A Useful Faith, and a False One
Can a belief be worth keeping for the consolation it gives the many, while being untrue in every claim it makes about the world?
Two voices argue and neither wins. Demopheles defends religion as a necessary vehicle of truth for those who could never bear metaphysics straight; Philalethes answers that a useful falsehood is still a falsehood, one that survives only by forbidding the questions that would dissolve it. Schopenhauer leaves the exchange unresolved because he thought the tension real: faith is an allegory of a truth philosophy states literally, valuable as consolation and dangerous as knowledge. Neither believer nor ordinary atheist, he held that religion clothes his own pessimism in symbol.
- theology
- morality
- human nature
- superstition
- ethics
- history
- psychology
- religion
Enter a dialogue
- A person leans on a faith that plainly consoles them — would you let them keep it, knowing you think its claims untrue?
- Your believer Demopheles and your truth-seeker Philalethes part without a winner. But if a useful falsehood is still false, hasn't Philalethes already won?
- Your defender of religion says most people can take truth only inside myth, like water in a jug. Does wanting truth pure mean breaking the jug?
- A child taught that doubt leads to hell will almost never ask whether the faith is true. Can a belief that guards itself so still serve truth?
- If all criminal laws were repealed tomorrow, you doubt religion alone would let anyone walk home safely. What, then, does religion really do for public order?