Reading Kant, Revising Kant
How does a system take shape before it is a system — in private notes, in the margins of the very philosophers it means to complete or destroy?
These are working notes from the Nachlass, never a book shaped for readers, and they catch Schopenhauer thinking on paper about the minds that mattered most to his own: Locke, prized for the primary-and-secondary-qualities distinction; Kant, revered and revised in equal measure; and the post-Kantian idealists Fichte, Schelling, and Hegel, whom he attacked lifelong as impostors. The engagement is the one running through everything he published — his system as the true completion of Kant — but caught raw. The workshop, not the finished front, and the wrong door for a newcomer.
- metaphysics
- epistemology
- causality
- transcendental philosophy
- categories
- understanding
- critique
- subjectivity
- intuition
- reason
- space
- time
Enter a dialogue
- Your summary of Fichte, Kant's follower, is a fairy tale: Being wants to look at itself, bears Knowing, which bears a child, the I. Is that fair?
- Kant holds that virtue means using none of life's comforts. Yet between too much and too little lies enough, not nothing. Where does his reasoning slip?
- Locke puts shape and size in things themselves, but colour and taste only in us, without saying why. Why not the reverse?
- You call Kant's account of the sublime excellent and his account of beauty false. What does he see in the one that he misses in the other?
- Kant says reason's demand for the whole chain of conditions behind everything is useful. Is it useful only as hay dangled before a donkey, forever out of reach?