Knowing and the Absolute
Can knowledge ever reach what lies beyond knowledge? Fichte now starts from knowing itself and finds that even at its highest it stops short.
No longer beginning with the I, Fichte asks what absolute knowing is, and answers at once that it cannot be the Absolute: the word 'knowing' already qualifies it. The Absolute is neither knowing nor being, nor their identity, nor their indifference, the term Schelling had just put at the centre of his system, and Fichte calls such an indifference a unity asserted, never shown. Knowing, at its core, is a seeing that sees through itself, one point rather than two terms joined by a line, and it knows being only indirectly.
- absolute knowledge
- absolute being
- absolute
- being
- knowledge
- epistemology
- intellectual intuition
- intuition
- thought
- unity
- reflection
- idealism
- transcendental idealism
- self-consciousness
- philosophical method
- synthesis
Enter a dialogue
- The Absolute, you write, is neither knowing nor being, nor their identity, nor their indifference. What is left to say about it at all?
- Even absolute knowing, you argue, cannot be the Absolute, because the word "knowing" already limits it. Why can knowledge never reach what it is about?
- Calling the Absolute the "indifference" of knowing and being looks like the natural way to unite them. Why do you dismiss it as a unity nobody can demonstrate?
- Someone asks what they really know and finds every answer is, again, only their own knowing. Is that a dead end, on your account, or the way in?