Punishment as an evil to be minimized
If punishment is itself pain deliberately inflicted, when may a state ever impose it? Bentham's answer is narrow: only where it heads off a greater pain, and never otherwise.
Punishment is an evil in itself, pain deliberately inflicted, and so it needs a justification the crime alone cannot give. A legislator may impose it only to prevent some greater pain, and never where it would be groundless, needless, unprofitable, or simply unable to work. That single test rules out whole classes of punishing that an unreflective code hands down. Where suffering would buy nothing, inflicting it is not justice but cruelty wearing the robes of law. The rest of the theory follows from treating penalty as a cost to be justified, not a debt to be paid.
- utility
- justice
- legal reform
- legal theory
- criminal justice
- capital punishment
Enter a dialogue
- Someone wants a cruel act punished as harshly as possible out of anger; how would you cool that wish with your test?
- Calling punishment an evil in itself sounds humane, but doesn't it rob a wronged victim of the plain justice of seeing the guilty suffer?
- How do you tell punishment that prevents a greater harm from punishment that merely satisfies a desire to see pain repaid?
- To treat every penalty as a cost needing justification, what satisfaction must a society give up in dealing with those who wrong it?
- A judge faces a crime that horrifies everyone but where punishing would change nothing; what does your rule ask of them?