The Standard Way In
Mathematics plainly gives us certain knowledge that outruns experience — so what must our minds be like for that to be possible, and how far does the same power reach?
Written to rescue the Critique of Pure Reason from its baffled reception, the book runs the same argument in reverse: it starts from a fact nobody disputed, that mathematics and mathematical physics yield certain knowledge beyond experience, and works backward to the conditions that make it possible. The doctrine arrives cleaner — that we can know the world only as it appears under the forms our sensibility and understanding impose, so metaphysics reaching past all experience cannot be a science. An appendix answers, with controlled fury, the review that had called Kant a Berkeleyan denying matter; the book became most readers' first door into him.
- metaphysics
- epistemology
- limits of knowledge
- reason
- methodology
- certainty
- mathematics
- knowledge
- dogmatism
- skepticism
- experience
Enter a dialogue
- You start from mathematics giving certain knowledge beyond experience — but what if that certainty is just how our own definitions agree?
- It shakes me to learn I can know the world only as it appears, never as it is — how should a person live with that?
- If metaphysics reaching past all experience cannot be a science, what ambitions must a would-be metaphysician bury?
- How does knowing the world as it appears differ from the Berkeleyan idealism you were furiously accused of?
- You wrote this to be understood after the great book failed — did running the argument backwards from mathematics cost it any rigour?