate, starts from what is widely accepted and can be no surer than that. Rhetoric starts from what seems true to the listener, and poetry moves by likeness and image. All of them can carry the truth, but only the first gives knowledge of it.

What are the four causes?

They are the four answers to the question why a thing is as it is: its matter, what it is made of; its form, the arrangement that makes it this kind of thing; its maker, what brings it about; and its purpose, what it is for. In a house: the stones, the plan, the builder, the shelter. He argues that no fifth kind is needed, and that to know a thing is to know its causes.

Who are “the theologians” he keeps arguing against?

He means the masters of kalām, the dialectical theology of the Muslim schools. They defended the faith with arguments built on premises they found convenient, such as the claim that only a living, willing agent truly acts. He distrusts them twice over: their arguments are dialectical rather than demonstrative, so they cannot settle what they claim to settle, and spread among ordinary believers they split a community into quarrelling sects.

What does he mean by “the Law”?

The Law, sharīʿa in Arabic, is the religious law of Islam revealed in the Qurʾān: what believers must do, avoid and believe. He judged by it in court. For him it is more than a code of conduct. It calls every believer to the truth, each by the road they can travel, and it orders those able to follow a proof to study the world God made.

What are the “separate intellects” that move the heavens?

They are minds with no body at all, which is what “separate” means: separate from matter. Each heavenly sphere is moved by one of them, without contact or push, so its motion never tires and never ends. The first of them is the first cause, God, on whom all the others depend. Having no matter, each is pure understanding, and what it understands is its own being.

Themes of the Mind

Concepts that recur together across the corpus held here, gathered into themes and ordered by how much of this philosopher's writing each one occupies.

Truth Does Not Oppose Truth

Can a believer follow reason all the way without betraying the faith? Everything depends on whether a proof and a revealed text can ever really disagree.

Writing as a judge, he made philosophy a duty rather than a licence: the religious Law commands those able to follow a demonstration to study what exists. Where a proof clashes with the plain sense of a verse, the verse is interpreted and the proof stands. His sharpest fire went to the theologians, who handed the public arguments that were neither proof nor plain faith. Some things stay beyond dispute: a life to come may be interpreted in its details, never denied.

  • reason and revelation
  • scripture
  • scriptural interpretation
  • hermeneutics
  • interpretation
  • religion
  • theology
  • law
  • religious epistemology
  • religious education
  • afterlife
  • miracles
  • prophecy
  • truth
  • logic

Proof, Debate and Persuasion

What does it take to be convinced, and convinced rightly? People reach their beliefs by different roads, and only one of them ends in certainty.

Most of his surviving pages are on Aristotle's logic, and they rank the roads to belief. A demonstration argues from certain premises to a conclusion that cannot be otherwise. Dialectic argues from what is widely accepted, rhetoric from what seems true to a listener, poetry by likeness, sophistry by counterfeit. Induction gathers cases and proves nothing alone. The ranking is no contempt for the lower roads: a speech moves people no syllogism would reach, and religious law speaks along all of them.

  • demonstration
  • dialectic
  • rhetoric
  • persuasion
  • poetics
  • sophistry
  • fallacies
  • argumentation
  • syllogistic logic
  • premises
  • certainty
  • induction
  • enthymeme
  • audience
  • emotion
  • geometry

Things That Act by Their Natures

Do things in the world really act, or does God do everything they seem to do? The answer decides whether nature can be understood through its causes at all.

Against theologians who held that only a living, willing agent truly acts, he defended natures: bread nourishes and fire burns by powers of their own. Deny that, and nothing can be known through its causes, and knowledge itself goes with them. Natures do not shut God out. Seed, rain and season stand between the first cause and the ripening tree, and an order in which everything serves a purpose, even one no one sees, points to a single wise maker.

  • causation
  • causality
  • nature
  • necessity
  • possibility
  • chance
  • teleology
  • divine action
  • natural powers
  • knowledge
  • scientific knowledge
  • scientific explanation
  • generation and corruption

Aristotle Restored

What does it mean to understand a great thinker rather than an inherited version of him? Recovering what Aristotle actually argued was, for him, the road to the truth itself.

For a quarter-century he worked on Aristotle in three forms: short digests, close paraphrases and long commentaries that quote the text section by section. The aim was restoration. Avicenna, he held, had departed from Aristotle on central points, and al-Ghazālī's attack had landed on those departures. He weighed the Greek commentators Alexander and Themistius reading by reading and refused al-Fārābī's revisions of the theory of proof. Beneath it lay a conviction: no one builds a science alone, so each generation starts from what earlier ones found.

