Ethics as Adaptation
How can a theory of natural development tell anyone how to act, rather than merely how organisms came to be? The answer matters because it could turn the conflict between private advantage and social duty into a temporary defect of adaptation.
Spencer treats conduct as an adaptive process, not as a command dropped into human life from outside it. In the 1879 volume, he measures acts by what they conduce to: longer, broader, more complete life for the person, offspring, and surrounding society. Against intuitionism, utilitarianism, and theology, he argues that each captures only part of this history. A society still divided between self-interest and regard for others is therefore insufficiently adapted; in a fully evolved society, the two would converge as natural fact.
- evolution
- adaptation
- biology
- psychology
- instinct
- habit
- emotion
Enter a dialogue
- A devoted mother nurses her baby past her strength, collapses, and her other children suffer. Why do you count that as a failure despite the devotion?
- We call a knife good when it cuts. If a good act is well fitted to its end in the same way, whose end is that?
- The sense of duty will fade as people grow more moral, you say, because good acts become pleasures. Is someone who feels no 'ought' more moral?
- Pessimists and optimists both judge life by whether it holds more pleasure than pain, you note. Why should pleasure and pain be the test of a life's worth?
- You call those who trust conscience, count pleasures or obey a divine command each partly right. Why should the history of conduct settle their quarrel?