The Copernican Turn
Rather than ask how our knowledge conforms to objects, what if we ask what objects must be like to be known by minds built as ours are? The reversal Kant staked everything on.
Knowledge does not mould itself to things; things, to be known at all, must submit to the forms a mind brings to them. Kant called the inversion a revolution on Copernicus's model, and it decides the book's central question — whether metaphysics is possible — by relocating necessity and universality from the world into the knower. Synthetic a priori judgements, true and yet informative, become the thing to be explained, and the explanation is that we supply their form. Every later argument in the book is a consequence of this single move.
- metaphysics
- epistemology
- cognition
- subjectivity
- reason
- methodology
- a priori
- synthesis
- knowledge
Enter a dialogue
- You make objects conform to the mind rather than the mind to objects — doesn't that lock us inside our own heads?
- It unsettles me that the world I know is half my own mind's doing — should that comfort or alarm a person?
- How is your Copernican reversal different from simply declaring we can never know reality at all?
- To win necessity and universal law for knowledge, what must a thinker hand back to the world of things themselves?