PhilosopherEngland

Margaret Cavendish

Without Latin, she gave matter a mind of its own

5 works · 1,813 passages grounded

Lifespan
~1623–1673
School
Naturalism
Wikipedia

The mind

Matter, as the new philosophy of the 1640s described it, did nothing by itself. René Descartes held that a body is only extension, moved from outside, and that thinking belongs to a separate substance, the mind. Thomas Hobbes allowed no second substance, but his bodies too moved only when another body pushed them. Both men were guests in Paris of William Cavendish, Marquess of Newcastle, an exiled English general, and of his wife Margaret, who by her own account exchanged little more than courtesies with them. She came to think that both were wrong about matter. Her claim, argued in book after book, was that matter moves itself, and that every part of it senses and knows in some degree.

She had almost no schooling. Born Margaret Lucas, the youngest of eight children of an Essex landowner who died when she was an infant, she was taught at home to read, write, sing and dance, and she never learned Latin, the language of the universities. In 1643 she joined the household of Henrietta Maria, the queen of Charles I, as a maid of honour, and the next year she followed the queen into exile in France. There, in 1645, she married Newcastle, who was thirty years older and had left England after losing the battle of Marston Moor. The Civil War kept costing her family. In August 1648 her brother Charles Lucas, a royalist commander, was shot by a firing squad at Colchester after the town surrendered to Parliament's army. In November 1651 she crossed to London with her brother-in-law to petition for an income from her husband's confiscated estates. The petition failed. She stayed until 1653, and while she was there she began to write for print.

Her first book, Poems and Fancies of 1653, built the world out of atoms. Two years later, in Philosophical and Physical Opinions, she printed a condemnation of that theory (scholars still dispute how complete the break was) and set out the system she kept for the rest of her life. Atoms that neither sense nor think, she argued, could not meet by chance and produce a world as regular as this one. Order requires knowledge, and since she admitted nothing into nature except matter, the knowledge had to belong to matter itself. A hand that throws a ball therefore passes no motion into it: the ball moves by its own motion, and the hand is only the occasion. The human mind is matter as well, so the question that troubled readers of Descartes, how a mind can move a body, does not arise. God alone she placed outside nature, and beyond what reason can know.

Her contemporaries would not dispute with her in print; she arranged the dispute herself. Philosophical Letters of 1664 answers Hobbes, Descartes and two other authors passage by passage, in letters to a correspondent she invented. Observations upon Experimental Philosophy, two years later, argues against the Royal Society, the new London body for experimental science, and against its microscopes: a lens, she argued, shows the outside of a thing, often falsely, and only reason reaches the motions within. She bound a fiction, The Blazing World, into the same volume.

She sent her books to the universities and to scholars. The replies praised her and left the arguments alone. Only Joseph Glanvill, a clergyman who defended the Royal Society, argued back. On 30 May 1667 the Society received her at Arundel House in London; she was the first woman to attend one of its meetings. Samuel Pepys, the diarist, wrote afterwards that he had heard her say nothing worth hearing. She published Grounds of Natural Philosophy, the last version of her system, in 1668, and died on 15 December 1673.

After her death she was remembered as an eccentric; Virginia Woolf, in an essay of 1925, found real fire somewhere in the mass of her writing. Philosophers began to read the arguments in the last decades of the twentieth century, and in 2001 Cambridge University Press published the Observations in an edition by Eileen O'Neill.

Key concepts

What is self-moving matter?

Self-moving matter has its motion in itself and needs nothing outside to push it. Cavendish denies that any body hands its motion to another. Even a lump of gold is not at rest: what looks like rest is matter working to hold its shape, just as it takes as much force to stop a ship as to launch one. Nature has no rest in it, only degrees of motion.

Was Margaret Cavendish a materialist?

Yes, though her matter is alive. Cavendish holds that nature is one infinite body and that whatever is not body is no part of it. The human mind is the finest matter, and even the thought of a bodiless spirit is made of matter. Immaterial substances in nature she compares to hobgoblins used to frighten children. God alone is immaterial, and he stands outside nature.

