WorkJeremy Bentham

An Introductory View of the Rationale of Evidence

The brief version of Bentham's war on the rules of evidence — no relevant testimony should ever be shut out — whose vast original the young J.S. Mill edited.

by Jeremy Bentham579 passages held

  • English, the original language, and your language
First published
(published posthumously)
Original language
English

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Overview

Behind this short work stands a huge one. Bentham had filled masses of manuscript with a theory of legal evidence, and in the 1820s he handed the heap to a young disciple, John Stuart Mill, then barely into his twenties, who cut and shaped it into the five-volume Rationale of Judicial Evidence of 1827. An Introductory View of the Rationale of Evidence is Bentham's own compressed statement of the same argument — the doctrine in brief, without the bulk. Its central claim runs against the whole grain of English law: that no relevant evidence should ever be shut out. Where the courts had built up elaborate rules barring whole classes of testimony — interested parties, spouses, the irreligious, confidential communications — Bentham held that every such exclusion throws away information a truth-seeker would want, and that evidence ought to be weighed for what it is worth, not silenced in advance by a rule. Better to hear a doubtful witness and discount him than to refuse to hear him at all. Like most of his work it was printed in full only in the posthumous Works. The argument had consequences: across the nineteenth century the exclusionary rules he attacked were steadily dismantled — the parties to a case, once forbidden to testify, were in the end allowed to — and modern evidence law, with its bias toward admitting whatever is relevant, took much of the shape he had argued for.

Key concepts

What is the central claim of the work?

That no relevant evidence should ever be shut out. The claim runs against the whole grain of English law, which had built elaborate rules barring whole classes of testimony. Bentham holds that every such exclusion throws away information a truth-seeker would want, and that evidence ought to be weighed for what it is worth, not silenced in advance by a rule fixed before the case is heard.

What exclusionary rules was Bentham attacking?

The courts had barred whole categories of witness: interested parties to a case, spouses, the irreligious, and confidential communications, among others. Each rule refused a source of testimony wholesale, regardless of what it might reveal in the particular case. Bentham's target was this categorical barring itself, the practice of deciding in advance that some evidence would not be heard at all, whatever its value.

What was John Stuart Mill's role in the larger work?

Behind this short book stands a huge one. Bentham had filled masses of manuscript with a theory of legal evidence, and in the 1820s he handed the heap to the young Mill, then barely into his twenties, who cut and shaped it into the five-volume Rationale of Judicial Evidence of 1827. This Introductory View is Bentham's own compressed statement of the same argument, the doctrine in brief without the bulk.

What effect did the argument eventually have?

It had real consequences. Across the nineteenth century the exclusionary rules Bentham attacked were steadily dismantled; the parties to a case, once forbidden to testify, were in the end allowed to. Modern evidence law, with its bias toward admitting whatever is relevant, took much of the shape he had argued for, though like most of his work the book itself was printed in full only in the posthumous Works.

Themes of the book

What this book returns to, gathered into themes and ordered by how much of the text each one occupies.

Hear Everything, Weigh Everything

No relevant evidence should ever be shut out. Every rule that bars a whole class of testimony in advance throws away information a truth-seeker would want, and courts had built such rules by the dozen.

The central claim runs against the whole grain of English law. Where the courts had erected elaborate rules barring entire classes of testimony, interested parties, spouses, the irreligious, confidential communications, Bentham holds that every such exclusion discards information a person seeking the truth would want. A court that refuses to hear is a court that has decided, before the fact, to know less. The principle is the free admission of proof: relevance, not a standing rule, decides what reaches the tribunal. It is Bentham's own compressed statement of an argument the young J.S. Mill drew from his manuscripts into the five-volume Rationale of Judicial Evidence of 1827.

  • evidence
  • legal theory
  • epistemology
  • utility
  • justice

Discount, Don't Exclude

Better to hear a doubtful witness and weigh him low than to refuse to hear him at all. The remedy for unreliable testimony is judgement of its worth, not silence imposed in advance.

