PhilosopherGermany

Edith Stein

The phenomenologist who asked how we know another's pain

4 works · 1,183 passages grounded

Lifespan
1891–1942
Also known as
Teresia Benedicta a Cruce
Wikipedia

The mind

At the University of Breslau the psychologist Georg Moskiewicz handed Edmund Husserl's Logical Investigations to a young student of psychology and told her that at Göttingen, where Husserl taught, the students philosophised day and night. The student was Edith Stein, and in 1913, after two years at Breslau, she moved to Göttingen. Husserl was the founder of phenomenology, a method that sets theories about the mind aside and describes experience exactly as it is lived. The method had an obvious weak point. It begins with one person's consciousness, examined from within, and a philosophy that begins there owes an account of how it ever reaches anyone else. Stein took that question for her doctoral thesis, broke off in 1915 to nurse in an Austrian military hospital, and finished the thesis in the summer of 1916.

Her answer is the claim she is remembered for. When we see pain in someone's face, we do not work it out from our own case, and we do not catch it as we catch a mood: we see it, there, as a fact about that person. Yet we never have it as we have our own pain. Empathy, in Stein's use of the word, is the name for this experience: we meet another person's life directly, and it stays theirs. The rest of the thesis, On the Problem of Empathy, is built on that claim. A person learns what kind of being she is, and even that her body is one body among others, through the people who see her. The University of Freiburg, where Husserl now held a chair, gave the thesis its highest grade.

From October 1916 she was Husserl's assistant, transcribing and editing his manuscripts for sixteen months, until she resigned in February 1918. The next step in a German academic career was the Habilitation, the second thesis that qualifies a scholar to lecture, and it had been closed to women. Göttingen turned hers away in 1919, and Husserl's letter of recommendation gave her little support. She petitioned the Prussian ministry of education, which ruled in February 1920 that she was right in principle; her own case did not change. The work she had written was printed in 1922 as Philosophy of Psychology and the Humanities, which carries her analysis from two persons to the crowd and the community, and An Investigation Concerning the State followed it in 1925.

The next turn in her life came from outside philosophy. Stein had been born into a Jewish family and had long since given up praying. Accounts of her conversion to Catholicism all point to one book, the autobiography of Teresa of Ávila, the sixteenth-century Spanish Carmelite, which she read in the summer of 1921 at the house of the phenomenologist Hedwig Conrad-Martius in Bergzabern. She was baptised on 1 January 1922. For most of the next decade she taught at a school run by Dominican nuns in Speyer and studied Thomas Aquinas, the thirteenth-century Dominican theologian.

Aquinas changed where her philosophy starts. As Stein read Husserl, the world is always a world for a subject, built up in that subject's acts. She criticised him for trying to secure objectivity from inside subjectivity; she wanted to begin from being itself. Her essay for his seventieth birthday in 1929, "Husserl and Aquinas: A Comparison", calls his orientation egocentric and Aquinas's theocentric.

In 1932 she took a lectureship at the German Institute for Scientific Pedagogy in Münster, and on 19 April 1933 she was dismissed because of her Jewish descent. That month she wrote to Pope Pius XI asking him to condemn the persecution of the Jews; she received no direct answer. In October she entered the Carmelite convent in Cologne. As a Carmelite she took the name Teresa Benedicta of the Cross and wrote Finite and Eternal Being. The book works upward from finite things to an eternal being, and it answers Martin Heidegger, Husserl's successor at Freiburg, who had described being as finite. It could not be published in Germany and appeared in 1950.

At the end of 1938 she moved to the Carmelite convent at Echt in the Netherlands. In July 1942 the Dutch bishops condemned the persecution of the Jews, and the German authorities answered by arresting Catholics of Jewish descent. Stein and her sister Rosa were taken on 2 August and killed at Auschwitz-Birkenau a week later. Pope John Paul II canonised her in 1998. It is still disputed whether she died as a martyr for her faith or was murdered as a Jew.

Philosophers now return most often to her first book. Its account of empathy is ranked with Husserl's and with that of Max Scheler, whose lectures she had heard at Göttingen, and her treatises on community are discussed in current work on how groups think and act together.

Key concepts

What does Stein mean by empathy?

Empathy, for Stein, is the experience in which another person's feeling is given to us directly without becoming ours. A friend says he has lost his brother, and his pain is there in his face and voice; nobody works it out or copies it. Yet the pain is lived at first hand only by him. So empathy is neither a shared mood nor imagining oneself in his place.

