A ministry dismissed because the King disliked it
May a King put out ministers who hold the confidence of the Commons? Not, the address answers, with the constitution left standing: a ministry that survives by royal favour is answerable to the favour, and the House it sits before has no hold on it at all.
Ministers who commanded a majority went out; a minister who commanded none came in. Burke's address sets the sequence down as a constitutional charge rather than a party grievance, because dismissal at pleasure empties confidence of meaning — approval that cannot keep a government in office is a compliment, not a power. Do it once and it can be done always. Windham seconded the motion on 14 June 1784, the House sat through two hours of it with open impatience, and rejected it without troubling to divide.
- royal prerogative
- executive power
- ministerial power
- executive accountability
- parliamentary sovereignty
- parliamentary privilege
- political influence
- political corruption
- impunity
Enter a dialogue
- The King's right to choose his own ministers is as old as the Crown. Why does exercising it become a constitutional charge rather than a party grievance?
- You have the Commons claim two roles toward the King: a council to advise him and an accuser of his servants. Why does it need both?
- The ministers fell over a bill on India. Why did you insist the East India Company's territories were never part of the King's own powers?
- A 'prerogative party', ready to be used against the Commons, is something you warn against. Why is a party built around the King's favour so dangerous?
- You say the Commons has no rule that could keep it safe from the Crown's resentment, even by obeying ministers. Why does unpredictable displeasure make a legislature unfree?