Real Things and Useful Fictions
Some words name things you could in principle perceive; a vast class of others, right, obligation, power, relation, name nothing anyone could point to, yet speech cannot do without them. What is such a word, if not a lie?
Bentham draws a line between real entities, things that can in principle be perceived, a body, a pleasure, a pain, and fictitious entities, words like obligation, right, power, quality that name nothing perceivable and still cannot be dropped from language. His claim is not that such words are lies but that they are indispensable fictions. This is the surprise of the fragment: the great enemy of nonsense does not banish these words, he explains how they work. The distinction is the metaphysical root of his lifelong campaign against legal fictions, and it lets him keep the useful abstractions while refusing to treat them as names of hidden objects.
- epistemology
- causation
- language
- motion
- ontology
Enter a dialogue
- Someone claims a horned Devil lives at a numbered house on a certain street. Why is that a nonentity, but a word like 'power' an indispensable fiction?
- If so much of our most serious speech names nothing perceivable, why does it not collapse into confusion?
- You say calling a body 'at rest' treats rest as a stake and the body as a beast tied to it. Why must plain speech pretend so?
- Talking at all needs fictions, 'the coin of necessity', yet priests' and lawyers' fictions serve ambition. What separates the two?
- Words that name nothing, such as 'necessity', have led to persecution and murder. How can an empty word do such real harm?