The Leibniz-Clarke Correspondence

Space, time and God's workmanship, argued between Leibniz and Newton's ally through the Princess of Wales.

by Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz174 passages held

French, the original language

Original title: Recueil des lettres entre Leibniz et Clarke
First published: 1717(published posthumously)
Original language: French

Overview

Caroline of Brandenburg-Ansbach had corresponded with Leibniz from Hanover, and when her father-in-law became George I of Great Britain in 1714 she went to London as Princess of Wales. In November 1715 Leibniz wrote to her that natural religion was decaying in England: Locke's followers doubted whether the soul was immaterial, and Newton's held that God had to mend his world from time to time, like a clockmaker whose work runs down. The letter came at the height of his quarrel with Newton over who had invented the calculus. Caroline showed the letter to Samuel Clarke, a London clergyman and Newton's ally, and an exchange followed, five papers from each side, all passing through her hands. Clarke defended absolute space and time, God's freedom to act in nature, and the reality of empty space and atoms. Leibniz answered with two principles. Nothing happens without a sufficient reason, so God could have had no reason to place the world at one spot in absolute space rather than another; and no two things are exactly alike, so space and time can only be orders of relations among things. Leibniz died on 14 November 1716 before answering Clarke's fifth reply, and in 1717 Clarke published the whole exchange in London, with Leibniz's French beside his own English translation and a dedication to Caroline. H. G. Alexander's 1956 edition traced its question of absolute space forward to Einstein.

Key concepts

What is the dispute between absolute and relational space?

Whether space is a real thing in its own right or only an order among things. Samuel Clarke defended absolute space and time, in which God places the world, along with the reality of empty space and atoms. Leibniz held that space and time are nothing but orders of relations among things, so that without things there would be no space and no time.

How does the principle of sufficient reason work against Clarke?

Nothing happens without a sufficient reason, so God could have had no reason to place the world at one spot in absolute space rather than another. If absolute space were real, God would face a choice with nothing to decide it. Leibniz concludes that there is no such choice to make, because there is no such space.

What is the identity of indiscernibles?

The principle that no two things are exactly alike: things that differed in nothing would not be two things. Leibniz used it alongside sufficient reason against Clarke, since the places of an absolute space would be exactly alike, and so could not be told apart even by God.

What was the charge about God as a clockmaker?

Leibniz’s complaint, in his first letter of November 1715, that Newton’s followers held God had to mend his world from time to time, like a clockmaker whose work runs down. He paired it with the charge that Locke’s followers doubted the soul was immaterial. Clarke answered by defending God’s freedom to act in nature.

How was the exchange carried on and published?

Through Caroline, Princess of Wales, who showed Leibniz’s letter to Samuel Clarke and passed on five papers from each side. Leibniz died on 14 November 1716 before answering Clarke’s fifth reply, and in 1717 Clarke published the whole exchange in London, Leibniz’s French beside his own English translation, with a dedication to Caroline.

Themes of the book

What this book returns to, gathered into themes and ordered by how much of the text each one occupies.

Is Space a Thing, or an Order of Relations?

Could God have put the whole world at a different spot in space? For Clarke, defending absolute space, the question made sense; for Leibniz it shows that space is only an order among things.

Leibniz answered Clarke with two principles. Nothing happens without a sufficient reason, so God could have had no reason to place the world at one spot in absolute space rather than another; and no two things are exactly alike. If space were a real thing, its places would be indiscernible from one another, and choosing among them would be a choice without a reason. Space and time can therefore only be orders of relations among things. Clarke held his ground for absolute space and time and for empty space and atoms. H. G. Alexander’s 1956 edition traced the question forward to Einstein.

space
time
absolute space
relationalism
relations
principle of sufficient reason
sufficient reason
identity of indiscernibles
vacuum
matter
motion
creation

Enter a dialogue

Does God Have to Mend His Clock?

Is it more worthy of God to step into his world, or never to need to? Leibniz charged Newton’s followers with making God a clockmaker whose work runs down.

The exchange began with a letter to Caroline, Princess of Wales, in November 1715, warning that natural religion was decaying in England. Locke’s followers doubted whether the soul was immaterial, and Newton’s held that God had to mend his world from time to time, like a clockmaker whose work runs down. For Leibniz that was a poor account of God’s workmanship; Clarke answered by defending God’s freedom to act in nature. The letter came at the height of Leibniz’s quarrel with Newton over who had invented the calculus, and the ten papers stopped only when Leibniz died in November 1716.

divine wisdom
divine action
miracles
mechanism
divine providence
divine attributes
divine choice
free will
agency
soul

Enter a dialogue

Within this work

passages held: 174
distinct concepts: 187
by passages held, corpus-wide: #380

What this book thinks together

The wheel takes this book’s leading concepts and shows how often they come up together. The wider the band between two, the more of its passages speak of both. Among them, most often together: “space” and “time”.

