Good simply by existing
How can created things be good just by being, when goodness itself is God and they plainly are not God? Boethius answers the puzzle in axioms, reasoning like a geometer.
Boethius poses the puzzle sharply: if a thing is good merely by existing, and goodness itself is God, each existing thing would seem to be God, which is absurd. Unusually for a theological piece, he lays down common notions, axioms he asks the reader to grant as in geometry, and reasons step by step. The resolution turns on a distinction. The first good is good through its own being; everything else is good by participation, good because its existence flows from that first good, and nothing without it. The method mattered as much as the answer, and Aquinas thought it worth a full commentary of his own.
- goodness
- participation
- substance
- being
- teleology
- divine simplicity
- metaphysics
- causation
- action
Enter a dialogue
- You hold that a thing is good simply by existing; what does that ask a person to see in the plain fact of their own being?
- If everything is good just by existing, the claim seems to erase the difference between a saint and a tyrant; how does your account keep them apart?
- How does being good by participation differ from being good in one's own right, the way you say only the first good is?
- To grant that a thing's goodness is wholly borrowed from its source, what must a person give up claiming as good in and of themselves?
- For someone who cannot see why a broken and struggling life is good at all, what does your argument that existence itself is good offer them?
- Building theology on axioms granted like a geometer's seems to prove only what you assumed at the start; can such a method reach anything real about God?