What does Cavendish mean by sense and reason?

Sense and reason are the two kinds of knowledge she finds in every part of nature, and the only guides she accepts in philosophy. Sense perceives particular things, and reason, which is harder to deceive, judges what sense reports. Neither belongs to humans alone. A man, a tree and a stone may perceive the same object, she writes, each in the way proper to its kind.

What does Cavendish mean by fancy?

Fancy is her word for imagination, which she defines as a voluntary action of reason: the mind making figures of its own accord instead of copying what stands before it. She keeps it apart from reasoning toward what is probable, and faults philosophers who pass off poetical fictions as truth. Kept in its place it has a use of its own. She issued a story of another world beside a treatise on nature.

How does Cavendish separate philosophy from faith?

She gives nature to reason and God to faith. Nature is material and can be studied by sense and reason. God is immaterial and incomprehensible, so no creature can form an idea of what he is. Reason gets only as far as knowing that God exists and that nature depends on him as an eternal servant depends on an eternal master. The rest she leaves to the Church.

What does Cavendish mean by fame?

Fame, for Cavendish, is a second life in the minds of others. In Grounds of Natural Philosophy she describes people leaving marks for remembrance, such as books, statues and houses that bear their names, so that later ages will perceive them. She calls this an after-life, expects it to last longer than a human life, and counts herself among those who prefer it to a short present one.

Themes of the Mind

Concepts that recur together across the corpus held here, gathered into themes and ordered by how much of this philosopher's writing each one occupies.

Nothing in nature is dead

Could a world this regular be the work of matter that knows nothing? Cavendish stakes everything on the answer that it could not, and so the whole of nature has to be alive.

Descartes and Hobbes gave her century a matter that waits to be pushed. Cavendish answers that order requires knowledge: if nature were not self-knowing and perceptive she would run into confusion, since no method comes of ignorant motion. So matter moves itself, there is no rest anywhere in nature, and what is called death is only motions turning to other work. Nature keeps to her kinds and varies every particular, neither wholly bound nor wholly free. Irregularity, she says, troubles single creatures and never nature as a whole.

  • matter
  • motion
  • self-motion
  • materialism
  • causation
  • nature
  • life
  • change

One knowing creature among many

What follows for human beings if sense and reason belong to every creature? They lose their monopoly on knowledge, and the habit of ranking themselves first begins to look like self-love.

Fish, she suggests, may know more of water than people do, birds more of air and bees more of the juices of flowers; that they lack human speech proves nothing about their understanding. A man, a tree and a stone can perceive the same object, each after its own kind. The human mind is matter too, and even its thought of a bodiless thing is made of matter. People who imagine themselves petty gods forget they are one small part of nature. Only a supernatural soul, which she leaves to faith, sets them apart.

  • perception
  • knowledge
  • sensation
  • mind
  • body
  • soul
  • natural kinds
  • self-knowledge

What reason can reach

How much of nature can a single human mind know, and by what means? Cavendish trusts reason above the senses and both above any instrument, and still calls every philosopher a guesser.

Certainty is not on offer in her philosophy. A part cannot know the whole it belongs to, so the best account of nature is the most probable one, and she claims no more for her own. Human skill, which she calls art, is nature's handmaid: it serves well in a physician's hands and deceives when it pretends to show nature's inner workings. Reason has an outer limit as well. The study of nature leads it to the knowledge that God exists and never to what God is, which she leaves to faith.

  • reason
  • epistemology
  • natural philosophy
  • appearance and reality
  • sense perception
  • God
  • theology
  • religion

Writing to be remembered

Why does a woman shut out of the schools write philosophy at all, and for whom? Her answer is fame: a long life in the memory of later ages, which she openly prefers to a short one now.

Learning, she writes, is artificial and wit is natural, and women lack the first only because the schools are closed to them. So she writes in plain English, charging authors who heap up hard words with putting the horses behind the coach, and resolves like a duellist to argue only with famous opponents. She would sooner be singular than imitate. Where argument will not reach, she turns to fancy and binds a fiction to a treatise like two worlds joined at their poles. Her own censorious age matters less to her than the future one.

