Hear Everything, Weigh Everything
No relevant evidence should ever be shut out. Every rule that bars a whole class of testimony in advance throws away information a truth-seeker would want, and courts had built such rules by the dozen.
The central claim runs against the whole grain of English law. Where the courts had erected elaborate rules barring entire classes of testimony, interested parties, spouses, the irreligious, confidential communications, Bentham holds that every such exclusion discards information a person seeking the truth would want. A court that refuses to hear is a court that has decided, before the fact, to know less. The principle is the free admission of proof: relevance, not a standing rule, decides what reaches the tribunal. It is Bentham's own compressed statement of an argument the young J.S. Mill drew from his manuscripts into the five-volume Rationale of Judicial Evidence of 1827.
- evidence
- legal theory
- epistemology
- utility
- justice
Enter a dialogue
- When a person is barred from testifying for their own spouse, by what right does a court refuse what they know?
- Isn't there wisdom in refusing certain testimony outright, since some sources are so tainted that hearing them only misleads?
- How would you tell a rule that protects the truth from one that merely spares the court the trouble of judging?
- What certainty must a legal system give up to admit that relevance alone, not any fixed rule, decides what it hears?
- If exclusion always throws away truth, why did centuries of careful lawyers build these rules in the first place?