A Useful Faith, and a False One
Can a belief be worth keeping for the consolation it gives the many, while being untrue in every claim it makes about the world?
Two voices argue and neither wins. Demopheles defends religion as a necessary vehicle of truth for those who could never bear metaphysics straight; Philalethes answers that a useful falsehood is still a falsehood, one that survives only by forbidding the questions that would dissolve it. Schopenhauer leaves the exchange unresolved because he thought the tension real: faith is an allegory of a truth philosophy states literally, valuable as consolation and dangerous as knowledge. Neither believer nor ordinary atheist, he held that religion clothes his own pessimism in symbol.
- theology
- morality
- human nature
- superstition
- ethics
- history
- psychology
- religion
Enter a dialogue
- A person leans on a faith that plainly consoles them — would you let them keep it, knowing you think its claims untrue?
- You let Demopheles and Philalethes end in a draw — but if a useful falsehood is still false, hasn't Philalethes already won?
- Religion clothes a truth philosophy states plainly, you say — what is lost, and what gained, in the clothing?
- To defend a faith as consolation for the many while denying its every claim, what must an honest believer be forbidden to ask?
- Someone wants comfort and truth from the same belief — can you tell them why, on your view, they cannot have both?