Ethics as Adaptation
How can a theory of natural development tell anyone how to act, rather than merely how organisms came to be? The answer matters because it could turn the conflict between private advantage and social duty into a temporary defect of adaptation.
Spencer treats conduct as an adaptive process, not as a command dropped into human life from outside it. In the 1879 volume, he measures acts by what they conduce to: longer, broader, more complete life for the person, offspring, and surrounding society. Against intuitionism, utilitarianism, and theology, he argues that each captures only part of this history. A society still divided between self-interest and regard for others is therefore insufficiently adapted; in a fully evolved society, the two would converge as natural fact.
- evolution
- adaptation
- biology
- psychology
- instinct
- habit
- emotion
Enter a dialogue
- When a person’s welfare conflicts with another’s, would you call that conflict evidence of incomplete adaptation?
- You treat rival moral theories as partial; what would show that adaptation completes the account?
- What would a person have to sacrifice, in your account, before self-interest could converge with concern for others?
- How would you have a person tell genuine moral progress from inherited moral feeling?
- Where would you place moral judgment when an act benefits the community but diminishes the actor’s own life?