The Sceptic's Ten Arguments, Turned Against Confidence
If the same thing looks different to the sick and the well, from near and from far, under one custom or another, what can a mind trust? Philo borrows the sceptics' answer without becoming a sceptic.
At the centre of the treatise stand the ten arguments for suspending judgment that the sceptic Aenesidemus drew up in the first century BCE: the same thing looks different to different animals, to different people, to the same person sick or well, from near or far, under one custom or another. His own books are lost, and Philo's is the oldest of the three ancient accounts that preserve the list, older than the famous one in Sextus Empiricus. Philo uses it for his own end: a mind that trusts the senses and the customs it was raised in has drunk too much, and cannot tell one thing from another.
- skepticism
- epistemology
- perception
- sensory perception
- judgment
- knowledge
- ignorance
- truth
- folly
Enter a dialogue
- Someone discovers that the certainties they grew up with are only their town's customs. What should they do with that discovery?
- You use the sceptics' arguments against the senses — why don't the same arguments dissolve your own faith as well?
- The chameleon matches the ground and a dove's neck shifts hue in sunlight. If nothing looks the same twice, what can a mind trust?
- You say nothing is understood alone, only against its opposite, as little by great, just by unjust. What follows for someone who never met the opposite?