Punishment as an evil to be minimized
If punishment is itself pain deliberately inflicted, when may a state ever impose it? Bentham's answer is narrow: only where it heads off a greater pain, and never otherwise.
Punishment is an evil in itself, pain deliberately inflicted, and so it needs a justification the crime alone cannot give. A legislator may impose it only to prevent some greater pain, and never where it would be groundless, needless, unprofitable, or simply unable to work. That single test rules out whole classes of punishing that an unreflective code hands down. Where suffering would buy nothing, inflicting it is not justice but cruelty wearing the robes of law. The rest of the theory follows from treating penalty as a cost to be justified, not a debt to be paid.
- utility
- justice
- legal reform
- legal theory
- criminal justice
- capital punishment
Enter a dialogue
- A man's sentence makes his innocent family suffer too, punishment overflowing onto the guiltless. Why should a judge count that suffering when passing sentence?
- Calling punishment an evil in itself sounds humane, but doesn't it rob a wronged victim of the plain justice of seeing the guilty suffer?
- A physician claimed a powder on a wounded man's blood healed him from afar. What does that quackery share with punishing one man for another's crime?
- Before any sentence is served, the offender's dread of it is already a real suffering. Why does fear of punishment belong among what punishment costs?
- A very small child or a raving madman breaks the law. Why did you say punishing them adds suffering, since no threat could have deterred them?