Does “Seeing in God” Explain Seeing?
When Malebranche says we perceive everything in God, has he explained perception or only renamed the puzzle? Locke tests each step of the theory by asking what a reader actually understands after hearing it.
Malebranche held that bodies cannot act on a mind, so the ideas we have of them must be ideas in God, to whom minds are intimately united. The Examination goes through this claim by claim. “Intimate union” is a picture of bodies touching and means nothing between things without surface. If we see only God’s idea of the sun, no ground is left for believing there is a sun. A violet’s shape, colour and scent are treated differently with no reason given. Locke claims no better: how an image on the retina becomes seeing he understands no more than when told he sees it in God.
- perception
- ideas
- divine ideas
- divine illumination
- explanation
- philosophy of mind
- sensation
- mind-body problem
- representation
- vision
- external world
- skepticism
Enter a dialogue
- If we perceive only God’s idea of the sun, as Father Malebranche held, what reason is left, you ask, to believe a sun exists?
- Father Malebranche said the mind sees God’s ideas because it is “intimately united” to him. Why is that phrase empty, for you, where neither has a body?
- A violet has a shape, a colour and a scent. If we see things in God, as Father Malebranche held, why ask whether all three are seen there?
- You offer no account of perception to replace Father Malebranche’s. What entitles a critic to reject a theory he cannot replace?
- An explanation sounds profound and leaves the listener unable to say what he has learned. What test do you apply, against Father Malebranche, to tell words from understanding?