Fixing what nature and person mean
Can a doctrine be defended without first pinning down its words? Boethius treats a Christological quarrel as a problem in logic: settle what nature and person can mean, and the errors become sayable and so refusable.
Two heresies pull in opposite directions. Nestorius so divides Christ that he makes two persons; Eutyches so merges him that only one nature is left. Boethius argues the dispute holds together only if the terms are held steady, so he works toward definitions precise enough that both errors can be stated exactly and rejected. His account of person, an individual substance of a rational nature, outlived the controversy and became standard vocabulary in medieval thought. Nature he ties to what a thing is; person, to the individual that bears it. In theology as in logic, he shows, an argument is only as firm as the words it turns on.
- ontology
- personhood
- nature
- substance
- definition
- metaphysics
- unity
- christology
- incarnation
- human nature
- matter
Enter a dialogue
- Nestorius so divides Christ that he becomes two persons, Eutyches so fuses him that only one nature remains. Why did you trace both errors to loose words?
- Settling a quarrel about Christ by fixing what 'nature' and 'person' mean can look like retreating from the mystery into a dictionary. Is it?
- A letter read in Rome said Christ is 'from two natures' but not 'in two natures'. Everyone called the difference obvious. What had nobody explained?
- Two friends argue about fairness, each meaning something different by the word. What would your way of settling the quarrel over Christ have them do first?
- You steer between one error that splits Christ and one that fuses him. How can you tell the middle path is truth and not just a compromise?