Restraining a Ruler Without a Vote
What can hold a ruler in check where you cannot yet have an elected assembly to do it? Bentham designs for a country with no representative tradition, and none, he assumes, arriving soon.
Most of Bentham's constitutional schemes were built for Europe or the Americas; this one he built for a Muslim state on the Barbary coast, after the young Tripolitan reformer Hassuna D'Ghies sought him out in London in 1822. The question that gives the work its title is what secures a people against misrule when the obvious instrument, a representative assembly, is not available. His wager is that the machinery of accountable government does not depend on the vote alone and can be carried across any culture that will take it, provided it is fitted to that culture's customs and religion rather than dropped on it like a borrowed constitution.
- corruption
- education
- political power
- accountability
- oppression
Enter a dialogue
- The ruler of Tripoli would himself gain from checks on his power, since his own life is always in danger. Why would a despot accept them?
- For someone living under a ruler no election can remove, what short of a vote could ever hold that power in check?
- All a ruler can grant is promises, and the only penalty for breaking one is notoriety. Why is that enough to hold him?
- When someone is jailed, you would post the name and the charge on the court door for all to read. What abuse does that prevent?
- Isn't it overreach to design checks on power for a country you have never seen, and never will, whatever its culture?