The Copernican Turn
Rather than ask how our knowledge conforms to objects, what if we ask what objects must be like to be known by minds built as ours are? The reversal Kant staked everything on.
Knowledge does not mould itself to things; things, to be known at all, must submit to the forms a mind brings to them. Kant called the inversion a revolution on Copernicus's model, and it decides the book's central question — whether metaphysics is possible — by relocating necessity and universality from the world into the knower. Synthetic a priori judgements, true and yet informative, become the thing to be explained, and the explanation is that we supply their form. Every later argument in the book is a consequence of this single move.
- metaphysics
- epistemology
- cognition
- subjectivity
- reason
- methodology
- a priori
- synthesis
- knowledge
Enter a dialogue
- You say reason must question nature like a judge who makes witnesses answer, not like a pupil. What does the judge know that the pupil does not?
- Asking for one test that sorts truth from falsehood on every subject is like milking a he-goat into a sieve. Why is that hopeless?
- A new light dawned when someone proved a fact about triangles by constructing one instead of staring at one. What did that person discover about knowing?
- Metaphysics, the study of what lies beyond experience, was once queen of the sciences and is now scorned like a forsaken matron. What went wrong?