A God Who Chooses, Against a God Who Unfolds
Does everything unfold from God by necessity, or does God understand the possibles and choose among them? In private notes, Leibniz set the second God against Spinoza’s.
The occasion was Johann Georg Wachter’s Elucidarius cabalisticus of 1706, which claimed that Spinoza had only put the Kabbalah into modern dress, since the Jewish mystical tradition already held his single substance. Leibniz’s notes go through nine propositions from the first part of the Ethics and argue that each is false. He remarks that Spinoza denies God an intellect while granting him thought, and against a necessary unfolding of everything from God he sets a God whose understanding holds the possibles and whose choice decides among them. The notes were never prepared for readers; their title came from the scholar who published them in 1854.
- necessity
- contingency
- creation
- emanation
- freedom
- free will
- will
- volition
- divine causation
- substance
- spinozism
- thought
- kabbalah
- ideas
Enter a dialogue
- Spinoza, for whom God is the only thing that truly exists, rejects a God who decrees by bare will, and you agree. Where do you part company?
- Everything follows from God as a triangle's angles follow from its nature, Spinoza says. Why is that no analogy for things that actually exist?
- Spinoza held that seeing events as necessary steadies the mind. Does a patient in pain feel it any less for knowing it had to be?
- Why is nothing lovable in a God who produces good and evil by necessity, so that Spinoza's love of God is only for show?
- A world that is no accident is necessary, on Spinoza's view. Why is a free God the middle path between chance and necessity?