What is the difference between a body and a living body?

A body is a thing in space, and a living body is a body someone feels from the inside. Stein's mark of it is that one's own body is always 'here', the zero point from which everything else is near or far, and that it is felt as well as seen. A stone held in the hand touches the body and is still no part of it. To see another's hand as feeling is to see a living body too.

How does motivation differ from causation in the mind?

Causation pushes, and motivation gives a reason. Moods and tiredness are caused: a mind lives on a limited store that Stein calls life-power, and when it runs low colours look colourless whether one likes it or not. A disappointment that kindles anger, or a recognised value that calls for an act, works differently. One experience makes the next understandable, and the person may take the reason up or refuse it. In that power to refuse Stein places freedom.

What separates a crowd, an association and a community?

The way their members stand to one another. In a crowd people are not turned toward each other at all, and a mood simply spreads among them. In an association each treats the others as objects to be studied and used for a purpose, as a demagogue works an audience. In a community people take one another as subjects and live a shared life, as when a military unit mourns its leader together.

What does Stein mean by sovereignty?

Sovereignty is a community's power to give itself its law and take none from a power above it. For Stein it is the one condition without which there is no state: a people can survive without it, as the Poles did when their state was destroyed, and a state can exist without a single people, as old Prussia did. It belongs to the state itself, never to a monarch or to the people.

What do egocentric and theocentric philosophy mean for Stein?

They name two places where a philosophy can start. An egocentric philosophy, Stein's word for Husserl's, begins with consciousness examined from within and asks how a world builds up for it. A theocentric one, that of Thomas Aquinas, begins with God as the first truth, from whom every being has what it is and what it can know. The first makes the theory of knowledge the foundation, and the second treats it as one part of a theory of being.

Themes of the Mind

Concepts that recur together across the corpus held here, gathered into themes and ordered by how much of this philosopher's writing each one occupies.

Empathy: seeing a feeling that stays another's

How does one person ever know what another feels? Stein answers that we see it, in the face and the gesture, and on that answer hangs whether anyone is shut inside their own head.

Three explanations stood in her way. One said we infer other minds by analogy with our own, a second that we imitate an expression and read off the feeling it stirs in us, and Theodor Lipps held that the spectator briefly becomes one with the acrobat he watches. Stein rejects all three. Pain in a friend's face is given directly, here and now, yet never lived at first hand: the watcher stands beside the other person and does not become him. She keeps the word empathy for that experience alone.

  • empathy
  • other minds
  • intersubjectivity
  • perception
  • emotion
  • intentionality

A self that others help to make

Could a person know herself with nobody else in the world? Not fully, Stein argues: it takes other people to show us our own body, our character, and values we did not know we lacked.

Felt from within, one's own body is never a thing among things. It is the fixed 'here' from which everything else is near or far. Only by taking up the way someone else sees us, Stein argues, do we learn to treat it as one body among many, and character works the same way: a friend may judge us more truly than we judge ourselves. Meeting people unlike us shows us values we lack. Whoever merely catches his feelings from those around him, she adds, never becomes a person in his own right.

  • embodiment
  • personhood
  • individuality
  • value theory
  • soul

What moves a mind: life-power and motives

Is a mind pushed along like a body, or does it act for reasons? Both, Stein answers, and a psychology that sees only the pushing has lost the person.

Mental life, on her account, runs under two laws at once. Moods, tiredness and freshness behave causally: a person has a limited stock of what she calls life-power, every experience spends or restores it, and to a drained mind colours look colourless and sounds flat. Thinking, valuing and deciding obey a second law, motivation, where one thing gives a reason for the next and the person may accept that reason or refuse it. A psychology modelled on physics, she concludes against Hugo Münsterberg, describes the first layer and misses the second.

  • causality
  • motivation
  • will
  • agency
  • psychology
  • vitality
  • consciousness

Crowd, association, community

What turns a number of people into a 'we'? Stein separates three ways of being together and asks which of them has a life of its own.

A crowd, in her analysis, only passes moods from one member to the next by contagion. An association is cooler: borrowing a contrast from the sociologist Ferdinand Tönnies, she describes its members as treating one another as objects for a purpose. In a community people live with one another as subjects. Such a community has a life-power of its own, made of what its members give to it, and no existence apart from them. Philosophers working today on how groups think and act together still discuss these treatises.

  • community
  • social ontology

The state, defined by sovereignty alone

Does a state need a people, a founding contract or a moral mission? Stein strips these away one by one and keeps only the power of a community to give itself its law.

