The Standard Way In
Mathematics plainly gives us certain knowledge that outruns experience — so what must our minds be like for that to be possible, and how far does the same power reach?
Written to rescue the Critique of Pure Reason from its baffled reception, the book runs the same argument in reverse: it starts from a fact nobody disputed, that mathematics and mathematical physics yield certain knowledge beyond experience, and works backward to the conditions that make it possible. The doctrine arrives cleaner — that we can know the world only as it appears under the forms our sensibility and understanding impose, so metaphysics reaching past all experience cannot be a science. An appendix answers, with controlled fury, the review that had called Kant a Berkeleyan denying matter; the book became most readers' first door into him.
- metaphysics
- epistemology
- limits of knowledge
- reason
- methodology
- certainty
- mathematics
- knowledge
- dogmatism
- skepticism
- experience
Enter a dialogue
- Seven plus five looks like pure logic, yet no amount of analysing 'seven' and 'five' turns up twelve. What must the mind bring in to get there?
- In your view, 'the room is warm' speaks only for one person now. What must a claim like 'the air is elastic' add before it holds for everyone?
- A hand and its mirror image match in every measure, yet the glove of one cannot fit the other. What do you conclude from that about space?
- You insist your idealism never doubts that things exist. What exactly is only appearance, then: the things themselves or how space and time present them?