Fixing what nature and person mean
Can a doctrine be defended without first pinning down its words? Boethius treats a Christological quarrel as a problem in logic: settle what nature and person can mean, and the errors become sayable and so refusable.
Two heresies pull in opposite directions. Nestorius so divides Christ that he makes two persons; Eutyches so merges him that only one nature is left. Boethius argues the dispute holds together only if the terms are held steady, so he works toward definitions precise enough that both errors can be stated exactly and rejected. His account of person, an individual substance of a rational nature, outlived the controversy and became standard vocabulary in medieval thought. Nature he ties to what a thing is; person, to the individual that bears it. In theology as in logic, he shows, an argument is only as firm as the words it turns on.
- ontology
- personhood
- nature
- substance
- definition
- metaphysics
- unity
- christology
- incarnation
- human nature
- matter
Enter a dialogue
- Your definition of a person, an individual substance of a rational nature, still shapes how we regard one another; what does it commit us to?
- Treating a dispute about Christ as a quarrel over the meaning of two words can look like retreating from the mystery into a dictionary; is it?
- How do you draw the line between a thing's nature, what it is, and its person, the individual who bears it, when in us the two seem inseparable?
- To insist a doctrine holds only if its terms stay steady, what must a believer give up who would rather rest in mystery?
- For a person trying to say clearly what they believe and finding the words slip, what does your method offer them to steady the ground?
- You claim precise definition can make each heresy sayable and so refusable; can logic really settle a matter that faith holds to exceed reason?