A ministry dismissed because the King disliked it
May a King put out ministers who hold the confidence of the Commons? Not, the address answers, with the constitution left standing: a ministry that survives by royal favour is answerable to the favour, and the House it sits before has no hold on it at all.
Ministers who commanded a majority went out; a minister who commanded none came in. Burke's address sets the sequence down as a constitutional charge rather than a party grievance, because dismissal at pleasure empties confidence of meaning — approval that cannot keep a government in office is a compliment, not a power. Do it once and it can be done always. Windham seconded the motion on 14 June 1784, the House sat through two hours of it with open impatience, and rejected it without troubling to divide.
- royal prerogative
- executive power
- ministerial power
- executive accountability
- parliamentary sovereignty
- parliamentary privilege
- political influence
- political corruption
- impunity
Enter a dialogue
- The King's right to choose his own ministers is as old as the Crown. Why does exercising it become a constitutional charge rather than a party grievance?
- How should a person act inside an institution whose approval decides nothing, once they see that its confidence can be overridden at pleasure?
- What tells a royal preference apart from a constitutional judgement, when both end with ministers going out and the King choosing who follows?
- Pressing a charge the House heard with open impatience and rejected without dividing took two hours and a reputation. Was the record worth that?