  • imagination
  • education
  • fortune

By the numbers

works held
5
passages traced
1,813
concepts traced
1,151
thematic clusters
6

Concepts that travel together

The wheel takes the leading concepts of these writings and shows how often they come up together. The wider the band between two, the more passages speak of both. Among them, most often together: “matter” and “motion”.
Concept co-occurrence, strongest first 8 concepts, joined by 28 pairings. 75 pairings reach beyond these concepts and are not drawn.
ConceptPaired conceptShared passages
mattermotion211
matternatural philosophy98
motionnatural philosophy90
matterperception79
causationmatter78
causationnatural philosophy76
motionperception72
causationmotion69
matternature64
motionnature60
materialismperception49
knowledgeperception46
natureperception40
natural philosophyperception34
knowledgematter29
materialismmotion28
causationnature25
causationperception24
materialismnature24
knowledgenature21
causationmaterialism17
knowledgemotion17
materialismmatter17
natural philosophynature11
knowledgenatural philosophy9
knowledgematerialism7
causationknowledge6
materialismnatural philosophy5

The arc of a career

A cell's weight is that concept's share of the work's passages, so a column can be read downwards as well as a row across. Densest: motion in Philosophical and Physical Opinions, 45.7%.

Density 0% 45.7%

Concept density per work, chronological 5 works, in the order they were written. 8 concept columns, ranked by total weight. 71 further concepts fall outside the columns shown.
WorkYearmotionmatterperceptionnatural philosophycausationnatureknowledgematerialism
Philosophical and Physical Opinions45.7%25.7%10.2%13.3%7%6.3%9.5%0.6%
Philosophical Letters25.6%30.8%16%18.7%17.6%12.7%5.4%12.5%
Observations upon Experimental Philosophy19.8%32%35.9%19.1%13.3%19.4%9.9%7.3%
The Blazing World4.4%5%7.5%11.3%8.1%5.6%5.6%4.4%
Grounds of Natural Philosophy13.5%10.4%21.2%9.3%8.5%8.9%6.9%5.4%

Works held

Titles in your language, the original beneath in brackets; “lit.” marks our own translation where no English edition exists. Side chips show which full texts are held.

EARLY — FROM ATOMS TO SELF-MOVING MATTER

  1. 1655 Philosophical and Physical Opinions

    Printed in London in 1655 while she lived in exile at Antwerp, this is her first full treatise on nature, and its opening part reprints Philosophical Fancies of 1653. Each of her later books on nature starts from the system laid out here.

    EN

THE DISPUTES — DESCARTES, HOBBES & THE MICROSCOPE

  1. 1664 Philosophical Letters

    Letters to a fictional correspondent, published in 1664, a year after the enlarged second edition of Philosophical and Physical Opinions. Here she tests the system of that treatise, passage by passage, against four named authors and, in a last section, several more.

    EN
  2. 1666 Observations upon Experimental Philosophy

    Her direct reply to the Royal Society's experimental programme, and her longest argument about how nature can be known at all. It was issued in 1666 in one volume with The Blazing World and again in 1668.

    EN
  3. 1666 The Blazing World

    The fiction issued with Observations upon Experimental Philosophy in 1666 and reissued in 1668. It gives her natural philosophy a plot, a heroine and a war, and takes the same side against the experimenters.

    EN

LATE — THE SYSTEM RESTATED

  1. 1668 Grounds of Natural Philosophy

    Her last statement of her system, published in 1668, five years before her death. It replaces Philosophical and Physical Opinions, leaves behind the polemics of the two books before it, and adds an appendix of speculations about other worlds.

    EN
Begin a dialogue with Margaret Cavendish

— or wander to another mind

Set two minds against each other

Each of these is a question the two of them answer differently. Choose one and they argue it out, both drawing on the texts held here.