Restraining a Ruler Without a Vote
What can hold a ruler in check where you cannot yet have an elected assembly to do it? Bentham designs for a country with no representative tradition, and none, he assumes, arriving soon.
Most of Bentham's constitutional schemes were built for Europe or the Americas; this one he built for a Muslim state on the Barbary coast, after the young Tripolitan reformer Hassuna D'Ghies sought him out in London in 1822. The question that gives the work its title is what secures a people against misrule when the obvious instrument, a representative assembly, is not available. His wager is that the machinery of accountable government does not depend on the vote alone and can be carried across any culture that will take it, provided it is fitted to that culture's customs and religion rather than dropped on it like a borrowed constitution.
- security
- power
- corruption
- authority
- education
Enter a dialogue
- For someone living under a ruler no election can remove, what short of a vote could ever hold that power in check?
- Isn't designing checks on power for a country you have never seen, and never will, the same overreach whatever its culture?
- How would you tell a genuine adaptation to a people's customs from a European scheme merely dressed in local clothes?
- What must a reformer give up believing to design for a country that may never adopt an elected assembly at all?
- Can the machinery of accountable government really cross any culture, or does that faith carry your own age's assumptions inside it?