The Slave Revolt in Morality
The values good and evil were not always ours. A warrior aristocracy called itself good as the strong and noble; the weak, unable to strike back in deed, took their revenge in imagination and inverted the scale, the event Nietzsche names the slave revolt in morality.
The first essay tells the decisive story. Nietzsche separates the noble good-and-bad, spoken from strength, from the later good-and-evil minted by ressentiment, the impotent hatred of those who can avenge themselves only by revaluing their oppressors as wicked. Meekness becomes virtue, power becomes sin, and the reversal succeeds so completely that its origin is forgotten. Answering Paul Ree's account of morality as forgotten utility, the polemic refuses to let a reader assume their own values are the natural ones, and hardens the suspicion first floated in The Dawn of Day into a history.
- morality
- resentment
- values
- social hierarchy
- human nature
- justice
- religion
Enter a dialogue
- You say no one can blame birds of prey for taking lambs, or lambs for hating them. Where, then, does the lambs' story about goodness go wrong?
- Where is the evidence that values were ever noble before the weak inverted them, rather than moral all along?
- Someone smiles, says nothing, waits and never forgets a slight. What makes such a soul 'squint', in your image, unlike that of someone who answers openly?
- Your former friend Paul Rée held that we call unselfish acts good because they were once useful, then forgot why. What does that explanation miss?
- The weak dress up powerlessness as chosen virtue, as patience and quiet waiting. How could anyone tell real forgiveness from inability to strike back?