Concept co-occurrence, strongest first 8 concepts, joined by 20 pairings. 90 pairings reach beyond these concepts and are not drawn.
Concept	Paired concept	Shared passages
space	time	16
matter	space	7
motion	space	7
creation	space	6
creation	time	5
causation	free will	4
causation	principle of sufficient reason	4
matter	motion	4
free will	principle of sufficient reason	3
principle of sufficient reason	space	3
causation	motion	2
causation	creation	1
causation	matter	1
causation	space	1
creation	free will	1
creation	matter	1
creation	motion	1
free will	space	1
free will	time	1
motion	principle of sufficient reason	1

Works held

The author's work in order, this book marked in place. Your-language title first, the original beneath it where the two differ; side chips show which full texts are held.

1684 Meditations on Knowledge, Truth, and Ideas (Meditationes de cognitione, veritate et ideis)
A journal article of 1684, written into the Arnauld–Malebranche quarrel over ideas; its grades of knowledge return in the Discourse on Metaphysics and the New Essays.
LA
1691 Whether the Essence of a Body Consists in Extension (Lettre sur la question si l'essence du corps consiste dans l'étendue)
Against the Cartesian view that body is nothing but extension: a letter to the Paris Journal des Sçavans in 1691, followed by a second in 1693.
FR
1695 New System of Nature (Système nouveau de la nature et de la communication des substances)
Leibniz's first public statement of his system, printed in Paris in 1695; his replies to Foucher and Bayle kept it in the journals until 1698.
FR
1698 On Nature Itself (De ipsa natura)
An answer to Johann Christoph Sturm in the Acta Eruditorum of 1698, defending forces inside created things and tying the dynamics to the metaphysics of substance.
LA
1710 Theodicy (Essais de Théodicée sur la bonté de Dieu, la liberté de l'homme et l'origine du mal)
Published anonymously at Amsterdam in 1710, it was the book by which the eighteenth century knew Leibniz, and the one Voltaire answered with Candide.
FR
1717 The Leibniz-Clarke Correspondence (Recueil des lettres entre Leibniz et Clarke) you are here FR
1718 Principles of Nature and Grace, Based on Reason (Principes de la nature et de la grâce fondés en raison)
A companion summary from the same Vienna months as the Monadology, long mistaken for it and printed before it, in 1718.
FR
1720 Monadology (Monadologie)
Written in French in 1714, it was known for over a century only in German and Latin translation.
FR
1765 New Essays on Human Understanding (Nouveaux Essais sur l'entendement humain)
The book-length reply to Locke, written as a dialogue in 1703–04, withheld after Locke's death and first printed in 1765.
FR
1840 Discourse Touching the Method of Certitude and the Art of Discovery (Discours touchant la méthode de la certitude et l'art d'inventer)
A plea for royal patronage of the sciences, addressed to an unnamed king, apparently Louis XIV, setting out the method of certainty and art of discovery Leibniz pursued for decades.
FR
1840 On the Ultimate Origination of Things (De rerum originatione radicali)
A short Latin essay of 1697 on why there is a world at all, left in manuscript until 1840.
LA
1840 Reflections on the Doctrine of a Single Universal Spirit (Considérations sur la doctrine d'un Esprit Universel Unique)
A French essay written in 1702 at the Prussian queen's palace outside Berlin, and left unprinted until 1840.
FR
1846 Discourse on Metaphysics (Discours de métaphysique)
The opening statement of Leibniz's mature metaphysics, written early in 1686 and left unprinted until 1846.
FR
1846 The Leibniz-Arnauld Correspondence (Correspondance de Leibniz et d'Arnauld)
The exchange of 1686 to 1690 between Leibniz and Arnauld over the Discourse on Metaphysics, every letter carried by the Landgrave of Hessen-Rheinfels.
FR
1854 Refutation of Spinoza (Animadversiones ad Joh. Georg. Wachteri librum de recondita Hebraeorum philosophia)
Private Latin notes on Wachter's book about Spinoza and the Kabbalah, given their title by the French scholar who published them in 1854.
FR
1890 Tentamen Anagogicum: An Anagogical Essay in the Investigation of Causes (Essai anagogique dans la recherche des causes)
A French essay of about 1696, from the years of Leibniz's dynamics, defending final causes against the mechanical philosophers.
FR
1903 New Openings (Nouvelles Ouvertures)
Written in French in 1686, by the Academy edition's dating, and left in manuscript until Couturat printed it in 1903.
FR
1903 Preface to the General Science (Préface de la Science générale)
Probably from 1677, an unfinished preface to the universal language of reasoning, unprinted until 1903.
FR
1915 Confessio Philosophi (Confessio philosophi)
Leibniz's first developed theodicy, a Latin dialogue from his Paris years; revised after Steno's objections, its account of sin returns much changed in the Theodicy of 1710.
LA

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