From a Limit to a World
How does a mind that only meets a boundary end up seeing coloured things laid out in space? Fichte reconstructs the steps instead of taking them from the senses.
The Foundation had left the I simply limited by a Not-I; the Outline asks how that limit shows up in experience. Fichte answers in strict steps. A sensation needs an I that is active and passive at once, and an activity that reaches beyond the limit. Intuition then gives what is felt a definite image, and what is intuited is set out in time, its object in space. Bitter, sweet and red belong to feeling alone, so for knowledge things differ only by the space they fill.
- sensation
- intuition
- space
- imagination
- perception
- representation
- ideal activity
- spontaneity
- passivity
- limitation
- reflection
- synthesis
- objectivity
- subjectivity
- necessity
- contingency
- transcendental idealism
- self-consciousness
- subject-object relation
Enter a dialogue
- Where the Foundation left the I merely limited, this sequel asks how a bare limit becomes something we feel. Why must sensation come first?
- Sensation, you argue, needs an I that is active and passive at once. How can anyone both undergo an impression and produce it?
- Bitter or sweet, you say, belong to feeling, so for knowledge things differ only by the space they fill. Why does space tell them apart?
- Space and time are deduced here step by step, not taken from the senses. Can a chain of reasoning really show that the world must be spread out?
- Someone looks at a red apple, assuming the redness simply arrives from outside. What has their own mind already done, on your account, before they see it?