If no rule should bar testimony, the tribunal needs another way to handle the untrustworthy, and Bentham supplies it: hear the doubtful witness, then discount him for what he is worth. A witness's interest, his character, his motive, become reasons to weigh his word carefully rather than grounds to gag him. This trusts the tribunal to reason about evidence instead of hiding behind categorical bars, and it treats reliability as a matter of degree, weighed case by case. Across the nineteenth century the exclusionary rules he attacked were steadily dismantled, and modern evidence law, biased toward admitting whatever is relevant, took much of the shape he argued for.

  • evidence
  • epistemology
  • legal theory
  • motive
  • moral psychology

Within this work

passages held
579
distinct concepts
714
by passages held, corpus-wide
#51

What this book thinks together

Every arc around the wheel is one concept in this book. A ribbon joins two the text reaches for together, and its width is how many of its passages hold both. Strongest: epistemology with evidence.
Concept co-occurrence, strongest first 8 concepts, joined by 15 pairings. 122 shared passages in all. 85 weaker pairings reach beyond these concepts and are not drawn.
ConceptPaired conceptShared passages
epistemologyevidence16
punishmentutility15
legislationpunishment13
evidencelegal theory11
jurisprudencelegal theory9
ethicslegislation8
jurisprudencelegislation8
epistemologylegal theory7
legislationutility7
legal theoryutility6
ethicsjurisprudence5
legal theorypunishment5
ethicspunishment4
evidencejurisprudence4
legal theorylegislation4

Works held

The author's work in order, this book marked in place. Your-language title first, the original beneath it where the two differ; side chips show which full texts are held.

  1. 1838 A Fragment on Government

    Bentham's first published book, carved out of a larger unfinished attack on Blackstone; the 1776 debut that brought him to the notice of reformers and set the course of everything he wrote after.

    EN
  2. 1838 An Introduction to the Principles of Morals and Legislation

    The theoretical foundation under all of Bentham's legislative projects, printed in 1780 but withheld until 1789; the penal code it was written to introduce was never completed, and the book outgrew the code it served.

    EN
  3. 1838 Essay on the Influence of Time and Place in Matters of Legislation

    An early essay, written about 1782 and left unpublished, testing his science of legislation against the hard case of colonial Bengal; it reached readers first through Dumont's French edition and only later in English.

    EN
  4. 1838 Essay on the Promulgation of Laws and the Reasons Thereof

    Transmitted to print through Dumont like his other early legislative writing, this short piece insists that publishing a law — together with its reasons — is a condition of its authority rather than a favour to the governed.

    EN
  5. 1838 Principles of Penal Law

    One half of the penal–civil pairing at the core of Bentham's science of legislation; assembled and published in French by Étienne Dumont in 1802, and reaching English readers only through later retranslation from the French.

    EN
  6. 1838 Principles of the Civil Code

    The source of Bentham's doctrine that security of expectation outranks the other ends of law, and the civil-law counterpart to his penal theory; published in French by Dumont in 1802 and carried into English only by later retranslation.

    EN
  7. 1839 A Protest Against Law-Taxes

    A short pamphlet provoked by the Irish budget of 1793 — printed that year, published in 1795, extended in 1816 — and one of the political-economy tracts in which Bentham argued that taxing legal proceedings shuts the poor out of the courts.

    EN
  8. 1839 Anarchical Fallacies

    The work in which Bentham's utilitarianism turns to demolish the doctrine of natural, imprescriptible rights; written in the 1790s against the French revolutionary declarations and first published, in French, by Dumont in 1816.

    EN
  9. 1839 Leading Principles of a Constitutional Code for Any State

    A short 1823 statement, published in The Pamphleteer, of the principles behind Bentham's unfinished Constitutional Code; the clearest brief version of the representative democracy his final years argued for.

    EN
  10. 1839 Principles of International Law

    A work his own century treated as utopian: four essays from the late 1780s, printed only after Bentham's death, in which he coined the term "international" and set out an early plan for perpetual peace.

