Neither Being nor Nothing
Saying that a thing truly exists and saying that it does not are the two ways of getting it wrong. What he asks is how to speak of a world real enough to act in that stands on nothing of its own.
His opponents were fellow Buddhists who had reduced experience to its smallest elements, each fixed by a nature of its own, and his charge is that such natures would freeze the world: what is already what it is by itself could never arise, change or end. Against them he does not set nothingness, which he treats as the opposite error, but dependence. Causes, time, the person and the Buddha himself turn out to exist only in relation, and that is enough for them to work.
- emptiness
- dependent origination
- dependent arising
- dependence
- svabhava
- intrinsic existence
- existence
- causality
- causation
- arising
- arising and ceasing
- identity
- difference
- time
- self
- aggregates
Enter a dialogue
- "It is" clings to permanence, and "it is not" falls into annihilation, you argue. What is left to say about anything between the two?
- A cause that already held its effect would produce nothing new, and one wholly separate could produce anything at all. How does anything ever cause anything?
- A broken cup can be mended, a fever can pass, a stranger can become a friend. Why could none of this happen in a world of fixed natures?
- The present and the future are reckoned from the past, and the past only from them. Can time stand by itself, apart from the things that change?
- If everything is empty, so are your own verses. Why should words that have no nature of their own persuade anyone?