The Prejudice of the Philosophers
Great systems are not disinterested inquiries but confessions, the involuntary memoir of a prejudice dressed as logic. If we cannot read our own motives and cannot be the cause of ourselves, what becomes of the philosopher's claim to truth?
Opening on philosophers themselves, Nietzsche argues that every grand metaphysics betrays the private drives of its author, so the will to truth is really a will governed by instinct and rank. He denies the free will on which moral blame rests, since to be the cause of oneself is impossible, and denies that introspection reaches our real motives. Beneath the drives he sets the will to power as the single explanatory principle. Perspectivism follows: there are no immaculate facts, only interpretations serving some form of life. The argument is offered as a prelude to a philosophy of the future.
- psychology
- subjectivity
- truth
- skepticism
- epistemology
- perspectivism
- self-deception
- instinct
- intellectual honesty
Enter a dialogue
- How might one unsettle a person convinced their opinions are pure reasoning, untouched by any private drive or prejudice?
- If every philosophy is a hidden confession, isn't your own claim just another prejudice with no better title to truth?
- Accepting that no one causes themselves, what must a person give up of pride, guilt and blame?
- How does your claim that there are only interpretations differ from saying every opinion is equally good?
- Someone believes they can see clearly into their own motives — what is really steering them underneath?