WorkMargaret Cavendish

Philosophical Letters

Hobbes, Descartes, Henry More and van Helmont, examined page by page in letters to a friend who never existed.

by Margaret Cavendish614 passages held

  • English, the original language, and your language
First published
(aged 41)
Original language
English

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Overview

Thomas Hobbes and René Descartes both came to dinner in Paris in the 1640s at the house of William Cavendish, Marquess of Newcastle. His wife Margaret, by her own account, never got past small talk with either. Twenty years later Margaret Cavendish answered them in print. Her case is that matter needs no soul, no spirit and no push from another body, because it moves and knows by itself. The book of 1664 takes the form of letters to an unnamed "Madam" who has asked for her opinion of four famous authors. It was not a real correspondence. The men she wanted to answer would not dispute with her in print, so she invented a reader who would ask. She starts with Hobbes's Leviathan, setting its politics aside, and denies that we see because an object presses on the eye: the eye's own matter, she argues, makes a copy of what is in front of it. Against Descartes, whom she knew only from passages translated for her, she rejects a mind made of something other than body and denies that one body can hand its motion to another. Against Henry More, the Cambridge Platonist, she refuses an immaterial spirit set over nature to direct dead matter. Jan Baptist van Helmont, the Flemish physician and chemist, has the third of the four sections to himself. The fourth turns to other writers, William Harvey and Galileo among them, and to questions about her own earlier treatise. Throughout she keeps theology out and argues from nature alone. On her account the world holds one kind of thing, and the puzzle of how a mind could move a body, which occupied Descartes's readers, never arises. She sent More a copy, and he told his friend Anne Conway, herself a philosopher, that the author could be sure nobody would trouble her with a reply. The letters she had back from scholars made almost no attempt to argue with her. The exception was Joseph Glanvill, a clergyman who wrote in defence of the Royal Society: he took up her positions and argued back in his letters to her.

Key concepts

What does 'patterning out' mean?

Patterning out is Cavendish's word for how perception works: the perceiver's own matter forms a copy of the object. Nothing travels from the thing to the eye and nothing presses on it. The sensitive matter of the eye moves itself into the figure of what stands before it, and the rational matter makes the same figure as a thought. The object serves only as the model.

What is an occasional cause?

An occasional cause prompts a change without producing it. Cavendish contrasts it with the prime or principal cause, which is the moving body's own matter. A watchmaker is the occasion of a watch running as it does, yet when the watch is carried about it goes by its own motion, and the watchmaker is elsewhere. She says no mistake is more frequent than confusing the two.

What are sensitive and rational matter?

They are the two self-moving kinds of matter, which she also calls life and knowledge. Sensitive matter works within the heavier matter that cannot move itself and produces sensation; rational matter moves only in its own parts and produces thought. Both are present in every creature and in every part of a creature, so an eye or an ear has knowledge of its own.

Can nature be infinite if God is infinite?

Yes, she argues, because the two infinities are of different kinds. Nature is an infinite body with infinitely many parts and a natural wisdom to order them. God is an infinite immaterial being whose power is supernatural and beyond understanding. A bodily infinite and a bodiless one cannot obstruct each other, so calling nature infinite takes nothing from God, who remains the God of nature.

Does she think only humans have reason?

No. Cavendish denies that man is, in her phrase, a monopoler of all reason. A foal knows its dam and finds its food when an infant cannot, and drugs made from plants and minerals, though they cannot pound or infuse as a person does, work upon a body in their own way. Each kind of creature has sense and reason fitted to its own nature.

Themes of the book

What this book returns to, gathered into themes and ordered by how much of the text each one occupies.

Perception and motion from within

Does the world press itself on the eye and one body hand its motion to the next, or does every body do its own seeing and moving? The answer decides whether matter is passive stuff or an agent.

Hobbes explains sight by pressure from the object, and Descartes lets one body pass its motion to another. Cavendish refuses both. Two men see each other across a distance with other bodies between, and nothing presses; the eye's own matter patterns out a copy of what is before it and dissolves it a moment later. Motion is not a thing that can leave the hand: if it travelled into the bowl, the hand would soon be weak and useless. The thrown bowl moves by its own motion, and the hand is only the occasion.

  • perception
  • sensation
  • motion
  • self-motion
  • causation
  • light

Nature without immaterial spirits

Is there anything in nature that is not body: a mind apart from the brain, a spirit that steers dead matter? Cavendish answers no, and hands whatever is truly bodiless over to faith.

Descartes seats the mind in a kernel of the brain, and she pictures it there like a spider in a cobweb, waiting for news from the threads. Henry More sets an immaterial spirit over nature, and she doubts that something without body could grapple with gross, heavy matter. Van Helmont's invisible principles she counts as effects mistaken for causes. Her own rule is to argue on the bare ground of natural philosophy and not mix divinity into it. God and the supernatural soul she leaves to the Church, as matters reason cannot reach.

  • soul
  • mind
  • immateriality
  • mind-body problem
  • materialism
  • theology
  • religion

Within this work

passages held
614
distinct concepts
564
by passages held, corpus-wide
#115

What this book thinks together

The wheel takes this book’s leading concepts and shows how often they come up together. The wider the band between two, the more of its passages speak of both. Among them, most often together: “matter” and “motion”.
Concept co-occurrence, strongest first 8 concepts, joined by 28 pairings. 76 pairings reach beyond these concepts and are not drawn.
ConceptPaired conceptShared passages
mattermotion87
causationmatter38
matternatural philosophy38
motionnatural philosophy36
causationmotion35
causationnatural philosophy29
matterperception29
motionperception29
materialismperception26
matternature26
motionnature24
materialismmotion23
mattermind18
materialismnature16
mindperception14
materialismmind12
causationmaterialism11
causationperception11
materialismmatter11
causationnature10
mindmotion10
natural philosophyperception10
natureperception10
mindnature8
natural philosophynature5
materialismnatural philosophy4
causationmind2
mindnatural philosophy2

Works held

The author's work in order, this book marked in place. Your-language title first, the original beneath it where the two differ; side chips show which full texts are held.

  1. 1655 Philosophical and Physical Opinions

    Printed in London in 1655 while she lived in exile at Antwerp, this is her first full treatise on nature, and its opening part reprints Philosophical Fancies of 1653. Each of her later books on nature starts from the system laid out here.

    EN
  2. 1664 Philosophical Letters you are here EN
  3. 1666 Observations upon Experimental Philosophy

    Her direct reply to the Royal Society's experimental programme, and her longest argument about how nature can be known at all. It was issued in 1666 in one volume with The Blazing World and again in 1668.

    EN
  4. 1666 The Blazing World

    The fiction issued with Observations upon Experimental Philosophy in 1666 and reissued in 1668. It gives her natural philosophy a plot, a heroine and a war, and takes the same side against the experimenters.

    EN
  5. 1668 Grounds of Natural Philosophy

    Her last statement of her system, published in 1668, five years before her death. It replaces Philosophical and Physical Opinions, leaves behind the polemics of the two books before it, and adds an appendix of speculations about other worlds.

    EN
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