Catching Yourself Thinking
How do we know that we are the ones thinking? The 1797 chapter argues that no amount of looking back could ever teach us.
Fichte addresses the reader directly: think of your table or your wall, and the one thinking and the thing thought are two; think of yourself, and they are one. Thinking, he tells the reader, is a doing. But if self-awareness came only from looking back on oneself, every look would need a further self to be aware of it, without end. So it must be there already, immediately, in every act of thinking, whether the object is a wall or oneself.
- self-consciousness
- consciousness
- thinking
- activity
- self-positing
- subject-object
- subject-object relation
- reflection
- intuition
- agency
- freedom
Enter a dialogue
- The reader of your 1797 chapter is asked to think of a table or wall, and then of themselves. Why is the second thought different in kind?
- If we became aware of ourselves only by looking back, each look would need a further self to notice it, forever. How do you stop that regress?
- Self-awareness, you argue, is not produced by reflection but is already present, immediate, in every thought. What would a mind without it even be?
- Someone is lost in their work and never once thinks "I". Were they aware of themselves all the same, on the account of your 1797 chapter?
- "Your thinking is an acting," you tell the reader of your 1797 chapter. What makes a thought a deed rather than something that merely happens to us?