Testing the Trinity against logic
Which of the words we use to count and sort ordinary things can survive being said of God? Boethius takes the hardest Christian claim, three and yet one, as a problem in Aristotle's categories.
God is three yet one: Boethius asks which of Aristotle's ten categories, the basic ways we predicate anything, carry over to God and which break. Most break. The words that divide the world into separate substances do not apply, since God is utterly simple, with no parts and no inner distinction. The threeness, he argues, must be understood through relation, the one category that can distinguish Father, Son and Spirit without multiplying the divine substance into three gods. It is the most closely reasoned of his theological pieces, and the one medieval masters returned to most, for holding a mystery steady enough to examine.
- metaphysics
- categories
- logic
- relation
- divine simplicity
- predication
- substance
- essence
- trinity
Enter a dialogue
- The Father, the Son and the Spirit are three, yet not three gods. What kind of difference could separate them without dividing God into three?
- Aristotle's categories, his basic ways of describing anything, look like a pagan's grid for caging a mystery. Why apply them to the Trinity at all?
- A body has size, a place and an age. Why can none of the words we use for such things be said of a God with no parts?
- A person finds three-in-one simply unthinkable. Does testing it against logic make it clearer, or only show how far it exceeds us?
- If God is utterly simple, with no inner distinction, how can Father, Son and Spirit differ at all, even as mere relations?