  • substance
  • being
  • essence
  • universals
  • categories
  • predication
  • definition
  • forms
  • matter and form
  • potentiality and actuality
  • first principles
  • metaphysics
  • natural philosophy

One First Cause, an Eternal World

How can a changing world depend on a cause that never changes? The answer shapes what it means to call God the maker of the world.

He held the world eternal and still wholly dependent: an unchanging first cause keeps the heavens in endless circular motion, and that motion carries change down to everything that grows and perishes. There can be no second first cause, and an endless series of causes would explain nothing. He rejected the picture of heavenly minds flowing one from another down a chain; each mover of the heavens answers to the first. One power binds the cosmos, as a soul unites an animal.

  • first cause
  • unmoved mover
  • infinite regress
  • eternity
  • time
  • creation
  • motion
  • celestial motion
  • celestial bodies
  • cosmology
  • divine will
  • divine unity
  • divine simplicity
  • divine knowledge
  • intellect

By the numbers

works held
5
passages traced
3,482
concepts traced
1,536
thematic clusters
5

Concepts that travel together

The wheel takes the leading concepts of these writings and shows how often they come up together. The wider the band between two, the more passages speak of both. Among them, most often together: “causation” and “demonstration”.
Concept co-occurrence, strongest first 8 concepts, joined by 21 pairings. 92 pairings reach beyond these concepts and are not drawn.
ConceptPaired conceptShared passages
causationdemonstration119
causationeternity54
causationmetaphysics42
demonstrationepistemology39
metaphysicssubstance30
causationsubstance28
causationcosmology25
cosmologyeternity17
demonstrationmetaphysics16
causationepistemology13
demonstrationrhetoric11
causationrhetoric9
demonstrationsubstance8
cosmologydemonstration6
cosmologymetaphysics6
eternitymetaphysics5
eternitysubstance5
cosmologysubstance4
epistemologyrhetoric4
cosmologyepistemology1
epistemologysubstance1

The arc of a career

A cell's weight is that concept's share of the work's passages, so a column can be read downwards as well as a row across. Densest: causation in Tahafut al-Tahafut (The Incoherence of the Incoherence), 41.6%.

Density 0% 41.6%

Concept density per work, chronological 5 works, in the order they were written. 8 concept columns, ranked by total weight. 89 further concepts fall outside the columns shown.
WorkYearcausationdemonstrationsubstancecosmologyepistemologyrhetoricmetaphysicseternity
Talkhīṣ manṭiq Arisṭū8.9%26.2%1.1%0%3.5%17.2%0.4%0%
Talkhīṣāt al-ṭabīʿiyyāt12.5%1.6%2.4%10.7%0.2%0%0.6%4.7%
Tafsīr mā baʿd al-ṭabīʿa21.2%5%26.2%2.3%1.7%0.2%12.3%3.8%
Decisive Treatise and Epistle Dedicatory4.9%29.3%0%7.3%22%9.8%2.4%7.3%
Tahafut al-Tahafut (The Incoherence of the Incoherence)41.6%9.5%1.3%9%1.8%0.2%10.1%9.9%

Works held

Titles in your language, the original beneath in brackets; “lit.” marks our own translation where no English edition exists. Side chips show which full texts are held.

  1. Decisive Treatise and Epistle Dedicatory (Faṣl al-maqāl)

    The legal case for philosophy, written around 1179: the first of three works from those years on religion and reason, followed by an exposition of the proofs of doctrine and by the Incoherence of the Incoherence.

    AR
  2. lit. Commentary on the Metaphysics Tafsīr mā baʿd al-ṭabīʿa

    One of his last commentaries, from around 1190, and the fullest of his three on the Metaphysics, after an early epitome and a middle commentary finished in Córdoba in 1174.

    AR
  3. Tahafut al-Tahafut (The Incoherence of the Incoherence) (Tahāfut al-tahāfut)

    The long sequel to the Decisive Treatise, written around 1180: the earlier book asks whether philosophy is allowed, and this one defends its doctrines in detail.

    AR
  4. lit. Middle Commentaries on Aristotle's Logic Talkhīṣ manṭiq Arisṭū

    The earliest layer of his work on Aristotle: most of these commentaries were finished by the mid-1170s, though the long commentary on the Posterior Analytics belongs to his last years.

    AR
  5. lit. Middle Commentaries on Aristotle's Natural Philosophy Talkhīṣāt al-ṭabīʿiyyāt

    His first commentaries on Aristotle's science of nature; the long commentaries on On the Heavens and On the Soul, which reached Latin in the thirteenth century, came much later.

    AR
Begin a dialogue with Averroes

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Set two minds against each other

Each of these is a question the two of them answer differently. Choose one and they argue it out, both drawing on the texts held here.