Real Things and Useful Fictions
Some words name things you could in principle perceive; a vast class of others, right, obligation, power, relation, name nothing anyone could point to, yet speech cannot do without them. What is such a word, if not a lie?
Bentham draws a line between real entities, things that can in principle be perceived, a body, a pleasure, a pain, and fictitious entities, words like obligation, right, power, quality that name nothing perceivable and still cannot be dropped from language. His claim is not that such words are lies but that they are indispensable fictions. This is the surprise of the fragment: the great enemy of nonsense does not banish these words, he explains how they work. The distinction is the metaphysical root of his lifelong campaign against legal fictions, and it lets him keep the useful abstractions while refusing to treat them as names of hidden objects.
- epistemology
- causation
- language
- motion
- ontology
Enter a dialogue
- For a person who has always felt their rights are solid facts, what is left of that once you call a right a fiction?
- Isn't calling right and obligation fictions a way of quietly emptying them of the force people rely on them to have?
- How would you tell an indispensable fiction the mind cannot do without from a mere piece of nonsense that should be dropped?
- What must a person stop expecting of words like power and duty once they accept these name nothing they could point to?
- If so much of our most serious speech names nothing perceivable, why does it not collapse into confusion?