New Openings

Leibniz asks for an inventory of all that is already known, and a science for using it.

by Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz9 passages held

French, the original language

Original title: Nouvelles Ouvertures
First published: 1903(published posthumously)
Original language: French

Overview

This French sketch opens on a worry: the century's appetite for getting to the bottom of things may not last, and if people find it does them little good they could slide back from curiosity into indifference and then ignorance. Mathematics had never gone further, history was being dug out of archives, and soon, Leibniz predicted, scholars would have to search among the Chinese and the Arabs to complete the history of mankind. What was missing was the use of all this. Men of learning scorned practical judgement and men of affairs trusted to luck: logicians had never worked out the degrees of probability, though a sensible gambler or merchant spreads his risks, and statesmen neglected finance and the army, both almost wholly mathematical. Two things would let people profit from what they know. The first is an exact inventory of existing knowledge, made of lists, tables and catalogues of facts rather than systems or dictionaries; the second is the general science, a method both for using what is known and for discovering what is not. Without them, he writes, our riches make us poor, like a great warehouse where nothing can be found, an image he used more than once. Louis Couturat, the French logician, first printed it in 1903 among the unpublished fragments he gathered from the Hanover manuscripts. Marcelo Dascal's English selection of 2006, following the Academy edition of Leibniz's works, dates it to 1686.

Key concepts

What worry opens the sketch?

That the century’s appetite for getting to the bottom of things may not last. If people find it does them little good, Leibniz fears, they could slide back from curiosity into indifference and then into ignorance. The rest of the sketch proposes what would make knowledge useful enough to keep curiosity alive.

What kind of inventory of knowledge does Leibniz ask for?

An exact inventory of existing knowledge, made of lists, tables and catalogues of facts rather than systems or dictionaries. It is the first of the two things he says would let people profit from what they know. Without it, he writes, our riches make us poor, like a great warehouse where nothing can be found.

What is the general science in New Openings?

The second thing Leibniz says is needed besides an inventory: a method both for using what is already known and for discovering what is not. The inventory gathers knowledge; the general science makes it usable. Without the two, Leibniz writes, a learned age could not profit from its learning.

What are degrees of probability, and who had neglected them?

Measures of how likely something is, for judging where certainty is not to be had. Logicians, Leibniz complains, had never worked them out, though a sensible gambler or merchant spreads his risks. Men of learning scorned practical judgement, men of affairs trusted to luck, and statesmen neglected finance and the army, both almost wholly mathematical.

Themes of the book

What this book returns to, gathered into themes and ordered by how much of the text each one occupies.

A Warehouse Where Nothing Can Be Found

What good is knowledge nobody can find? Leibniz fears the century’s curiosity will sour into indifference unless what it knows is inventoried and put to use.

The sketch opens on a worry: if people find that getting to the bottom of things does them little good, they could slide back from curiosity into indifference and then ignorance. Mathematics had never gone further and history was being dug out of archives; what was missing was the use of it all. Two things would let people profit from what they know: an exact inventory of existing knowledge, made of lists, tables and catalogues of facts rather than systems or dictionaries, and the general science, a method for using what is known and discovering what is not. Without them, he writes, our riches make us poor.

collective knowledge
general knowledge
scientific progress
scientific method
pursuit of truth
history
historical method
historical evidence
division of labor
public welfare
human welfare

Enter a dialogue

The Missing Logic of Probability

Why do learned people handle practical affairs so badly? Leibniz blames a missing logic: nobody had worked out the degrees of probability, though every sensible gambler and merchant relies on them.

Men of learning, Leibniz complains, scorned practical judgement, and men of affairs trusted to luck. The logicians had never worked out the degrees of probability, though a sensible gambler or merchant spreads his risks as a matter of course. Statesmen neglected finance and the army, both almost wholly mathematical. The complaint cuts both ways: the learned hold knowledge they cannot use, and practical people decide without the reasoning that would help them. A logic for weighing what is likely, rather than proving what is certain, is the bridge he finds missing.

probability
practical reasoning
decision theory
risk management
applied mathematics
theory and practice
political philosophy