Prussia under Frederick the Great was fully a state with no single Prussian people beneath it, and the Polish people outlived the Polish state: with those two cases Stein pulls state and nation apart. A state is a social body that takes its law from no power above it. It lasts only while its subjects recognise it or can be made to. The idea itself promises nothing. A given state may protect life and thought or destroy more of both than it fosters, and none has a moral right to preserve itself by fighting religion.

  • state
  • sovereignty
  • political authority

Where philosophy begins: the self or God

Must philosophy start from what a mind finds certain in itself, or from a truth it did not make? Stein's comparison of Husserl with Thomas Aquinas turns on that one choice.

Husserl and Aquinas, she argues, share more than their followers supposed. Both treat philosophy as sober work of reason, and the phenomenologists' insight into essences proves to be laborious analysis of a kind Aquinas described as reading the inside of things. They part over the starting point. Husserl seeks certainty in consciousness examined from within, so his world stays a world for a subject. Aquinas begins from God as the first truth and counts faith a second road to knowledge. Stein calls the two orientations egocentric and theocentric, and on Aquinas's verdict reason alone yields a fragment.

  • phenomenology
  • epistemology

By the numbers

works held
4
passages traced
1,183
concepts traced
916
thematic clusters
5

Concepts that travel together

The wheel takes the leading concepts of these writings and shows how often they come up together. The wider the band between two, the more passages speak of both. Among them, most often together: “consciousness” and “phenomenology”.
Concept co-occurrence, strongest first 8 concepts, joined by 18 pairings. 90 pairings reach beyond these concepts and are not drawn.
ConceptPaired conceptShared passages
consciousnessphenomenology43
empathyphenomenology35
embodimentempathy22
embodimentphenomenology20
consciousnessempathy17
emotionphenomenology16
emotionempathy13
epistemologyphenomenology12
embodimentemotion11
phenomenologyscholasticism8
consciousnessemotion6
empathyepistemology6
consciousnessembodiment5
consciousnessepistemology4
epistemologyscholasticism4
communityemotion2
communityconsciousness1
communityempathy1

The arc of a career

A cell's weight is that concept's share of the work's passages, so a column can be read downwards as well as a row across. Densest: empathy in On the Problem of Empathy, 45.4%.

Density 0% 45.4%

Concept density per work, chronological 4 works, in the order they were written. 8 concept columns, ranked by total weight. 79 further concepts fall outside the columns shown.
WorkYearphenomenologyepistemologyempathyconsciousnessembodimentscholasticismemotioncommunity
On the Problem of Empathy34.5%4.6%45.4%16.8%22.7%0%16.4%0%
Philosophy of Psychology and the Humanities9.5%1.8%2.1%10.5%1.9%0%7.3%14.7%
An Investigation Concerning the State0.4%0%0%0.4%1.1%0%0.4%8.5%
Husserl and Aquinas: A Comparison26.3%43.9%0%3.5%0%24.6%0%0%

Works held

Titles in your language, the original beneath in brackets; “lit.” marks our own translation where no English edition exists. Side chips show which full texts are held.

EARLY PHENOMENOLOGY — EMPATHY, COMMUNITY & STATE

  1. 1917 On the Problem of Empathy (Zum Problem der Einfühlung)

    Her first book and the one most read today. Everything she later wrote on persons and communities starts from the account of the living body and the other self worked out here.

    DE
  2. 1922 Philosophy of Psychology and the Humanities (Beiträge zur philosophischen Begründung der Psychologie und der Geisteswissenschaften)

    It extends the dissertation's study of the individual in two directions — inward, to the forces that drive a mind, and outward, to groups — and supplies the social categories her treatise on the state takes over.

    DE
  3. 1925 An Investigation Concerning the State (Eine Untersuchung über den Staat)

    Political theory from a phenomenologist: it takes the crowd, the association and the community distinguished in the 1922 treatises and asks which of them a state is.

    DE

THE TURN TO AQUINAS

  1. 1929 Husserl and Aquinas: A Comparison (Husserls Phänomenologie und die Philosophie des hl. Thomas v. Aquino)

    Short, and the hinge of her career: the earlier books work inside Husserl's method, and from here on her philosophy measures that method against Aquinas.

    DE
Begin a dialogue with Edith Stein

— or wander to another mind

Set two minds against each other

Each of these is a question the two of them answer differently. Choose one and they argue it out, both drawing on the texts held here.