    EN
  11. 1839 Principles of Judicial Procedure with the Outlines of a Procedure Code

    Bentham's theory of how courts should operate, drawn from manuscripts he worked on for over thirty years and published only posthumously; his fullest case against legal technicality and the exclusion of evidence.

    EN
  12. 1839 Tax with Monopoly

    A minor scheme from Bentham's 1794 review of possible taxes, proposing to soften a tax by pairing it with a monopoly; unpublished in his lifetime, like almost all of his political economy.

    EN
  13. 1839 The Book of Fallacies

    Bentham's satirical catalogue of the fallacies used to resist reform, edited from his manuscripts and published in English in 1824 after Dumont's French version of 1816; the most quotable and least systematic of his major works.

    EN
  14. 1840 A Commentary on Mr Humphreys' Real Property Code

    A late sign of Bentham's codifying cause gaining ground: his 1826 Westminster Review response to James Humphreys' proposal to codify English real-property law, welcoming it while pressing it further.

    EN
  15. 1840 A Manual of Political Economy

    Bentham's principal treatise on political economy, written in the 1790s, first printed in the collected Works of 1843, and given an authoritative edition by Werner Stark in the 1950s; the source of his "be quiet" rule for the state.

    EN
  16. 1840 Bentham's Draught for the Organization of Judicial Establishments Compared with the National Assembly

    A rival judicial blueprint Bentham drew up in 1790 against the French Assembly's own reform draft and sent unbidden to Paris; an early mark of his turn toward democracy, and left unfinished.

    EN
  17. 1840 Codification Proposal

    The 1822 pamphlet in which the ageing Bentham offered his services as codifier to any liberal government; it opens his "legislator of the world" years and points toward the unfinished Constitutional Code.

    EN
  18. 1840 Emancipate Your Colonies

    An early argument for shedding colonies that his own age passed over: written in 1793 for the French National Convention, held back while Britain and France were at war, and printed only in 1830.

    EN
  19. 1840 Nomography or the Art of Inditing Laws

    A late unfinished fragment, printed in the posthumous Works, on the craft of drafting legislation — Bentham's catalogue of the faults of legal style and their cures, with an appendix on his own methods.

    EN
  20. 1840 Pannomial Fragments

    The unbuilt goal of Bentham's whole legislative project: fragments, published posthumously, toward the foundations of his Pannomion — the single complete code he projected for decades and never finished.

    EN
  21. 1840 Papers Relative to Codification and Public Instruction

    A collection of Bentham's 1811–15 correspondence with American and Russian authorities, published in 1817; the working papers behind his later Codification Proposal and among the beginnings of the Constitutional Code.

    EN
  22. 1840 Swear Not at All

    Part of Bentham's late assault on the Anglican establishment: an 1817 tract against the swearing of oaths, above all the religious subscription forced on students at Oxford and Cambridge.

    EN
  23. 1841 A Fragment on Ontology

    One of three linked fragments on logic, language and metaphysics that Bentham wrote around 1813–15 and never published; the metaphysical root of his theory of legal fictions and the home of his method of paraphrasis.

    EN
  24. 1841 An Introductory View of the Rationale of Evidence you are here EN
  25. 1841 Essay on Language

    Written around 1813–16 with his essays on logic and ontology and unpublished until the posthumous Works; Bentham's attempt at a universal grammar, built on the claim that the sentence, not the word, is the true unit of meaning.

    EN
  26. 1841 Essay on Logic

    One of the linked essays of the mid-1810s, printed only after his death; here Bentham recasts logic as the art of thinking toward a purpose, and it lays bare the classifying method underlying his whole system.

    EN
  27. 1841 Securities Against Misrule Adapted to a Mahommedan State

    Constitutional writings Bentham produced in 1822 for Tripoli, at a Tripolitan reformer's request, adapting his checks on misrule — above all a free press and public opinion — to a Muslim state; printed only after his death.

    EN
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