WorkImmanuel Kant

Inquiry Concerning the Distinctness of the Principles of Natural Theology and Morality

The essay that lost the Berlin Academy's 1763 prize to Mendelssohn: Kant's case that metaphysics must reason like Newton, not like Euclid.

by Immanuel Kant51 passages held

  • German, the original language
Original title
Untersuchung über die Deutlichkeit der Grundsätze der natürlichen Theologie und der Moral
First published
(aged 40)
Original language
German

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Overview

The Prussian Royal Academy of Sciences set its 1763 prize question sharply: can the truths of metaphysics be made as certain as those of geometry? Kant answered no, and lost. The prize went to Moses Mendelssohn; Kant's essay took the runner-up's honourable mention, and the Academy printed the two together in 1764. His answer is the more interesting for its defeat. Mathematics, Kant argues, makes its own objects — it defines a triangle, and the definition is complete — so it can build downward from definitions with perfect distinctness. Metaphysics inherits its objects already tangled in experience and must work the other way, analysing given concepts to find what is certain in them, the method he credits to Newton rather than to Euclid. The essay is the clearest pre-critical statement of a conviction that would drive everything after: that philosophy had been failing because it borrowed mathematics' method without mathematics' advantages. It closes with a few pages granting that the ultimate ground of moral obligation was, in 1764, still unfound, and nodding toward Hutcheson's moral sense as the nearest candidate — a debt to the British moralists Kant would spend the next twenty years trying to replace. Little read on its own now, the essay is mined chiefly for the seeds of the critical philosophy, and for the sight of Kant, at forty, still ranking behind Mendelssohn.

Key concepts

What does Kant mean by 'distinctness' here?

Distinctness (Deutlichkeit) is the clarity and certainty with which a concept's marks are laid out — how fully and surely a thing is known. The Berlin Academy's prize question asked whether metaphysics can reach the same distinctness as mathematics. Kant's answer is no, and turns on the different ways the two disciplines can arrive at it at all.

What two methods does Kant contrast, and why Newton not Euclid?

Mathematics works synthetically: it defines its object — a triangle — and builds downward from the definition, which is complete because it made the object. Metaphysics must work the other way, analysing concepts it is handed already tangled in experience, resolving them into their simplest certain marks. That method of analysis, Kant says, is Newton's, not the geometer's construction.

What are the 'formal' and 'material' principles of obligation?

In the essay's moral appendix Kant separates the formal supreme rule of obligation — do the most perfect thing possible — from the material principles that say which particular ends are actually good. The formal principle he can state; the material ground, what ultimately makes an end obligatory, he confesses is still unfound in 1764, resting for now on unanalysed feeling.

What role does Hutcheson's moral sense play in the essay?

It is Kant's placeholder. Having admitted that the ultimate material ground of moral obligation is not yet identified, he points to Hutcheson's moral sense — an unanalysable feeling of the good — as the nearest available candidate. It marks a debt to the British moralists that Kant would spend the next twenty years working to replace with reason alone.

Themes of the book

What this book returns to, gathered into themes and ordered by how much of the text each one occupies.

Certainty, Geometry's and Metaphysics'

Can the truths of metaphysics be made as exact as a geometer's? The Berlin Academy's prize question, answered here with a firm no and a reason that would drive everything after.

Mathematics makes its own objects — define a triangle and the definition is whole — so it builds downward from definitions with perfect distinctness. Metaphysics inherits its objects already tangled in experience and must work the other way, analysing given concepts for what is certain in them, the method Kant credits to Newton over Euclid. The essay lost the 1763 prize to Mendelssohn; its verdict, that philosophy had been failing by borrowing mathematics' method without mathematics' advantages, is the sharpest pre-critical statement of the problem the first Critique would finally resolve.

  • reason
  • necessity
  • contradiction
  • judgment
  • metaphysics
  • epistemology
  • certainty
  • mathematics

The Unfound Ground of Obligation

Where does the bindingness of a moral duty finally rest — and what if, in 1764, no philosopher including Kant could yet say?

Granting in its closing pages that the ultimate ground of moral obligation was still unfound, the essay nods toward Hutcheson's moral sense as the nearest available candidate — the British moralists' answer Kant would spend twenty years trying to replace with something firmer than feeling. It is an honest confession of a gap, not a doctrine: the certainty he could grant geometry, and even the analytic method he could grant metaphysics, he could not yet grant the command to be good. The Groundwork, two decades on, is the debt paid.

  • duty
  • moral law
  • methodology
  • conceptual analysis
  • definition
  • first principles
  • matter

Within this work

passages held
51
distinct concepts
88
by passages held, corpus-wide
#651

What this book thinks together

The wheel takes this book’s leading concepts and shows how often they come up together. The wider the band between two, the more of its passages speak of both. Among them, most often together: “epistemology” and “metaphysics”.
Concept co-occurrence, strongest first 8 concepts, joined by 24 pairings. 52 pairings reach beyond these concepts and are not drawn.
ConceptPaired conceptShared passages
epistemologymetaphysics13
certaintymetaphysics9
metaphysicsmethodology8
definitionmetaphysics7
certaintyepistemology6
first principlesmetaphysics6
conceptual analysismetaphysics5
definitionmathematics5
certaintymathematics4
definitionepistemology4
epistemologyfirst principles4
epistemologymethodology4
mathematicsmetaphysics4
certaintymethodology3
epistemologymathematics3
certaintyfirst principles2
conceptual analysisepistemology2
conceptual analysismethodology2
first principlesmathematics2
certaintyconceptual analysis1
conceptual analysisdefinition1
conceptual analysisfirst principles1
conceptual analysismathematics1
definitionmethodology1

Works held

The author's work in order, this book marked in place. Your-language title first, the original beneath it where the two differ; side chips show which full texts are held.

