An I That Makes Itself
Can anything be certain before we know a single thing about the world? Fichte answers that one thing is: the act by which the I sets itself up as an I.
Every judgement, even 'A is A', presupposes someone who judges, and Fichte follows it back to that someone. The I is not a thing that later becomes aware of itself; it exists only in positing itself, at once the one acting and the product of the action. Such an act cannot be proved, only performed and noticed. Going beyond 'I am', he warns, leads straight to Spinoza's single all-embracing substance, in which no free self survives.
- self-consciousness
- activity
- agency
- subjectivity
- self-determination
- freedom
- reflection
- philosophical method
Enter a dialogue
- Most people, you write, would sooner take themselves for a piece of lava on the moon than for an I. What is so hard about being an I?
- Your book begins not with a fact but with a deed: the I becomes what it is by positing itself. Why must philosophy start with an act?
- "A is A" looks like the emptiest truth there is. How do you get from that bare rule of logic to the claim that the I simply is?
- You call the I at once the one acting and the product of the action. Is there nobody doing the positing before the act takes place?
- Someone says "I am" without a second thought. What, according to this book, have they already done in saying it?