  1. 1764 Inquiry Concerning the Distinctness of the Principles of Natural Theology and Morality (Untersuchung über die Deutlichkeit der Grundsätze der natürlichen Theologie und der Moral) you are here DE
  2. 1764 Observations on the Feeling of the Beautiful and Sublime (Beobachtungen über das Gefühl des Schönen und Erhabenen)

    The popular essay of Kant's pre-critical years, twenty-six years before the Critique of Judgement gave taste a rigorous grounding; its remarks on race and sex now drive much of the scholarship on him.

    DE
  3. 1766 Dreams of a Spirit-Seer, Elucidated by Dreams of Metaphysics (Träume eines Geistersehers, erläutert durch Träume der Metaphysik)

    The anonymous, ironic book of 1766 in which Kant's faith in speculative metaphysics visibly collapses — the clearing of the ground that the first Critique, fifteen years later, would build on.

    DE
  4. 1781 The Critique of Pure Reason (Kritik der reinen Vernunft)

    The book at the centre of everything after it: the first of the three Critiques, revised almost past recognition for its 1787 second edition, and the work the Prolegomena was written to explain.

    DEEN
  5. 1783 Prolegomena to Any Future Metaphysics

    Written to salvage the Critique of Pure Reason after its baffled reception, this shorter 1783 restatement runs the same argument in reverse, and became most readers' first encounter with Kant.

    DEEN
  6. 1784 An Answer to the Question: What Is Enlightenment? (Beantwortung der Frage: Was ist Aufklärung?)

    The most quoted thing Kant wrote, and among the shortest: a 1784 magazine answer to a question a Berlin pastor had left hanging, and the defining slogan of the German Enlightenment.

    DE
  7. 1784 Idea for a Universal History with a Cosmopolitan Purpose (Idee zu einer allgemeinen Geschichte in weltbürgerlicher Absicht)

    The essay where Kant first treats history as more than chronicle — nine propositions arguing it has a hidden rational shape; the seed of Perpetual Peace, and a device Hegel later took over.

    DE
  8. 1785 Fundamental Principles of the Metaphysic of Morals (Grundlegung zur Metaphysik der Sitten)

    The short, deliberately preliminary book that isolates the categorical imperative before building anything on it; three years later the Critique of Practical Reason would give the same moral law its fuller grounding.

    DEEN
  9. 1786 What Does It Mean to Orient Oneself in Thinking? (Was heißt: sich im Denken orientieren?)

    An intervention in the pantheism controversy that split the German Enlightenment: written months after Mendelssohn's death, it stakes out a rational faith between dogmatic proof and Jacobi's leap.

    DE
  10. 1788 The Critique of Practical Reason (Kritik der praktischen Vernunft)

    The second of the three Critiques, and Kant's reply to those who doubted the Groundwork's freedom; it introduces the fact of reason and the postulates of God and immortality.

    DEEN
  11. 1790 Critique of Judgement

    The book the Romantics and the German Idealists built on: Kant's 1790 account of beauty and of purpose in nature, written to bridge the gulf that had opened between his first two Critiques.

    DEEN
  12. 1793 Religion within the Boundaries of Mere Reason (Die Religion innerhalb der Grenzen der bloßen Vernunft)

    The book that got Kant ordered to stop writing on religion: four essays, from 1793, rebuilding Christian doctrine on reason and consigning revelation and clergy to what Kant called counterfeit service.

    DE
  13. 1795 Perpetual Peace: A Philosophical Sketch (Zum ewigen Frieden: Ein philosophischer Entwurf)

    The late essay whose plan for a league of free states reached the twentieth century intact; Kant, past seventy, wrote it as Prussia pulled out of the war against revolutionary France.

    DE
  14. 1797 Introduction to the Doctrine of Right (Einleitung in die Rechtslehre)

    The framing section of the Doctrine of Right, the legal half of Kant's 1797 Metaphysics of Morals; it defines a right through freedom alone and ties every right to a power to coerce.

    DE
  15. 1797 The Metaphysical Elements of Ethics (Die Metaphysik der Sitten)

    Long read as a mere appendix to the Groundwork, this ethical half of the 1797 Metaphysics of Morals is where Kant spells out the duties of virtue; later Kantians recovered it as his theory of character.

    DEEN
  16. 1798 On the Power of the Mind to Master Its Morbid Feelings by Sheer Resolution (Von der Macht des Gemüts, durch den bloßen Vorsatz seiner krankhaften Gefühle Meister zu sein)

    The third part of Kant's late Conflict of the Faculties (1798), written as a reply to the physician Hufeland — a philosopher's dietetics, and his most personal page on governing the body through the mind.

    DE
  17. 1803 Lectures on Pedagogy (Über Pädagogik)

    One of the last books to appear under Kant's name (1803), though his editor Rink built it from lecture notes; the fullest record of Kant on education, and of his debt to Rousseau.

    DE
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